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Introduction to the Special Issues: 
Peacebuilding, Reconciliation, and Transformation 
 
Edited by 
Jessica Senehi, Stephen Ryan and Sean Byrne 
 
Abstract 
This introductory article in the special issue on Peacebuilding, Reconciliation, and 
Transformation highlights some of the central themes within the emergent field of Peace 
and Conflict Studies (PACS). The article discusses how this transdisciplinary field 
contributes to our understanding of some of the key issues that confront the PACS field in 
terms of analysis, theory building, and praxis. The contributors to this special issue 
provide a broad array of perspectives that explores conflicts and its transformation from 
a multidimensional perspective. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The EU–Canada Conflict Analysis and Resolution Program: A Cross-Cultural, 
Transdisciplinary Experiment in Peacemaking and Peacebuilding is a highly innovative 
and interdisciplinary project, which commenced on October 1, 2007, that will end on 
September 30, 2010. The program addresses six themes, each intellectually challenging 
and vitally important to European Union (EU) and Canadian citizens. It explores conflicts 
in the EU and Canada related to family and community, business, the environment, 
gender, ethnicity and foreign policy. The latter theme also opens up possibilities for 
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participants to learn about the actions and attitudes of both regions towards conflict in 
other parts of the world.  
In the course of examining these themes, the Program’s student participants have 
contended with an array of complicating factors. For example, quite apart from skills and 
training, one’s language, experiences and world view all influence how one perceives and 
reacts to conflict. The Program participants had the unique opportunity to experience and 
learn to contend with these cultural challenges. Within the EU-Canada context, issues of 
race, ethnicity, class, and gender are often addition complicating factors. Thus, student 
participants in the Program explored these differing attitudes, assumptions, values, and 
approaches that characterize negotiation within the different EU-Canadian cultures and 
postulated ways to deal effectively with cultural differences. 
   The objectives of this project was to create a student-exchange program aimed at 
creating citizens of the EU and Canada equipped to assess and handle conflict skillfully, 
peacefully and effectively. The primary field of study and training was Conflict 
Resolution and Peacebuilding, however the program also dealt with senior undergraduate 
and graduate students in a wide variety of disciplines including Social Sciences, Political 
Science, Sociology, Economics, Psychology, Social Work, International Relations, 
Performing Arts, Environmental Science, Languages, Law, Communication, Journalism 
and Business Studies among others.  
Participants included 36 undergraduate seniors and graduate students: 18 each 
from Canada and the EU, and 6 per university have participated in the student mobility 
experience. Students participated in one semester (approximately four months abroad). 
The Consortium included the following institutions: in the EU, (1) the University of 
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Ulster (United Kingdom), (2) the University of Ljubljana (Slovenia), and (3) the Irish 
School of Ecumenics–Trinity College Dublin (Republic of Ireland); and, in Canada, (1) 
the University of Manitoba (Manitoba), (2) Conrad Grebel University College–University 
of Waterloo (Ontario), and (3) Saint Paul University (Ontario). This special issue of the 
Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies arises from the many conversations we have had 
over the past three years on cutting edge issues in the field. The following article 
discusses a number of these issues while the contributors to this special issue outline the 
ideas in more detail in their individual essays. 
 
Social Justice and Peacemaking 
 
Gandhi (1992) believed that peace begins internally within the self. One can only 
search for the truth (satyagraha) non-violently (ahimsa) by breaking out of the cycle of 
one’s oppression. Gandhi sought to empower the individual and to provide a sense of 
hope to get a commitment to non-violent action based on ahimsa, or truth, in the external 
world (Burrowes, 1996). Every individual has a personal responsibility and a duty to 
contribute to world peace, or to “be” the peace they wish to see. People can make a 
decision to forge transformative change within society (Barash and Webel, 2002). We 
can imagine and believe in the possibility of peace by reprogramming the mind to a new 
way of thinking and by developing a paradigm of “power with” rather than “power over” 
(Boulding, 1990b, 2000). Can we rebuild our world by thinking globally and acting 
locally? Positive peace or social justice can be built upon peace education and structural 
change (Brock-Utne, 1985; Byrne, 1997).  
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Thus, peacemaking and social justice is an interdisciplinary inquiry, which 
addresses the issues of peace and war, violence, and nonviolence in contemporary world 
society (Jeong, 2008). It addresses, in particular, three main questions: (1) What are the 
roots and sources of destructive conflicts, and can they be prevented and, if so, in what 
circumstances? (2) What is peace, and what are the means of achieving peace, social 
justice,  and peaceful change? And (3) what means are there of transforming violent 
structures into peaceful structures?  
Thus, there is a need to provide a more in-depth understanding of peacemaking 
and peacebuilding strategies within different arenas in the world context. For example, it 
is necessary to focus on the realist “power-over” model and the origins or prevention 
(e.g., deterrence) of war, the social milieu in which a number of military strategists 
functioned, and how that environment influenced the tactics, operations, strategies, 
leadership, and political processes that were most crucial in their decision to use threats 
or applications of force as a conflict management mechanism (Burrowes, 1996). It is 
important to understand the dynamics and factors that contribute to war if we are to 
comprehend and, instead, promote the waging of peace (Enloe, 2001). In other words, 
peace is not the antitheses of war because both elements co-exist on a continuum that is 
constantly impacted by a number of socio-economic, cultural, psychological, and 
political factors that influence what strategy will be adopted as  peacemaking and 
peacebuilding instruments (Boulding, 1990b).  
The conflict intervener needs to know about power relations and the origins of 
war if she or he is to develop analytical tools to successfully intervene in conflict 
situations. Consequently, HoWon Jeong (2010) poses a number of important questions: 
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How does one see the future? Must one accept the realist counsel that trends are destiny, 
that is, trends in physical, structural, ecological and cultural violence? What makes more 
sense, fatalistically accepting the future as a fixed path, or the engagement of active 
citizenship in proactive responses in peacemaking and peacebuilding? Alternatives to 
violence and ecologically unsustainable forms of development must be explored if we are 
to empower people to change their world (Jeong, 2005). 
Consequently, every religious tradition conveys its own distinctive resources for 
peacemaking, social justice, and human rights advocacy and also for applications of force 
as in “just war” theory (Abu-Nimer, 2003; Kaldor, 2007). While no single religious 
tradition or cultural institution has ever demonstrated adequate competence or proficiency 
with regard to its own chronic conflicts and inhumanity (Appleby, 2000; Gopin, 2000), 
collectively these wisdom traditions (some would call them hokum) convey an invaluable 
supplement to each other’s (and secular society’s) peacemaking, social justice, and 
human rights resources (Sampson and Lederach, 2000; Smock, 1995, 2002).  
Interdependence is a means of conflict prevention—but as the latest world 
economic woes have shown—also grounds for increased tension and resentment. 
Political, economic, and environmental problems increasingly cross geographical 
boundaries and require international cooperation, rather than competition, to be resolved 
(Homer-Dixon, 2009). Identity factors, while a source of great strength inside 
communities, are also often an obstacle to the achievement of inter-communal peace 
(Byrne, 2001b). We need to understand the various theoretical approaches to the 
conceptualisation of ethnicity, nationalism, and identity, and to ask if and, if so, under 
what circumstances, identity-based politics poses a threat to peace; the findings are mixed 
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(Irvin, 1999; O’Leary and McGarry, 1993). If this is the case, then can the PACS field 
offer a serious alternative?  
Further, as Alice Ackerman (200b) succinctly argues we need to look at the role 
of the media and information transmission in society, in both peace and war, and their 
relationship to governments and public opinion. There is a need to know whether or not 
the media (in its various forms) promotes an objective view of peace (Strobel, 2001). 
Important here is the concept of ‘peace journalism’ (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2005). We 
also need to look at the changing nature and role of the media within contemporary 
society (Ackerman 2000b). For example, symbols are important in peace and in war, and 
they can be used as weapons in the pursuit of both (Ackerman, 2000b). Third-party 
interveners need to understand the invention, adoption, and use of symbols, whether 
signage, territory, people, or events, and assess their impact in relation to specific 
conflicts (Schirch, 2004). How do symbols adopt an intrinsic (political) worth of their 
own and how have they been modified across time? Moreover, media people need more 
training in the precursors, roots, and remedies of conflict as well as exploring the role of 
the Internet and other new technologies in spreading peaceful (or not) ideas (Webel and 
Galtung, 2007). 
In addition, we need to examine the role of warlords and peacemakers in the 
contemporary international system. It is thus critical to assess the role of political and 
community leadership in peacebuilding processes and examine the salience of the warrior 
model of leadership (Ackerman 2000a; Enloe, 2001; Sylvester, 1987). We also need to 
understand how to address the ‘spoiler’ problem, when warlords are prepared to use 
violence to resist peace processes (Stedman, 1997; Darby, 2001). With reference to 
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particular leaders, we need to examine changing styles of leadership, and the obstacles 
that they have faced in making the transition from protagonist to pragmatist (Pearson and 
Olson-Lounsbery, 2009). We should attempt to answer the question about whether 
gender really matters predictably as a leadership factor (Ackerman, 2000b).  
Drawing on experiences in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Rwanda, and Somalia there has been a proliferation of studies in the past decade that 
examine post-violence peacebuilding and conflict prevention (see, for example, Maynard, 
1999; Paris, 2004; Pugh, 2000; Rupesinghe, 1998). We need to look at the roles, 
reputations, and possible futures of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations 
and NATO, and their ability to build peace in the 21st century. In the aftermath of 
protracted ethnic conflicts, can peace be developed without reconciling the perpetrator 
and the victim (Power, 2003)? We need to understand the issues surrounding the nature 
of “victims” in conflict and the role of “justice” in peace processes, and the efforts at 
achieving reconciliation and justice, which have been central aspects of peacebuilding 
efforts in protracted ethnopolitical conflicts. 
 
The Peace and Conflict Studies Field 
 
It is nearly a cliché that “the world is getting smaller.” Increasingly, through 
processes such as immigration and conglomeration, people from different backgrounds 
are coming together and interacting in communities and in the workplace. Global dangers 
such as climate change and nuclear war require multinational cooperation. As in all 
human history conflict is being defined along religious, gender, and ethnic lines. 
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Throughout the world, violence and human rights abuses abound. Where peace accords 
have been signed, the critical work of reconciliation, healing, and peacebuilding remain 
(Lederach, 2005). At no time has the need to resolve conflict peacefully while promoting 
justice and reconciliation been greater. In this nuclear age, the future of the world could 
well depend upon the ability to meet this need. The interdisciplinary study of PACS has 
emerged in recent decades to bring people of diverse theoretical and experiential 
backgrounds together to: (1) research these complex social problems in a systematic way, 
and also (2) to develop and promote strategies, policies, and skill sets for addressing these 
issues.  
In 1957, Kenneth Boulding and others, to provide a rigorous international and 
interdisciplinary approach to conflict resolution, established the Journal of Conflict 
Resolution at the University of Michigan (Barash and Webel, 2002). In 1963, in Oslo, 
Johan Galtung established the Journal of Peace Research and broadened the focus of the 
field to encompass not only nuclear deterrence, but also issues of structural violence, 
development, human rights, and social justice (Boulding, 1977; Galtung, 1975ab, 1985, 
1987). In 1965, the International Peace Research Association was formed, bringing 
together international scholars from diverse disciplines that share a preoccupation with 
goals of peace, justice, respect for diversity, and the need for sustained environmental 
viability. In 1985, the Canadian government established the Canadian Institute for 
International Peace and Security, and in 1984, the U.S. Institute of Peace was established 
in the United States to support scholarship in PACS. In Europe important work has been 
done inter alia by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Centre for the 
Analysis of Conflict, INCORE, and the Berghof Foundation. An increasing number of 
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journals have been dedicated to PACS. The sum total of all these efforts is to expand 
knowledge in the field.  
PACS has emerged as a field within the contexts of the Anti-War, Civil Rights, 
Women’s, and Community Empowerment movements of the 1960s in the United States, 
which have advocated for the just and nonviolent transformation of protracted social 
conflicts (Byrne and Senehi, 2009). In addition, conflict resolution scholar-
practitioners—such as Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Edward Azar, John Burton, Ronald 
Fisher, John Groom, Neil Katz, Herbert Kelman Louis Kriesberg, Janie Leatherman, John 
Paul Lederach, Christopher Mitchell, Susan Allan Nan, Joyce Neu, Thania Paffenholz, 
Betty Reardon, Jay Rothman, Nadim Rouhana, Anna Snyder, among others—have 
developed many skills and processes that were used by mediators in local communities to 
do peacemaking work in larger regional, ethnic, and international conflicts.  
In the 1980s, the PACS field move in the direction of certification as law schools  
began to teach Alternative or Appropriate Dispute Resolution (ADR) courses such as 
mediation, arbitration, group problem-solving, adjudication, international law, and 
negotiation. ADR surfaced in many settings, from interpersonal to international relations, 
in the recognition in both the legal and policy fields that dispute resolution, or conflict 
management as it is called in some circles, has become a matter of national importance 
and an area demanding a high level of professionalism (Umbreit, 2006). 
In the United States, partly out of concern for the overburdened court system, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) became heavily involved during the early seventies 
with the development of alternative, often grassroots centres for resolving citizen and 
community conflicts (Kriesberg, 1997). This development paralleled an information 
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explosion generated by social scientists, lawyers, community organizers, negotiators, and 
mediators regarding how and why various racial, communal, and public policy disputes 
of the 1960s and 1970s were being, or had been, resolved (Duffy and others, 1991). By 
1980, a national professional organization, the Society for Professionals in Dispute 
Resolution (SPIDR), had been formed; community dispute resolution centres existed in 
every major American city on a model of trained volunteers intervening locally; and the 
ADR movement among lawyers and professionals had changed the curriculum of various 
law schools and the issues to which the ABA would be attuned (Kriesberg, 2001). Issues 
such as victim-offender reconciliation came to prominence, with international 
application, as in South Africa’s “truth and reconciliation” processes (Minnow, 1998). 
ACR was launched in January 2001, when the Academy of Family Mediators (AFM), the 
Conflict Resolution Education Network (CREnet), and the Society for Professionals in 
Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) merged into one organization. 
Also in the 1970s and 1980s, undergraduate majors and master’s programs in 
peace studies and conflict resolution sprung up in universities in North America, Europe, 
South East Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in response to student demands to better 
understand the analysis and resolution of conflicts (Kriesberg, 1997). For example, as 
early as 1965, Wayne State University’s Center for Teaching About War and Peace (later 
the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies) was established in Detroit; in 1973, the 
Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford awarded graduate degrees in 
Peace Studies. In 1987, the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) at 
George Mason University began offering a Ph.D. program in Conflict Resolution. In 
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1984, UNESCO established the European Peace University in Austria, and a new M.A. 
Program in Peace Studies.  
The role of International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) at the United 
Nations also focused the international community’s attention on humanitarian, refugee, 
and protracted civil war issues around the globe (Snyder, 2003). Hence, countries such as 
Canada, Norway, Ireland, Sweden, and others began to advocate for the human rights and 
human needs of global citizens as political and socioeconomic resources were put to the 
analysis, resolution and intervention in conflicts (Kriesberg, 2001). These moves resulted 
in breakthroughs such as the international Ottawa Treaty to ban landmines in 1999. 
Today academic programs in this new field, as well as government supported institutes 
such as Canada’s Lester B. Pearson Centre and the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, 
are teaching students and supplying curricular materials concerning the analytical, 
theoretical, and practice skills necessary to study violence and design appropriate 
interventions in violent conflicts at multiple levels of analysis (Kriesberg, 2001). 
Faculty and students are discussing human needs, minority rights, human rights, 
human security, violence prevention, restorative justice, cultural and gender identities, 
environmental sustainability, appropriate technologies for development, creativity and 
peacemaking, and peace education (Jeong, 2010). Violence and social conflicts in a 
variety of domains and at different levels are examined, including, among others, 
international war, ethnic and intercultural conflicts, community conflicts, environmental 
conflict, and conflict in businesses, health care institutions, inter-personal violence, and 
schools (Jeong, 2010). The PACS field examines direct, cultural, and structural violence 
that encompasses war, genocide, hate crimes, family violence, and violence against 
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children (Polkinghorn and Byrne, 2001). Social cleavages such as those along class, race, 
religious, gender, ethnic, or linguistic divides are also studied. The goal is to identify, 
analyze, and promote diverse nonviolent approaches for addressing the various forms of 
violent conflict in ways that are sustainable, meet the needs of all parties, and attend to 
social justice. The assumption of the PACS field is that—although violent conflicts differ 
and each conflict has unique aspects—there are common theoretical ideas for 
understanding and responding to violent conflicts at different levels and in different 
contexts. Clearly, the PACS field is an important emerging area of study. There is a large 
demand for study in this area both in North America and internationally, including 
students from countries where there have been protracted violent conflicts in recent 
decades.  
The PACS field also gives the “pracademic” the tools not only to analyze the deep 
causes of violent conflict across socio-economic, cultural, political, psychological, 
historical, and environmental dimensions, but also to determine how diverse 
peacemaking tools can manage and prevent them. This has resulted in practical guides to 
peace work in areas of peacemaking (for example, Galtung and others, 2002; Banks and 
Mitchell, 1996) and peacebuilding (for example, Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001). 
Analysis and practice in the PACS field seek to uncover “the relationships between 
inequality, injustice and power asymmetry on the one hand and violence on the other” 
and “provide various strategies for achieving peace” (Jeong, 2000, p.1). The PACS field 
is relevant to improvement in human wellbeing and the future survival of humanity (what 
Johan Galtung, 1996 calls “positive peace”) and encompasses a variety of themes ranging 
from peace pedagogies, environmental policies, cultural norms, development practice, 
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inter-religious dialogue, nonviolence, social justice, human rights, and indigenous 
peacemaking among others (Jeong, 2010). A PACS perspective, therefore, seeks to 
broaden our concerns beyond peacemaking (i.e., conflict resolution and conflict 
management) to include peacekeeping, human rights, and peacebuilding.  
 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution 
 
Conflict analysis and resolution expands beyond the state system to include 
additional actors, especially formal and informal mediators and third-party interveners, 
and it frames broader issues of culture, violence, ethnicity, identity, human rights, the 
environment, proliferation, sexism, development, and ethnocentrism among others  
(Cheldin, Druckman and Fast, 2003; Jeong, 2000). Thus, philosophical foundations of 
conflict knowledge influence: (1) how we analyze violent conflicts, (2) how we intervene 
in violent conflicts and, (3) how we ultimately decide which conflict processes are most 
appropriate for a given conflict situation (Sandole, Byrne, Sandole-Staroste, and Senehi, 
2009). The relationship of both of these components is very important when one analyzes 
social conflict issues. One learns not only to understand and analyze the perceptions and 
worldviews of others but ones own views and how both may affect ones intervention 
activities in any conflict environment (Weeks, 1992). 
Conflicts occur within different ecological contexts and cultural systems, which 
stem from a variety of needs and interests. Theories about the origins and emergence of 
conflicts at all levels (interpersonal through international) are the starting point of the 
conflict resolution component of the field (Jeong, 2008). The argument is that once 
scholars and conflict resolution practitioners understand where conflict comes from, they 
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can focus on the possibilities for conflict resolution (Ross, 1993, 2007). In other words, 
one needs to know the basic theoretical concepts of the field and seek to apply this 
knowledge as we learn practice skills for intervening in and resolving conflicts (Carpenter 
and Kennedy, 1988; Gray, 1989). Practical strategies for identifying and resolving sources 
of conflict necessitate that conflict interveners or practitioners receive practical training at 
the introductory and advanced levels in mediation, negotiation, facilitation, problem-
solving, and storytelling and narrative methods (Byrne, 2000; Schwarz, 1994; Senehi, 
2009ab; Ury, Brett and Goldberg, 1993). Skills training is placed in the wider context of 
academic research on social conflict, mediation, conflict resolution, and on group 
processes. Conflict resolution skills assist the third-party intervener in conflict to wage 
conflicts productively and to resolve them. Paul Wehr’s conflict mapping idea illustrates 
this point too. 
The conflict resolution scholar and practitioner seek to answer the following 
questions at both the theoretical level and the level of personal action: What are the causes 
and consequences of social conflict? How do we come to know and understand what 
conflict is? How do our assumptions about conflict affect our strategies for management or 
resolution? What methods are available for waging and resolving conflicts productively 
rather than destructively? 
The conflict resolution component of the PACS field also explores the cultural 
dimensions of conflict, including the role of culture in defining and understanding conflict 
for individuals and groups, by looking at the cultural dimensions of conflict in three ways: 
the dynamics of interpersonal beliefs and socialization, academic theory, and international 
conflict (Avruch, 1998). Certain cultures handle conflict differently, have different conflict 
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resolution styles, and that remedies prescribed from outside might or might not fit those 
norms (Rice, 2009). Our understanding of these issues has been deepened by 
anthropological studies of war zones (Nordstrom, 2004; Loizos, 2008). Third-party 
interveners—such as mediators, facilitators, or negotiators—must explore their own 
personal biases and learn how to recognize and elicit the biases of others (Lederach, 1995). 
In particular, interveners’ values, perceptions, experiences, and assumptions are related to 
their own cultural background, so that a self assessment of “blind spots” and cultural and 
gender assumptions that play a role in conflict perception and assessment must be 
recognized (Kolb and Coolidge, 1991). It is critical to be aware of variables related to the 
definition and processing of conflicts across cultures; the effects of child rearing practices, 
language, family structure, racism, sexism, kinship, and other cultural variables on levels of 
conflict and violence in a society; the role of culturally sensitive assessment as a 
requirement for conflict intervention; and the ways of gaining insight into the perspectives 
of others in conflict situations (Cohen, 1995; Senehi, 2002). 
Just as culture is critical to the analysis and resolution of conflicts, 
communication styles are also critical to understanding, analyzing, and managing conflict 
(Bolton, 1986; Tannen, 1990). The human and emotional aspects of conflict include the 
influence of anger, gender, and culture, which in turn impact the practice-based 
approaches to mediation and negotiation (Kriesberg, 1998, Lewiki, Saunders and Minton, 
1999). For example, gender roles matter in conflict, and conflict is experienced and 
perceived differently by men and women (Northrup, 1996; Stephens, 1994). The process 
of mediation is used to resolve civil, commercial, family, public, and workplace disputes 
(Moore, 1996). Mediation principles and skills, different approaches to mediation, and 
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current research in mediation are now quite sophisticated with a number of states in the 
U.S., for example, requiring board certification before a mediator can establish a private 
practice (Hocker and Wilmot, 1995; Katz and Lawyer, 1992). Communication theory 
speaks of the importance of “face” in some societies, as well as high and low context 
cultures that generate misunderstandings (Broome, 2009), as when the US “demands” 
that Japan abide by “fair trade” rules or that North Korea cease its nuclear research. 
Third parties are also used for resolving unproductive negotiations influencing the 
dynamics, quality, and outcomes of the negotiation process. Third-party interveners need 
to blend theory and skill practice that will help them recognize the relation between 
theoretical principles and actual behaviour and will prepare them to negotiate more 
effectively (Deutsch and Coleman, 2000). In particular, third-party interveners must be 
aware of the basics of competitive, distributive, and positional (win-lose) negotiation; 
collaborative, integrative, and mutual gains bargaining; and the use of power and 
negotiation in unequal power relations (Kolb, 1994; Lewecki, Saunders and Minton, 
1999). Transformational conflict resolution and peacebuilding is also an important 
component of the PACS field. 
 
Transformational Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding 
 
Moving beyond negotiated agreements, the concept of conflict transformation 
explores the possibilities for achieving justice, reconciliation, and sustainable peace in 
societies where deep-rooted and persistent (or recurrent) violent conflicts have had a 
devastating impact economically, politically, and socially (Byrne, 2001a; McCandless, 
1999; Rupesinghe, 1995). The nature of deep-rooted conflicts focus on the interpersonal, 
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relational, structural, and cultural shifts that must take place for people to move out of 
and away from complex, protracted, violent, or potentially violent social conflict (Ryan, 
2007). The practices of peacebuilding and conflict transformation seek to mobilize people 
and resources to transform unjust structures and relationships (Senehi, 1996, 2000, 2002). 
Transformation can range from “reframing” disputes to seek common ground between 
adversaries, to fully reconciling previously distrustful and vengeful adversaries. Specific 
attention must be given to the key issues of human security, identity, justice, human 
rights, and reconciliation (Axworthy, 2003; Lederach, 1997), all caught up in what John 
Burton (1990) referred to as “human needs” theory. The conflict transformation 
practitioner at the community level has to adopt and learn from the key concepts, 
techniques, and innovative approaches of conflict revolvers at the international level to 
develop a more humanistic, transformative approach to conflict analysis and resolution, 
and peacebuilding (Bloomfield, 1997; Hughes, 1998). 
Moreover, ethnic- and community-based conflicts are an emerging area of inquiry 
in PACS, especially since the end of the Cold War (Olson-Lounsbery and Pearson, 2009; 
Pearson and Olson-Lounsbery, 2009; Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse, 2005; Darby 
and MacGinty, 2003; Gurr, 2000) as the international “community” has more often 
intervened and intervened in multilateral formats to attempt to end civil disputes 
(Talentino, 2005). PACS scholars and practitioners are now illuminating the merits and 
limitations of a variety of prescriptions for regulating and resolving ethnic- and 
community-based conflicts (Byrne and others, 2000; Hume, 1996). We need to 
understand how individuals, groups, and countries struggle to achieve justice, reparations, 
and, on occasion, reconciliation in the aftermath of mass violence, torture, forced 
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relocation, ethnic cleansing, rape warfare, and genocide (Carter, Irani and Volkan, 2008; 
Volkan, 1998). Conflict specialists can connect, work with, and influence humanitarian 
aid efforts, capacity building, democratization efforts, and conflict transformation 
projects (Leatherman and Nadezhda Griffin, 2009). Difficulties encountered by western 
interventions in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan have also led some to challenge the 
assumptions of the so-called ‘democractic peace hypothesis’ when applied to situations 
of civil war (MacGinty and Richmond, 2009; Rieff, 2005; Chandler, 2002; Snyder, 2000) 
Conflict resolution practitioners also need to understand the multiple types of 
post-conflict trauma, recognize the symptoms of trauma and violence, and assess the 
types of interventions that may be needed, both short- and long- term (Byrne and 
Keashly, 2000). Relief and assistance programs from refugee rescue to humanitarian 
relief, the international Red Cross, UN programs, Rotary International, Mennonite and 
Quaker NGOs, and Christian relief efforts need to address the ethical and practical 
dimensions of dealing with traumatized individuals in a variety of settings (Snyder, 
2003). We have also witnessed the welcome emergence of professionals in varied fields 
who have turned their attention to peacemaking, beginning with Vietnamera Scientists 
and Physicians against War groups, to latter day Medecins sans Frontiers and Engineers 
Without Borders initiatives. 
In addition, reconciliation is a multi-dimensional process that envelops truth, 
mercy, justice, and peace (Lederach, 1997, 1999) building relationships, and promoting 
justice so that people can heal form the past (Galtung, 1996; Ryan, 2007). Liberation 
education uses local cultural resources to get people to think critically about self in 
context (Friere, 1999). Indigenous knowledge systems of local people inform conflict 
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analysis and resolution (Lederach, 1995, 2005; Tuso, 1999). Consequently, 
“transformational politics” comprises an interdependent “web of relationships” that 
nurtures participatory democracy at the grassroots (Woolpert, Slaton, and Schwerin, 
1998). Contact builds mutual understanding and transforms negative beliefs (Gallagher, 
1995; Love, 1995). 
Linking personal involvement at the micro to the macro political level creates 
“empowerment and recognition” (Bush and Folger, 1995). Personal involvement in local 
grassroots organizations teaches organizational skills and builds self-esteem and self-
efficacy (Schwerin, 1995). Implemented correctly this might negate the notorious 
problem of the extremist “spoiler” or rejectionists which undercut peace negotiations and 
agreements (e.g., the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Israel and 
President Anwar Sadat in Egypt). Transformational conflict resolution is organic and 
nonviolent (Ury, 2000, p. 4), and involves the whole community working for social 
justice for all (Knox and Hughes, 1996; Vayrynen, 1991).  
“Imagining a shared future” (Boulding, 1990a) allows people to think creatively 
outside of the box to create a new way of doing (Lederach, 2005), i.e., an ongoing 
momentum of mutual conciliation rather than mutual antagonism. Participation in 
encounter groups to build trust and dialogue groups and problem-solving workshops 
assist people in forging mutual understanding (Kelman, 1997; Rothman, 1997), to 
transform and transcend “chosen traumas of the past” (Volkan, 1998). Transformation 
praxis integrates middle-range leaders and the grassroots to create a myriad of 
opportunities to address the direct, cultural and structural roots of conflicts (Lederach, 
1997). Involving all of the stakeholders in the negotiation and peace-making process 
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builds trust and a commitment to peacemaking (Byrne, 1995; Kelman, 1997; Rothman, 
1997; Yang, 1998). 
Moreover, human development empowers people to develop their own capacities 
(Curle, 1990). Properly targeted socio-economic resources can build a sustainable 
infrastructure of peace (Diamond and McDonald, 1996) including people in their cultural 
context (Lederach, 1997). For some, spiritual transformation also provides the individual 
with a sense of meaning and motivation to strive nonviolently for truth and justice 
(Gandhi, 1992; Lentz, 1976), to transform structures and relationships. 
The transformation conflict resolution process moves people from a destructive 
mode toward accommodation and coexistence (Kriesberg, Northrup, and Thorson, 1989; 
Yang, 1998). A multi-modal and multi-level intervention approach that encompasses a 
plethora of social factors that escalate conflict has to coordinate the cross-level 
peacebuilding efforts (Byrne and Carter, 1996; Byrne, Carter and Senehi, 2003) that also 
ensures that negotiated agreements are implemented on the ground (Kriesberg, 1999). 
Stepping outside of the box to imagine peace is also a critical component of the PACS 
field. 
Imagining Peace 
 
Worldwide and domestic events demonstrate to the efficacy of power to 
overwhelm goodwill and trust in the short term, but also substantiate the power of 
nonviolent struggle in the long term. The continued use of violence on all levels raises 
our awareness of its cost in psychological damage and human life (Sharp, 2005). As we 
become increasingly conscious of the urgent need for alternatives to violence, more 
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scholars, educators, and institutions are working to refine our thinking and practice in 
nonviolence. 
Reducing the momentum of a conflict is more difficult than taking early 
preventive measures to forestall violence by addressing the dynamics and sources not the 
symptoms (Jeong, 2008). Thus, the PACS field can assist in early warning; the effective 
transition though to early response can make all of the difference regarding peace and 
war (Arthur, 2009). Unfortunately response is often muted or delayed for actors’ 
individual interests, as in the failure of the international community to intervene in 
genocide in Rwandan politics of the 1990s.  
The PACS field embraces envisioning and the creative imagination, as well as 
institutionalizing legal and political processes to invent and envisage and to uphold an 
alternative more peaceful approach to world politics. For instance, Warren Ziegler (1995) 
has designed workshops to envision a world without weapons to develop participants’ 
capacity to envisage alternative futures. Given the opportunity to invent, through 
envisioning, a different world, student participants in the workshops had new tools to 
work to make it happen. The use of the imagination through directed visioning is an ideal 
tool to use in the peacemaking and conflict resolution process. For example, storytelling 
is an intervention process that benefits from the empowerment given to participants 
through visioning (Senehi, 2000, 2002, 2009ab).  
The use of visioning allows the parties to imagine a future and not be stuck in the 
present, even to imagine more effective institutions to address and prevent violence. The 
ability to envision a future without violent conflict and/or violence encourages the parties 
to work toward transforming their relationships and addressing the deep roots of the 
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conflict (Ruane and Todd, 1996). As Elise Boulding (1990a) noted, “people are 
empowered to action by their own sense of the possible” (p. 380). The envisioning 
process is used to enhance cognitive and analytical skills in resolving conflicts. Being 
able to envision a difference can allow the individual to make that difference a reality. 
Elise Boulding (1992) notes, “It has been empirically demonstrated in all sorts of 
experiments that people with the same capacities, but with different aspiration levels 
perform according to their aspirations levels, not according to their capacities” (p. 380). 
The use of visioning is an extension of the creative process that leads directly to the 
establishment of values and needs, and in individuals’ actions and reactions to their 
surroundings.  
Meanwhile, the creative use of the imagination has been stymied through 
technology and repression (Boulding, 1990a). Elise Boulding (1990a) holds out hope for 
the power of creative imagination: “It is clear…that the human capacity for imaging…is 
not lost, only weakened. It can be nurtured back to vigorousness and liveliness. Vigor in 
imagery leads to vigor in social action” (p. 386). Thus, visioning is a process used to 
imagine new and more creative resolutions to conflicts, and is an important intervention 
tool within the PACS field.  
 
Human Rights and Peace and Conflict Studies 
 
Applied research on how human rights and PACS are related in significant ways 
is critical as human rights abuses often emerge in the context of social conflicts and war. 
It has also become a central issue for societies in the transition stage from violence to 
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peace (Bell, 2003). Peace is defined as not only the absence of war, but also the presence 
of human rights, social justice, and human security (Byrne and Senehi, 2009a). The 
issues of power, culture, and meaning, which are central to PACS must be a part of the 
study of human rights. Also, PACS focuses not only on theory, but also on practice, 
including approaches for effective communication, positive social change, social justice, 
peacemaking, and addressing the root causes of conflict—all of which are essential for 
addressing human rights. Often, the definition of particular human rights is a serious 
source of conflict—for example, genocide, the death penalty, abortion, conscientious 
objection, or cultural factors in human rights (Byrne and Senehi, 2009b; Power, 2003; 
Wiesel, 1961). Negotiating such contentious issues require techniques and skills 
associated with PACS, and is part of the process of democracy and human rights 
Applied research on the theoretical and practical connections of human rights to 
PACS includes the consideration that to theorize human rights, it is important to develop 
a body of scholars who share a vocabulary and a central focus on the breath of issues 
relevant in human rights (O’Byrne, 2003). While each discipline has ideas related to 
human rights, they may be so specific that they preclude making the connection between 
the micro and macro levels of society, or between theory and practice, or synthesizing the 
knowledge of the various courses in order to develop general skills in addressing human 
rights as a contemporary problem (Byrne and Senehi, 2009b) 
This would include human rights and issues addressed in PACS that involve 
critical contemporary social problems relevant to every dimension of society. Every 
discipline has a wealth of theoretical approaches that can inform problemsolving. As 
students develop specialized research areas, they need to bring a theoretical depth that 
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might be offered, for example, in specific disciplinary traditions. Such specialization 
helps the Ph.D. graduate find a job in a department other than one specifically in human 
rights or in PACS. This would include evaluative research on PACS practitioners, with a 
particular focus on those working in the area of human rights and in peace and justice 
organizations. 
 
Young People and Peace Education 
 
Research to describe the motivation of students with human rights and peace 
education is extremely relevant. This includes research on students’ hunger to have 
critical questions addressed: Why is there violence in our society? Why is there conflict 
between, and violence toward, identity groups? And, importantly, what can be done about 
it? Increasingly, our students have experienced violence first-hand in their communities, 
families, or life experience, making these topics highly relevant. To not make these issues 
central in our education may be experienced by young people as a form of denial or 
silencing (Beah, 2007; Greenspan, 2003). 
Research and practice focuses on nurturing global citizens, future leaders, and 
peacemakers. Our students are tomorrow’s leaders. Many young people have an idealism 
that should be recognized and supported. Youth have an important role to play in creating 
a culture of peace that supports human rights in their workplaces, communities, and in the 
world (Helsing and others, 2006, Senehi and Byrne, 2006, McEvoy-Levy, 2006). 
Students will bring their human rights knowledge into their various disciplines and 
professions. Basic research on promoting a positive civil culture in the classroom as 
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educators who have included human rights education in their curriculum have reported a 
more positive class culture in their schools (Sapon-Shevin, 1999). 
 
Women, Human Rights, and Peacebuilding 
 
Recent research has alerted us to the absence of women in all areas of peace work. 
This includes peacekeeping (Mazurana and others, 2005), peacemaking, and 
peacebuilding (Porter, 2007). That this is a problem has now been recognised by the U.N. 
in its groundbreaking Resolution 1325. Yet much more work needs to be done in relation 
to the contribution women can make in the areas covered by this special edition. Applied 
research focuses on some of the consequences of the more than 200 “identity” wars 
throughout the world that are the biggest challenge to human rights, and global and 
human security (Leatherman and Griffin, 2009). This includes research on the impact of 
war on women who are killed, maimed, brutalized, orphaned, traumatized, and/or 
impoverished (Mortenson and Relin, 2008). Such research resonates with Canada’s 
identity as a global leader in promoting world peace, human rights, and collective 
security, and serving as a model of how people from different backgrounds and with 
different histories can live together in relative peace.  
This includes research on reflexive praxis that has practitioners analyzing 
complex conflicts through multidimensional lenses to design appropriate intervention 
processes so that they can intervene more effectively in social conflicts and as scholars 
develop better theory (Byrne and Keashly, 2000). Systems and structures involve 
stakeholders with different goals, interests, power, and worldviews. Research to identify 
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the parties, issues, relationships, and the source of conflict, and focus on the human and 
emotional aspects of conflict, which includes the influence and intervention of anger, 
gender, class, religion, culture, and human rights (Enloe, 2007). Identifying sources of 
conflict may not be as a simple task when the causes are embedded in an institution’s 
structure and operating systems. Consequently, if the rules, roles, or responsibilities are 
designed to produce conflict, then resolving conflicts often requires some structural or 
systemic changes which may produce unintended, and non obvious consequences 
(Kriesberg, 2002). Research is important to evaluate and assess how theory and practice 
work or collide when dealing with complex problems in human systems and structures in 
our interdisciplinary approach to practice and theory building. For example, defining key 
theoretical concepts such as transformation, human rights, and social justice may lead to 
confusion in both theory-building and in praxis rather than more informed and effective 
practice and theory-building (Ryan, 2007). 
 
Conclusions 
 
It is easy to forget how young PACS is as an area of academic study. The students 
who have participated in the EU-Canada Conflict Analysis and Resolution may be just 
the second generation who have had an opportunity to be educated in this field. They will 
have to grapple with perennial problems of violence and peace in a world that is changing 
rapidly. Some have been addressed in the following contributions and others, such as 
global poverty, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the threats to the 
environment have not. It is our belief that the  PACS field offers an effective and 
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inspiring methodology to those working for social change to create a just and peaceful 
world, especially when it provides them with the opportunity to travel to new places and 
be exposed to new perspectives. PACS empowers individuals and communities to work 
together to transform relationships and society to build a culture of peace and a just and 
fair society.  
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Abstract 
 
Genocide is one of the most challenging problems of our age. In her book, “A Problem 
from Hell:” America and the Age of Genocide, Samantha Power (2002) argues that the 
United States, while in a position to intervene in genocide, has lacked the will to do so, 
and therefore it is incumbent on the U.S. citizenry to pressure their government to act. 
This article reviews how the topic of genocide raises questions along the fault lines of the 
field of Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS). In this article, a framework is provided to 
examine genocide and responses to it. This includes a review of a multiplicity of factors 
that (a) facilitate genocide, (b) constrain action in the face of it, and (c) facilitate 
intervention. In this analysis, further consideration is given to the location of the actor 
either within the region of the conflict or external to it. Our goal is to situate the study of 
genocide in the PACS field and promote to the articulation of possibilities for 
intervention by individuals, organizations, and policymakers. 
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Introduction 
 
The “crime without a name” —as Winston Churchill put it in an August 1941 
BBC radio broadcast (cited by Power, 2002, p. 29)—was labelled “genocide” by Raphael 
Lemkin, and was adopted into international law in Geneva, in 1948. In her book, “A 
Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (2002), Samantha Power 
discusses the brutal murder of millions of people in Armenia (1915–1917), Cambodia 
(1975–1979), Iraq (1988), Bosnia (1992–1993), Rwanda (1994), Srebrenica (1995), and 
Kosovo (1998–1999). Through detailed reporting based on documents and interviews, 
Power demystifies behind-the-scenes thoughts, decisions, and responses by individuals, 
leaders, and the U.S. government. Typically, a myriad of factors culminated in what 
Powers calls a lack of will to respond. Power also describes a different response—
individuals who made a commitment to advocate for the rights of the vulnerable, the 
marginalized, the jeopardized, and the powerless. Power calls for an engaged citizenry to 
take an activist stance and hold their governments accountable, and demand effective and 
timely measures to stop genocide.  
 We found that the book resonated powerfully and fundamentally with our 
commitment to peace and social justice, and also raised questions along the fault lines of 
the Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) field: (a) Power focuses on decision-making to 
intervene militarily, and PACS examines effective nonviolent measures for achieving 
social justice. (b) These genocides are very direct and visible, but how do we name 
structural violence and indirect, invisible oppression—another face of genocide—within 
our own societies? (c) The language of human rights focuses on name-blame-and-shame 
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type approaches toward perpetrators of the crime of genocide whereas PACS 
methodologies emphasize mutual respect toward all parties and separating the people 
from the problem. And, finally, (d) in the face of the kind of brutality and victimization 
of whole groups of people that has occurred in the past centuries and continues to take 
place, how can we maintain the hope, optimism, and belief in human agency that is such 
a part of the PACS field, and is it realistic to do so?  
 We address these questions in the theoretical background of this paper. A general 
conclusion is that by fracturing the problem, we can perhaps find footholds and 
handholds for scaling this precipice. We do this in two ways: First, we address in turn, 
the factors that (a) facilitate genocide itself, (b) facilitate responses characterized by 
inaction, and (c) facilitate responses characterized by effective intervention and 
prevention. We further develop this analysis with a consideration of the intervener’s 
location either within the region of conflict or external to it. This analysis is a beginning 
sketch, and should be further developed and tested. This is significant for facing up to 
some of the cloudier areas in our field, and critically interrogating what this field can 
offer in situations that manifest extreme conflict and violence.  
 
Dilemmas for the Field 
 
Again, examining genocide in terms of our field and our reading of Power’s book 
raised some dilemmas for the PACS field—especially in the North American 
construction of the field—that are typically avoided. Here, we raise these issues and 
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discuss them briefly, but each one is worthy of a full-length article in itself. Further, we 
review some of the theoretical perspectives from PACS to the examination of this topic.  
 
Commitment to Nonviolence 
As A. J. Muste was famously quoted in the New York Times in 1967, “there is no 
way to peace, peace is the way”—that is, process and outcome are inextricable 
(Lederach, 1995). At the heart of the PACS field is a commitment to nonviolence: its 
moral authority (King, 1999), its transformative potential (Gandhi, 1962), and its 
strategic possibilities (Sharp, 2005). While Power exposes how genocide is a tool of 
political manoeuvring that hinders an effective response to people’s suffering and how 
genocide often occurs under the cover of war, she consistently affirms military or armed 
intervention to stop genocide. A concern is that the use of violence to stop violence 
increases harm to people, does not get to the root of the issues, and locates power in 
weapons rather than people. 
 In the PACS field, this gap between nonviolence and military intervention is 
rarely, if at all, bridged, nor discussed in length. Nonviolence typically encompasses the 
issues of war resistance, peace activism, and conscientious objection, as well as 
compelling critiques of militarization (for example, Enloe, 2000; Goldstein, 2001). 
While, recently, critiques of war are often accompanied by affirmation of the 
commitment and sacrifice of service men and women, in North America, there is an 
emotional history to this issue as well that has not been fully or publicly aired. For 
example, U.S. soldiers, often traumatized, returning from the U.S.-Vietnam war were 
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called “baby killers.” And young war resisters were labeled as “unpatriotic,” “disloyal,” 
“cowardly,” and often left their life in the U.S. behind to settle in Canada or abroad. 
 A fuller discussion and examination of these issues is important for the PACS 
field. Meanwhile, Powers offers many nonviolent approaches for the populace and 
government to consider. The analysis below only includes nonviolent interventions. 
There is a breadth of nonviolent interventions that can take place that may eliminate or 
mitigate the need for military intervention. It has often been observed that many 
important nonviolent responses to the Holocaust were not taken, for example, the 
admission of more Jewish refugees to Canada and the United States, or the acceptance, in 
1939, rather than the turning away of the passenger ship The St. Louis, which carried 900 
German Jewish refugees (Morse, 1968).  
  
North American Genocide and Structural Violence 
Another concern is how do we distinguish between the direct violence of 
genocidal wars of the past century with the settlement of Canada by colonial powers and 
the current violence many Aboriginal people face in North America. For example, 
colonial laws like the Indian Act in Canada were designed to destroy a racial group. 
Masked as assimilation and presented as the “glorious settlement” of Canada, the well-
documented results have been: the Indigenous population disenfranchised from their 
homes, forced from their lands, children taken from their families and placed with non-
Aboriginal people, entire populations wiped out, forced marches/relocations, a legacy of 
abuse from residential schools, and documented forced infection with deadly disease (for 
example, Churchill, 1997). Even as people stood in disbelief as acts of genocide unfolded 
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before their eyes around the word, aboriginal people in North America fought for, and 
continue to fight for their existence.  
 Using the word genocide to describe Aboriginal–non-Aboriginal relations in 
Canada and the United States can be unsettling. This is a difficult conversation that even 
the tireless activist Raphael Lemkin avoided (Power, 2002). However, the damage of an 
unacknowledged loss—what Kenneth Hardy (2005) calls a “dehumanized loss”—leads to 
rage, sadness, sorrow, and despair that leads to violence toward self and others. Such 
denial blocks, impedes, and constrains potential resolution, restitution, and restoration of 
dignity, respect, value, community, and health.  
 Therefore, it is our responsibility, in fact an immense weight, to address these 
issues. Perhaps a detailed and rich analysis of how to understand the intervention of 
genocide can lead to a cultural mind shift—even a global civic culture of peace as 
Boulding (1988) envisioned—and can help promote the capacity for both recognizing 
and changing destructive and dehumanizing power relations, structural inequalities, 
social and cultural devaluation, and ethnocide even when it is in our own society. 
Because it is typically harder and more risky to raise local human rights issues, perhaps 
considering the factor of location (within the conflict region or external to it) is an 
important consideration in identifying options and strategies of response.  
  
“Name-Shame-Blame” versus “Win-Win” approaches    
In the PACS field, there is recognition that conflict is a part of social life and can 
be handled constructively whereas violence is seen as something to be avoided. 
Typically, in the field of conflict resolution, identity-based conflict is addressed by 
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creating a space of equal safety and neutrality (for example, Rothman, 1997). This is 
required to keep the trust of the parties. When does that effort at balance belie justice or 
serve the purposes of the identity-group in power at the expense of the less powerful 
group? How, and at what point, do we address issues of power? Is “name-blame-and-
shame” an alternative tool of conflict resolution or antithetical to conflict resolution 
approaches? Advocacy for justice and a balance of power has always been part of the 
peace and conflict studies field (for example, see Laue, 1982), but how does that fit in 
with the majority of work that emphasizes a “win-win” approach?    
 While the dilemma of whether peace serves the interests of or undermines justice 
is fairly well known (Lederach, 1995, 1997) and while the PACS field has always had 
social justice as a central aim, it is important to remember how subtle and enervating this 
dilemma might be. How does practice for peace and conflict resolution change, or need to 
change, when power differentials are steep and violence is happening? In the context of 
violent conflict, those who attempt to build peace or reach out to the “enemy” may be 
seen as sentimental at best or dangerously naive at worst.  
 It is not always clear when escalating layers of conflict gradually escalate to 
genocidal violence. Genocide is often perpetrated in the name of one identity group 
against a minority group, and not everyone in the dominant group can necessarily be seen 
as a perpetrator. Within the “bystander” populace, individuals and networks have worked 
in various ways to resist, sabotage, or overturn genocidal processes in their societies. 
Within the targeted group, there are varying ideas, strategies, and choices about how to 
resist. The identification of numerous means and points of intervention in intergroup and 
identity-based conflicts allows choices and creates possibilities for intervention of 
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intergroup divisions, hatred, and tolerance that helps individuals, groups, and 
policymakers position themselves to be of influence. 
 
Despair Versus Agency 
A significant insight that comes from both reading about genocide and Power’s 
analysis is the incredible sense of loss that genocide generates. Even the secondary 
trauma from reading about genocide or working with victims may be overwhelming. 
Direct trauma affects millions of survivors, including the many refugees who have settled 
in North America from other parts of the world. Most people in North American have 
been affected by genocide, political violence, or war—if not in their generation then in 
their parents’ or grandparents’ family. For this reason as well, studying genocide may 
trigger deep feelings of personal loss or loss of community. Power (2002) quotes the 
words of observers: “infuriating,”  “maddening” (Henry Morganthau Sr., p. 7), 
“frustrated” (an Associated Press correspondent, p. 10), “angrier” (Theodore Roosevelt, 
p. 11), “appalled,” “livid,” (Lemkin, p. 19), “grief-stricken” (Szmul Zygielbojm, p. 31, 
committed suicide), “pain and anguish” (Arthur Goldberg, U.S. intelligence, p. 36), 
“obviously a man in pain” (lawyer’s description of Raphael Lemkin, p. 49). 
 Stepping into this emotional terrain is risky. How do we keep ourselves safe, 
resilient, and effective as peace workers in the face of even vicarious trauma? It is 
difficult to raise these issues because they can be so disturbing and because we may 
become agents of vicarious trauma when we discuss them. Discussing these issues may 
be re-traumatizing for those who are affected by these issues, and, at the least, we need to 
consider how to respond to profound emotions that emerge when these issues are 
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discussed. Clearly, peace and human rights education is important, but what information 
at what age is appropriate to share? How do we process our own feelings around these 
issues so that our own buttons do not get triggered in our work? For the peacemaker 
whose work is based on the belief that it is possible for people to create peace, such a 
sense of loss could potentially lead to despair and burn-out.   
 At the same time, we can see where people have acted successfully to find 
inspiration, courage, and hope. One of the most moving aspects of Power’s work is the 
focus on personal narratives that bear testimony to the faith, courage, and perseverance of 
individuals to act for the collective good even in the face of state power, and speak to 
human agency and possibility—often relying on naming the problem. Raphael Lemkin 
devoted his life to the scholarly articulation and international legislation of genocide. 
U.S. Senator William Proxmire was a leader in persuading the U.S. Senate to ratify the 
Convention and for 19 years, beginning in 1967, he gave more than 3,211 speeches on 
this topic, no two the same. Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire, whose appeals to 
the U.N. for reinforcements in Rwanda were unheeded, became a spokesperson who 
spoke and wrote about his painful experience in order that people become more aware of 
the pain of genocide and the responsibility to protect. In 1998, African American 
prosecutor Pierre Prosper argued in the first case before an international criminal tribunal, 
that in the context of Rwanda, sexual violence against women carried intent of genocide, 
that is, to “destroy the very foundation of a group” (p. 485). Fragmenting this monolithic 
problem into smaller components—for example, recognizing the things that have been 
accomplished—creates more possibilities to see how action, including our own, can be 
effective. 
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Framework 
 
Theorists have often preferred “elegant” theories and “Occam’s razor” where the 
simplest and most obvious explanations are the most likely to be true. But in the complex 
network of social problems, a multiplicity of factors interconnect in complex, and, often, 
unpredictable ways. This complexity makes social problems harder to understand and 
resistant to change as systems have a way of absorbing shock and returning to a kind of 
homeostasis. This complexity also opens up possibilities for myriad points of entry and 
myriad roles for interveners as agents of problem-solving, healing, and change. 
Ultimately, resolution of broad social conflicts and social problems requires social 
movement and social change, which can be seen as a long-term process of social healing. 
Perhaps all interventions make an impact though they are hard to see when looking at the 
big picture—until eventually a tipping point is reached, and the momentum for change 
becomes more powerful than the pull of history.  
 PACS approaches embrace conflicts’ complexity, and provide a consideration of 
many factors. The intensity and development stage of a conflict impacts how it is 
approached (Byrne and Keashly, 2000). External guarantors, allies, and other external 
parties can have a critical role in the escalation or de-escalation of conflicts and political 
violence (Byrne, 2007), There are different types of mediators who bring varying degrees 
of power to leverage sources or credibility, for example, high-profile “primary 
mediators,” such as U.S. Presidents, and low-profile, “secondary mediators,” such as 
religiously-based mediators, often Quakers or Mennonites (Princen, 1992). Conflicts are 
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understood to be driven by a complexity of material as well as intangible interests (Ross 
1993, 2009). Further, a multitude of social dimensions can drive conflict: demographic, 
economic, political, historical, linguistic, and psychocultural. Conflicts further play 
themselves out and are driven by dynamics at multiple levels of analysis: for example, 
elites, middle-tier elites, and the grassroots (Lederach, 1997). That is, the personal is 
political (Millet, 1970) and global dynamics affect domestic relations (Tifft and 
Markham, 1991). This also means that conflict resolution can take place at these different 
levels and everyone can and should be involved. Age is a consideration, and while high 
proportions of youth in a society can be associated with revolution, young people can 
also be peacemakers and drive positive social change (McEvoy-Levy, 2006). Conflict 
mitigation can and should occur in different social arenas, or tracks, including 
government; professional conflict resolution; business; private citizens; research, training, 
and education; religious approaches; funding; and public opinion and communication 
(Diamond and McDonald, 1996). 
 Taking into account conflict complexity, this analysis sketches a framework that 
examines the situational, interest-based, ideological, and emotional factors that (a) shape 
human action to initiate and escalate genocide, (b) inhibit, constrain, or deter human 
action to intervene in genocide, and (c) promote human action to not engage in or to 
intervene against genocide. The notion that there are situational, interest-based, 
ideological, or emotional factors is an analytical categorization only as these types of 
factors influence each other in complex and significant ways. The term “ideological” is 
used to refer to cognitive factors, keeping in mind that knowledge is socially constructed. 
In any particular case, not all of these factors may be in play, and not all those factors in 
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play are equally salient. The goal of this analysis is to identify as many factors as possible 
in order to clarify different avenues for intervention and thereby to promote the agency of 
individuals, groups, and policymakers at various stages of violence escalation and de-
escalation: early, intervention, post-genocide work, and prevention of future genocides.  
 
Escalation of Genocide 
 
 
Within the Conflict Zone 
 Situational.  Situational factors that might facilitate genocide include autocratic 
political systems, economic conditions, as well as a prostrate populace (for example, Mac 
Ginty and Williams, 2009). War itself can serve as a cover for genocide.  Law can serve 
the interests of genocide. For example, numerous laws were developed by the Nazi 
regime to control and segregate Jews during the Holocaust. By legal act, governments 
have restricted, relocated, and defined the identity of indigenous peoples (for example, 
Churchill, 1997). Momentum towards genocide builds with the escalation of 
dehumanizing practices: for example, in Armenia: disarmament of the population, the 
rounding up and killing of 250 intellectuals, Turkish notables killed in every province, 
Armenian workers no longer used, churches desecrated, schools closed, teachers who 
refused to convert were killed, deportation of civilians to Syria, lack of facilities 
contributing to death, and property seized (for example, Power, 2002). Genocide is 
progressive violence.  
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 Interests.  The political and economic interests of the perpetrators may drive the 
genocide of a group. Removing populations may be driven by elites’ greed, mistrust, and 
expansionism, and be a strategy for securing power and ownership of a territory. The 
victims of genocide are seen as obstacles to the agenda of the perpetrators.  
 Ideology.  Nationalism at the exclusion of minority groups may fuel genocidal 
violence characterized as “ethnic cleansing.” While history may be situational, 
interpretations and the use of history may be manipulated to motivate genocide. Folklore 
and cultural narratives may demonize minority groups (for example, Snyder, 1978). 
Propaganda and media may justify or mask what is happening within a country. For four 
years leading up to the Serbian Army’s invasion of Bosnia, Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic waged a disinformation campaign, including staged films of Bosnian men 
raping Serbian women, to infuriate Serbian soldiers against Bosnian Muslims (Hedges, 
2003). 
 Emotional.  Ethnic hatred, and a destructive re-channeling of a society’s fears, 
humiliation, unresolved shame, and sense of devaluation can fuel the intense emotions 
required for genocide. Love of country and countrymen can be manipulated with 
propaganda that inflames these negative emotions. During the break-up of the former 
Yugoslavia, in the early 1990s, Serbian President Slobodan Milosovic and Bosnian leader 
Radovan Karadzic used the historic Battle of Kosovo and the death of Prince Lazar in the 
14th century, among other propaganda, to rally Serbs to the process of so-called “ethnic 
cleansing” of Muslims in Bosnia to the point of crating a sense of “time collapse” 
(Volkan, 1997). Fear of being seen as an outsider may motivate people to be active 
perpetrators to prove their loyalty in order to save themselves (for example, Gross. 2001).  
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External to the Conflict Zone 
 Situational.  External states may have historical ties to regional parties and act as 
their “external ethno-guarantors” (Byrne, 2007). Many observers feared that the regional 
wars that were the break-up of the former Yugoslavia could lead to a devastating global 
war if Russia became involved to support the Serbs, Turkey became involved to support 
the Bosnian Muslims, and Germany or Western Europe came to the aid of the Croats.  
 Interests.  Greed and economic desire may motivate other state actors in the 
global community to provide weapons (Pearson and Sislin, 2001). For example, Germany 
provided the chemicals that were used by Saddam Hussein against the Kurds. Small 
states such as land-locked Switzerland are vulnerable and may claim neutrality. In World 
War II, by providing a banking centre to Nazi Germany, Switzerland may arguably have 
facilitated genocide while creating a disincentive for the Allies to bomb or invade their 
nation.   
 Ideology.  Belief in the balance of power may motivate external actors to support 
a country that is perpetrating genocide in order not to disrupt what is seen as a global 
balance of power. For example, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge in Cambodia received the tacit 
support of China and the USSR. In Rwanda, radio had a critical role in the planned 
genocide in Rwanda when Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) 
disseminated propaganda portraying Tutsis as “cockroaches,” a threat, and outsiders 
along with popular music and scripted programming that was purported to be the real 
conversations of Rwandans (Strobel, 1997). 
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 Emotional.  Emotions of ethnic hatred or devaluation as well as indifference to 
human suffering may deter intervention.  
 
Lack of Intervention against Genocide 
 
Within the Conflict Zone 
 This section refers to constraints to intervention of both victims and those not 
directly targeted in the conflict zone. It may not always be clear who is in which group, 
and both groups make choices at early stages in the escalation to genocide regarding their 
responses to the situation.   
 Situation.  The reality of power makes action difficult. Ineffective human rights 
laws fail to protect people. Separation, segregation, control of movement, and control of 
means of communication seriously constrain or prevent people’s ability to gather, 
strategize, or even understand what is going on.  
 Interests.  Those who may not have directly instigated genocide may still be 
willing to benefit economically, socially, or politically as a result of it. People at the 
grassroots level may seize the opportunity of genocide to increase their possessions. In 
the Polish town of Jedwabne where 1,600 Jews were murdered by their neighbors, some 
of the worst perpetrators seized the property of the victims for themselves (Gross, 2001). 
During the Rwandan genocide, hungry landless impoverished young people seized the 
opportunity of the chaos to kill land-owning men, usually older than 50, and seize their 
farms (Diamond, 2005).  
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 Ideology.  Media and propaganda may convince those not targeted that nothing is 
wrong. There may be a belief that the victims have brought the situation on themselves, 
and it is the responsibility of the victims to correct the situation. Victims and those not 
directly targeted may believe there is nothing they can do. When Lemkin tried to bring 
his family to the United States in advance of the Holocaust, they were complacent and 
felt the escalating violence was simply the price of martyrdom and their fate (Power 
2002). A sense of defeatism pervades the situation.  
 Emotions.  Both victims and those not directly targeted may feel paralyzing and 
realistic fear in the face of the violence (Mac Ginty and Williams, 2009). Those who are 
not targeted may harbour ethnic hatreds themselves, be indifferent to the pain of others, 
or experience passivity.   
 
External to the Conflict Zone 
 Situation.  Problems of such magnitude and complexity are really quite 
challenging. Outside governments weigh the financial and human costs of intervention. 
The outcome of intervention is unpredictable and raises concerns about unintended 
consequences.  
 Interests.  For governments, intervention may entail political, security, and 
economic risks, and can seriously jeopardize strategic economic interests. Even 
intervention such as economic sanctions might be resisted if it affects business sectors in 
the sanctioning country. When arguing for the passage of the U.N. Convention on 
Genocide, Sen. Proxmire argued that lawmakers were more responsive to constituent 
pressure and profit than human dignity as there were more than a hundred treaties and 
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conventions on economic issues such as the Tuna Convention with Costa Rica, a Halibut 
Convention with Canada, and a Road Traffic Convention allowing licensed American 
drivers to drive on European highways, among others (Power, 2002).  
 Ideology. The notion of “gentleman’s bias” (Power, p. 260) demands that 
ambassador’s refrain from critiquing or undermining the governments where they are 
stationed. There may be a lack of knowledge or agreement about what to do, and a sense 
of futility and defeatism. Or, there may be serious concerns about the financial, time, and 
human cost of intervention, as well as unintended consequences of such intervention.  
 Often outsiders do not believe stories about the escalating atrocities when they 
hear them. They dismiss reports as “propaganda,” “exaggerated,” “hoaxes,” 
“unbelievable,” “unsupported with evidence” (Power, pp. 8–9). Outsiders may be 
relatively complacent about the violence because they believe that there are atrocities on 
both sides, and that brutality is part of war. Devaluation or dehumanization of the victim 
leads to inaction and may be combined with a sense that the region of conflict is 
characterized by primitiveness and tribalism and has a natural propensity for violence 
(Wolff, 2006). Outsiders may believe that it is happening on both sides and not recognize 
the acts of murder that are taking place. Disbelief in the possibility for evil actions and 
that things could get so much worse than they are at a given point inhibits intervention. 
There may be a sense that the problem belongs to the victim and there is no responsibility 
to protect or intervene. In general, while knowledge of the violence might be getting out 
to government, the general public may be largely ignorant of what is going on, or not 
understand it. Denial of the problem may set in as a defense mechanism.  
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 The media may play a critical role in how conflict and intervention is understood 
by the public (Strobel, 1997). In the current age of Google, Yahoo, Twitter, CNN, and 
24/7 news feeds, the public is constantly exposed to information on both extraordinary 
and frivolous world events. Everyone becomes a spectator to everything that is going on 
in the world. How do persons interpret, respond to, or make sense of issues that are 
happening across the world or next door? The amount of information can overwhelm 
one’s ability to process and understand, to make sense of, and to act on this information.  
 Emotions. Thinly masked ethnic hatred, prejudice, or devaluation of the other 
may contribute to inaction. Outsiders who fail to act may be accused of indifference to 
pain. Counter-intuitively, increased news coverage and awareness of a multiplicity of 
horrific social issues throughout the world can engender issue fatigue, even hopelessness 
and despair, or the desire for isolationism. 
 
Genocide Intervention 
 
Within the Conflict Zone 
 This section refers to those factors which facilitate genocide prevention and 
intervention by both victims and those not directly targeted in the conflict zone.  
Situation. A vibrant civil society and thriving business sector and economy make 
a society resilient to genocide (van Tongeren and others, 2005). Good leaders are able to 
work constructively for peace. Getting people together to discuss issues and create 
networks and crosscutting ties provide communication links. Effective and enforceable 
laws are a deterrent to political misconduct, corruption, and abuse.  
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Interests.  Thriving trade and interdependent economic and social relations may 
provide a disincentive for war. Business is an important track of diplomacy and aspect of 
civil society (Diamond and McDonald, 1997).  
Ideology.  Nonviolent protest challenges prevailing ideas about violence and 
initiates, sustains, and gives form to a social process of making meaning. To be in a 
position to influence, it is important to demonstrate the case for, and to educate for, peace 
and tolerance. It is important to get out the story of what is happening and the atrocities 
that are occurring, and to name what is happening. The media has a role in getting this 
information to the public. For oppressed groups, the homeplace can be a site of resistance 
where grandmothers, grandfathers, mothers, fathers, aunts, and uncles provide 
socialization that maintains a group’s culture, identity, and history, often encoded in 
folklore; strategies for survival; as well as comfort and re-humanization (Hooks, 1990).  
Emotions. Impatience with the status quo drives people to resist and take action. 
Sometimes people call up the strength to resist when there is no way. Power describes a 
busload of Kurdish men who resisted after lengthy rides in inhumane conditions to their 
would-be mass graves in Iraq. In the tumult that arose as a result, only one man, Ozer, 
was able to survive undetected under a mound of bodies when they were shot in 
retribution, and eventually crawl out and find refuge. Ozer’s story and what happened to 
all of those men is now told in Power’s book. During the genocide in Rwanda, when the 
girls from a Catholic school were taken to a field, and shot, one girl was able to persuade 
one of the men to save her, and was a sole survivor (Kayitesi, 2008).  
 
External to the Conflict Zones 
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Situation. Power (2002) refers to the International Criminal Court as “a giant 
without arms” (p. 491). Restructuring and empowering the U.N. is a possibility that needs 
to be seriously investigated. Early warning systems can facilitate international mediation 
before conflict escalates further. Power emphasizes that many perpetrators weigh daily 
how far they can go, and therefore it is essential for the U.S. and others states to 
immediately and forcefully condemn racially-based violence when it erupts. Naming and 
condemning the reprehensible action and the individuals responsible for it are important 
steps. Getting experts together—including academics from the PACS field—for 
consultations during a crisis is critical.  
 Interests.  It is important to name the interests in the region, and to seek 
clarification of U.S. national interests in particular nations. Public dialogue can be a 
process of interrogating, lobbying, and reshaping arguments to clarify how stopping 
genocide is a U.S. interest.   
 Ideology.  Lobbying and advocacy is perhaps one of the most important 
interventions. Education can promote widespread understanding of genocide and ways to 
address it. Peace education can build a culture of human rights that is resilient to 
genocide and prepared to respond. Education about current affairs can also provide early 
warning and alert governments and people to what may need to be addressed. Stories 
about current and past genocides need to be told. Credible sources and eyewitnesses who 
report atrocities are important for building awareness and compassion. When journalists 
or government officials are dispersed or murdered, civilians fleeing the massacres tell 
their stories. They must be heard. Again, the media has a role in this. Nonviolent action 
and protest is part of a public discourse that can affect policy, raise consciousness of the 
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issues and build solidarity at local and international levels. Constructive narratives can 
chart pathways to peace. The decision to make the prevention of genocide a priority can 
build the momentum for change; this requires international condemnation when 
massacres, political violence, and genocide occur. It is important for outsiders to listen 
for what victims and those attempting to intervene on the ground are requesting when 
making policy decisions.  
 Emotions. A broader conception of sacrifice may be needed to address global 
problems, and global inequality that fuels political greed and violence. It is painful to 
absorb survivors’ stories of horror, and there must be the capacity to believe the 
unbelievable. We must also recognize the emotions of the perpetrator and not always 
expect rational actors. Impatience and courage are critical for working for social justice 
and peace.  
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Figure 1.  
Factors that Contribute to Genocide, Lack of Intervention, and Intervention 
 
INTERVENOR 
POSITION TYPE OF FACTOR 
Escalation of 
Genocide 
Lack of 
Intervention 
Intervention  
Within 
the 
Conflict 
Zone 
SITUATIONAL Autocratic political systems  
Poor economic conditions  
Prostrate populace • War as 
a cover • Laws legitimating 
violence • Escalating 
dehumanization 
Ineffective human rights 
laws • Separation 
Segregation • Control of 
movement and control of 
communication hamper 
resistance 
Vibrant civil society and 
economy • Leaders build 
peace and share power  
Effective and enforceable 
laws  
INTEREST-BASED Political and economic 
interests • Greed • Security  
Expansionism 
Potential interveners exploit 
perceived economic, social, 
and political benefits of 
genocide rather than 
intervene 
Thriving democracy, trade, 
and business that promote 
diplomacy and civil society 
IDEOLOGICAL Folklore, cultural narratives, 
and interpretations of history 
that justify genocide 
Media and propaganda 
mask and hide the facts of 
genocide, or justify it 
Belief that the victims 
brought it on themselves 
Culture of nonviolence, 
peace, and tolerance 
Humanization 
EMOTIONAL Ethnic hatred • Fear  
Humiliation • Unresolved 
shame • Propaganda that 
inflames these emotions 
toward to the Other 
Paralyzing fear • Ethnic 
hatred • Indifference  
Acceptance and resignation 
Compassion • Resistance 
Courage • Impatience with 
the status quo 
External  
to the 
Conflict 
Zone 
SITUATIONAL Historical ties to  
regional parties based on 
ethno-alliances 
Actual magnitude and 
complexity of the problem  
Unknowable direct and 
indirect financial and human 
risks and costs 
Strong and enforceable 
international law • Early 
warning systems • Practices 
in place related to the 
responsibility to protect 
INTEREST-BASED Greed and economic 
interests • Larger political 
interests, e.g., the global 
balance of power 
Political, security, and 
economic risks 
Clarification of how stopping 
genocide serves interests 
IDEOLOGICAL Belief in maintaining the 
strategic global balance of 
power, and desire to 
maintain it despite actions    
of allies 
The notion of “gentleman’s 
diplomacy” • Magnitude and 
potential for evil is 
unbelievable • Atrocities 
believed to be both sides 
Idea problem is the victims’ 
Disbelief • Unawareness 
Education • Lobbying 
Activism • Peace education 
Human rights education 
Current affairs education 
Vibrant public discourse 
Peace journalism and 
constructive media 
EMOTIONAL Indifference • Othering 
Ethnic hatred 
Indifference • Overwhelmed 
by horror • Prejudice and 
Othering • Issue fatigue 
Hopelessness and despair 
Build capacity to the believe 
the unbelievable • 
Impatience • Courage 
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Conclusion 
 
The study of genocide must be central to the PACS field. Alternatives to violence 
have defined the PACS field, and more work needs to be done to examine and evaluate 
nonviolent alternatives to genocide by different types of actors and at every stage of the 
escalating violence, the de-escalation of violence and so called “post-conflict” phases, as 
well as prevention. Social justice and civil rights have been central to the development of 
the field, and this works also needs to be further developed in order to address the many 
faces of genocide, including the forms of the cultural devaluation and murder that harms 
devastates whole groups of peoples, including indigenous peoples throughout the world, 
violence against women (femicide), violence against children (infanticide), and all people 
who face extraordinary material deprivation (modern slavery, extreme poverty). While 
anger, rage, and hatred might be an understandable and normal response to genocide adn 
violence—what Kenneth Hardy (2005) calls de-humanized loss—it remains critical to 
explore a breadth of strategies and possibilities to re-channel this anger, make sense of 
the past, and use past experience to create better societies.  
The PACS field is distinguished by its commitment both theory and practice, and 
their interconnection. Praxis, as Paulo Friere (1970) put it, is “reflection and action upon 
the world in order to transform it” (p 75). It is not enough to critically analyze, but to also 
chart paths and break paths toward peace. This analysis seeks to provide a framework 
that might promote action and de-facilitate the bystander position by providing insight 
and options. An important variable is location relative to the conflict and violence.  
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There is also a group of people that move between the conflict zone and locations 
distant to it. These are often diplomats (such as Hans Morgenthau in Armenia); 
journalists (such as Samantha Power herself); military personnel (such as Romeo Dallaire 
in Rwanda); refugee survivors; and scholars who through research, or because they are 
from a conflict zone, travel internationally. Raphael Lemkin was such as scholar. He was 
also a refugee. While growing up in the Bialystock region of Poland, during the World 
War I period, when Germany and Russia were battling in Poland, his family fled their 
farm to hide in the neighbouring forests. In September 1939, six days after the 
Wehrmacht’s invasion of Poland, he fled, at first on foot, and eventually made his way to 
the U.S. where, with the help of a professor for whom he had translated the Polish 
criminal code, he obtained a position at Duke University. Such cultural go-betweens are 
in a unique, if often bedevilled position, as mediators between knowledge systems, who 
may be able to be effective advocates for victims of political violence and genocide.  
While people far from the violence might easily not act nor intervene for 
numerous reasons, including lack of awareness, as outsiders they may also have more 
security and capacity to speak out, bring resources, and provide refuge during crises. The 
great thinkers and peacemakers who, over the past five decades, have inspired the field of 
peace and conflict studies, have been leaders in addressing power relations, social 
injustice, and violence. But there is much more work that needs to be done, and, as Power 
argues, it means involving civil society. This includes finding inspiration—sometimes 
even in the forms of songs and stories—to sustain us on the journey, which is really the 
journey of humanity, to a world with peace and justice for everybody.  
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Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland: 
 
The Past, Present and Future 
 
Stephen Ryan 
 
Abstract 
 
This article explores the reasons for the slow progress being made in the Northern 
Ireland peace process. It examines complications that exist in dealing with the past, 
present, and future of the conflict between the two main communities whilst also arguing 
that it is hard to separate these time frames in practice. In terms of the present, some well 
known difficulties with the consociational approach are identified. Recent studies have 
also demonstrated a failure to address sectarianism at the grass-roots level and there has 
been a resurgence in activity by spoilers and rejectionists. When thinking about the future 
the two communities still have competing views about the final constitutional destiny of 
Northern Ireland and this inhibits the development of a sense of a shared future. 
Although there have been a plethora of initiatives for dealing with the past and for truth 
recovery, there does not appear to have been a satisfactory approach to this important 
dimension of peacebuilding. The article concludes by advocating two key strategies. The 
first is the development of initiatives based on the pursuit of superordinate goals. The 
second endorses Rorty’s idea of sentimental education as a way of building greater 
solidarity. 
 
“Wars don’t simply end. And wars don’t end simply” (Enloe 2004: 193)  
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Introduction 
 
The great Irish poet William Butler Yeats might have been astute to state in the 
Lake Isle of Innisfree that peace “comes dropping slow,” but even he might have been 
dismayed by the dawdling pace at which Northern Ireland has moved away from violent 
conflict since the signing of the Belfast Agreement in April 1998. Of course, Yeats was 
writing about inner peace—to “live alone in the bee-loud glade”—rather than the much 
more difficult task of creating a peaceful and democratic multi-cultural society. Yet even 
if we factor in the complex nature of this undertaking, it seems that the various parties to 
the conflict have adopted what Nietzsche called the “gospel of the tortoise”: a mentality 
that creates “as little as possible in the longest time possible” (Nietzsche, 2008, p. 83). A 
striking example of this is that even though they had been partners in the executive since 
May 2007, the First Minister (from the Protestant DUP) and the Deputy First Minister 
(from the Catholic Sinn Fein) did not shake hands until January 2010—and even this took 
place in private (Sunday Times 17 January 2010). 
Indeed, it would be reasonable to say that for the past eleven years Northern 
Ireland has been a society stuck in a transitional stage. Or to use the language of conflict 
research, it has achieved a conflict settlement, but not a resolution of conflict. The 
distinction between the two concepts was made clear by Burton (1988): 
 
For our purposes here, conflict resolution means terminating conflict by methods 
that are analytical and that get to the roots of the problem. Conflict resolution, as 
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opposed to mere management or “settlement”, points to an outcome that, in the 
view of the parties involved, is a permanent solution to a problem (p. 2). 
 
The slow progress is a little surprising because one would have thought, when 
compared with some other intractable conflicts, that Northern Ireland enjoys certain 
comparative advantages. Of course no intractable conflict is ever going to be resolved 
quickly or straightforwardly. Loizos, in an analysis of Cyprus, warns against the 
“attractive idiom of conflict resolution workshop...which assumes that everything, even 
political hostility, has its appropriate duration, after which it can transform” (2008, p. 
183). The experience of violence is always going to haunt the present in a number of 
ways. It results in militarization, increased ethnocentrism and the sharpening of the 
boundaries between in-groups and out-groups, more residential segregation, the 
construction of the “enemy image,” economic and political underdevelopment, and a 
strong sense of victimhood (Ryan, 2007). But we should also note some aspects of the 
conflict in Northern Ireland that might have made it easier to move towards peace. There 
is, for example, no significant refugee issue to complicate the peace process as has been 
the case in the Israeli-Palestinian, Bosnian, and Cyprus conflicts. There was no wholesale 
destruction of infrastructure that had to be rebuilt. There are differences in wealth 
between the two communities, but they are nowhere near as large as those between black 
and white South Africans or Israelis and Palestinians. There is also an existing 
democratic culture and all that comes with this: a strong civil society, an independent 
media, the capacity to organise free and fair elections, and a commitment to human rights 
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Cultural differences are also not as severe as in other conflicts. The use of Irish in 
Northern Ireland has become less contentious since the Belfast Agreement and the 
language issue has never been as divisive as it is in Belgium or the Basque country. Both 
of the main communities use English as their primary means of communication. Most 
members of the two main communities also regard themselves as Christian. Of course, 
some might argue that it is the close similarities between the two main communities that 
might explain the depth of their mutual hostility. It was Sigmund Freud who referred to 
the “narcissism of minor difference” in Civilization and Its Discontents. He wrote that “it 
is precisely communities with adjoining territories, and related to each other in other 
ways as well who are engaged in constant feuds and in ridiculing each other” (Freud, 
1985, p. 305). Freud thought this was a “relatively harmless satisfaction of the inclination 
to aggression” (p. 305) but Volkan believes it to be a more serious problem and notes that 
“people will kill to reinforce their ethnic or national group’s distinction from the enemy 
group, however minuscule that distinction may be” (1997, p. 109).  
Finally, we should note that there has been significant external financial support 
for the peace process from the European Union (EU) and the U.S. (see, for example, 
Arthur, 2000; Buchanan, 2008; Byrne, Irvin, Fissuh and Cunningham, 2006; Byrne, 
2009).  The EU Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation, usually called 
Peace I and Peace II, has delivered financial assistance for projects in the whole of 
Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Irish Republic. Peace II, for example, 
spent 425 million euro on areas such as economic renewal, social integration, 
development and regeneration, and cross border cooperation. The third stage of funding, 
Peace III, will spend another 333 million euros to carry forward key parts of the previous 
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rounds with a renewed emphasis on reconciliation. An additional £630 million has been 
committed to the International Fund for Ireland to “tackle the underlying causes of 
sectarianism and violence and to build reconciliation between people and within and 
between communities throughout the island of Ireland” (International Fund for Ireland, 
2010). The Fund has received donations from the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
and the European Union. 
This article will attempt an answer to the question why has the peace process in 
Northern Ireland been less than smooth despite the relatively advantageous starting point 
when compared to some other protracted intercommunal conflicts? In so doing, it will  
try to assess the peacebuilding process in Northern Ireland in terms of how, and to what 
extent, it has developed the capacity to deal with a divided  past and present, and in all 
likelihood with a disputed  future.  It is not a comprehensive analysis by any means, but it 
seeks to identify some key issues that might throw some light on this topic.  
Before we do this it is important to say two things. Firstly, we cannot understand 
any situation of protracted violent conflict in terms of simple, linear time. Several recent 
studies of violence and upheaval demonstrate this. For example, Das (2007) in an 
exploration of subjectivity and time asks what she calls the “haunting question”: is there 
“one duration or are there many?” (Das, 2007, p. 98). In exploring how the memory of 
traumatic past events is “folded” into social relationships she points to the need to grasp 
phenomenal time where events far apart in physical time can be imagined as 
simultaneous. Nordstrom (2000), in a chapter entitled “The Tomorrow of Violence,” 
notes that the impact of violence does not stop with “physical carnage” because it 
“reconfigures its victims and the social milieu that hosts them....It isn’t a passing 
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phenomenon that momentarily challenges a stable system, leaving a scar but no lasting 
effects....Violence becomes a determining fact in shaping reality as people will know it in 
the future” (p. 223). 
Secondly, we are not arguing that there are no positive aspects to the Northern 
Ireland situation. Despite the slow progress there have always been those who have held 
up the Northern Ireland process as a positive example others could follow. Since the St. 
Andrews agreement the odd-couple power sharing arrangement between the DUP and 
Sinn Fein has delivered a period of stable government. But even when the peace process 
was stalled it was never paralysed and it never collapsed (Halliday, 2000, p. 287). The 
tortoise always kept moving forward. Indeed, the real achievements in Northern Ireland 
should not be under-estimated. There is the considerable accomplishment of a devolved 
power-sharing government. The main paramilitary organizations in both communities 
seem to have rejected violence. The British army has all but disappeared from the streets 
and many bases have been closed. The RUC has transformed into the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland, district policing partnerships have been introduced and a Police 
Ombudsman has been created. The parades issue, so contentious in the past, is now being 
managed in a peaceful way. However, the undoubted positive developments that flowed 
out of the Belfast Agreement should not blind us to some negative aspects and there are 
surely lessons to be learnt from looking at these as well. 
 
The Trouble with Consociationalism 
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In March 2007 elections to the devolved Assembly at Stormont returned 36 DUP 
and 28 Sinn Fein MLAs confirming their status as the largest Unionist and Nationalist 
parties in the resurrected devolved government. Two years later, in May 2009,  it could 
be claimed that Northern Ireland had experienced the longest spell of stable, pluralist, and 
democratic government in its history though we should note that the executive did not 
meet for four months during  this period because of disagreements over the devolution of 
policing and justice powers. This has replaced the decommissioning issue as the factor 
most likely to disrupt the peace process, as recent events have demonstrated.  
O’Leary (1999) has described the devolved administration as “consociation plus.” 
It undoubtedly makes use of some classical strategies proposed by the theory of 
consociational engineering devised by Lijphart (1977), but it also contains supranational 
elements. These are found in Strands 2 and 3 of the Belfast Agreement, which set up a 
North-South Ministerial Council, cross border implementation bodies, and a British-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference. Furthermore, it “was the first consociational settlement 
endorsed by a referendum that required concurrent majorities in jurisdictions in different 
states” (O’Leary 2001, p. 49). 
 There seem to be at least four problems we can identify with the current system of 
government. The first is the failure to confirm the final constitutional status of Northern 
Ireland. This will be examined in the next section. Secondly, there are well-known 
weaknesses with the consociational approach, including claims that it deepens cultural 
divisions, establishes complex arrangements that can easily be paralysed, and 
concentrates too much on the elite level of politics. Thirdly, linked to this, is the failure to 
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move beyond sectarianism at the grass-roots level. Fourthly, there is the inability to 
neutralise all rejectionists and “spoilers.”  
The issue of whether consociationalism is a cause or a consequence of cultural 
divisions is still debated. The evidence from Northern Ireland would seem to suggest that 
it might result in greater polarization because the main beneficiaries in political terms to 
date have been the “hard-line” parties in both communities. This move away from the 
moderate ground, which was evident in the 2003 Assembly elections, has resulted in the 
Ulster Unionist Party being replaced by the Democratic Unionist Party as the main 
Protestant party and Sinn Fein has replaced the SDLP as the main Catholic party.  
The claim that consociationalism can entrench communalism is a critique often 
associated with Horowitz (1985), who believes that in divided societies there is a need for 
structural approaches that provide incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation. In particular he 
explored how electoral systems either block or encourage such cooperation. Unlike 
consociationalism, the best types of electoral systems will reduce competition between 
ethnic groups by, inter alia, encouraging the majority to behave more moderately towards 
the minority and encouraging voluntary multi-ethnic coalitions. They can also avoid a 
rigid bifurcation by preserving fluidity. He accepts that the electoral system is just one 
component in what must be a larger framework, but he also argues that an electoral 
system can produce positive change in a relatively short time. 
Critics also point to other weaknesses of consociationalism as a long-term device 
for resolving inter-communal conflicts. It can be rigid and unable to adapt to social 
changes, as was the case in Lebanon. This is something Horowitz has called the “frozen 
quota” problem (Horowitz, 1985, p. 586). Consociational arrangements set up 
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complicated forms of government that can be paralysed relatively easily if one of the 
groups decides to withdraw cooperation over issues such as how complex arrangements 
are to be implemented, as was the case in Cyprus between 1960–63. This has also been 
the experience in Northern Ireland since 1998.  Finally, the approach has been criticised 
for being too elitist and this has led Byrne (2001) to call for a stronger integration of 
consociation ideas with civil society approaches.  
Several commentators have noted that the progress made at the elite level in the 
late 1990s did not always transfer to the grassroots. This is a problem, because the Belfast 
Agreement was a political bargain made in the absence of “interethnic reconciliation” and 
this “creates serious problems for the success of consociation in the long term” (Kerr, 
2005, p. 192). Certainly, a number of interface flashpoints remained between the 
residential estates of the two communities (Heatley, 2004). Furthermore, the number of 
“Peace Lines” in Belfast, which separate Catholic and Protestant residential areas, have 
not been drastically reduced since 1998. A recent study has found that whereas there 
were eighteen barriers in the early 1990s there were eighty-eight in 2008 and only five 
barriers had been removed during the entire Troubles (Community Relations Council 
2008). Another report on segregation in six areas of Northern Ireland by the Institute for 
Conflict Research found that although there was a diversity of experiences there was a 
continuing legacy of the troubles and in some areas levels of sectarianism and 
segregation had increased (Hamilton and others, 2008). The report concludes: 
 
In some areas there are greater levels of mixing, sharing and integrating, while in 
others the legacy of the past, of hostility, fear and mistrust dominate the wider 
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social environment. In most social environments the process of avoidance still 
appears to dominate interactions between members of the two main communities 
(p. 154). 
 
Such findings seem to be confirmed by a 2009 report based on a consultation with 130 
young men, which found that “very little seems to have changed in spite of the peace 
process” and that “many young men appear to be stuck inhabiting a ceasefire world” 
(Centre for Young Men’s Studies, 2009, p. 2). In addition these young men stated that the 
paramilitaries were still active in both communities and that “conflict and violence 
impacted on their lives on most days” (p. 2). The Guardian offers support for such a 
view, and reported on 2 June 2009 that for 2007–8 and 2008–9 just over 1,500 “sectarian 
incidents” a year were reported to the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Another study 
has found that in the mixed area of the Waterside in Derry the segregation of Protestants 
and Catholic communities has increased (Shirlow and others, 2005). Finally, from a 
Loyalist perspective, Gary McMichael has noted the lack of consultation with grassroots 
within the UDA, commenting that: 
 
Those of us in the negotiations had evolved and shifted in our attitudes....But 
those outside did not follow us and we weren’t able to bring them with us. They 
had not had the same opportunity to evolve as we had. A big reason for that was 
that we didn’t have the infrastructure (Quoted in Spencer, 2008, p. 183).  
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Or as another insider noted, the pro-Agreement Ulster Democratic Party failed because it 
“left the foot soldiers behind” (Spencer, 2008, p. 186). All of this suggests that the pro-
Agreement elites might have been moving too fast and failed to bring their supporters 
with them (Dixon, 2001, p. 305). 
 The sense that the elites have not done enough to energise the grass roots is 
reinforced by the fate of the Civic Forum. This consultative body was included in the 
Belfast Agreement as a result of work by the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition. It had  
60 members representing different sectors of society including 18 from the voluntary 
sector, 7 from business and the trade unions, 5 from the churches and 2 from victims 
groups. It first met in October 2000 but could not sit when the Assembly was suspended 
and is now the subject of a review by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First 
Minister (OFMDFM). 
Given the difficulties that remain at the grass-roots level one would have expected 
priority would be given to strategies to help address this problem. Yet this has not been 
the case. The OFMDFM was meant to produce a draft programme for cohesion, sharing 
and integration (CSI strategy) before the end of October 2008, but there is still no sign of 
a final document, though the DUP and Sinn Fein have produced separate drafts. This 
failure to agree to what, in essence, would be a community relation’s strategy has 
frustrated many working in this area. 
The final issue that has affected the trajectory of the peace process is the “spoiler” 
and rejectionist problem. The term spoiler was introduced by Stedman (1997), though 
there are some who point out that it has a negative connotation and might be used to 
delegitimize those who have genuine grievance towards a peace agreement. However, as 
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the term has become widely used it is retained for the purposes of this analysis. Stedman 
defined spoilers in a way that only included those willing to use violence to bring down a 
peace process. Therefore we have to distinguish them from rejectionists, who may also 
have strong feelings against an agreement, but who restrict themselves to political means.  
After a period when the process here was relatively untroubled by spoilers, they 
have now returned to complicate the peace process. Today they are restricted to the 
Republican community, and are made up of three main groups: the Real IRA (RIRA), the 
Continuity IRA and Oglaigh na hEireann. They have emerged as a more serious threat in 
the past year, leading the outgoing Chief Constable, Hugh Orde, to state in March 2009 
that the threat from such groups was at a “critical level” (McDonald, 2009a). A month 
later, two senior pro-Agreement republicans are reported to have told the Irish 
Government that the IRA had “lost control of Ardoyne” in Belfast (McDonald, 2009b). 
In 2009, the rejectionist groups killed two soldiers and a policeman (and tried to kill 
several others), took over the village of Meigh and tried to blow up the Policing Board 
Headquarters in Belfast. It therefore came as no surprise when the International 
Monitoring Commission noted that armed attacks committed by rejectionist Republican 
groups was at its highest level for six years (The Guardian editorial, 31 December 2009). 
 Stedman (1997) argues that some spoilers can be managed, and the strategy 
depends on their goals. However, it would be wise to note a comment by Nietzsche 
(2008): 
 
One can divide those who are intent on overthrowing society into the ones who 
want to gain something for themselves and the ones who want to gain it for their 
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children and grandchildren. The latter are the more dangerous; for they have faith 
and the good conscience of selflessness. The others can be diverted: the ruling 
society is still rich and clever enough for that. Danger begins when goals become 
impersonal (p. 92).  
 
As several writers have noted, there were many features of the Belfast Agreement 
that did not appeal to Unionists (see, for example, Aughey, 2001; Farrington, 2008; 
McGarry and O’Leary, 2004; Murray, 2000; Spencer, 2008; Tonge, 2004). In the 
immediate post-Agreement stage it was the opposition to it from the Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP) and from certain elements within the loyalist community that appeared to 
put the agreement most at risk. Today, the most significant opposition to the Belfast–St. 
Andrews peace process comes from the new Unionist group called the Traditional 
Unionist Voice (TUV). The former DUP European MEP Jim Allister who performed 
above most observers’ expectations in the 2009 European Elections leads this. Allister 
has been scathing about the current peace process, calling the Executive a “wretched, 
useless government” and a “miserable, failing government.” Sniping from the margins, 
Allister (2009) is likely to exploit the recent deal on policing and justice by an 
administration he characterises as “terrorists in government, spongers in parliament” by 
claiming that the DUP is appeasing Sinn Fein and will not collapse the Assembly because 
it fears an electoral contest with the TUV.  
The threat to the peace process presented by the TUV is the same as the one that 
the DUP presented in the immediate post-Agreement era, though, of course it would be 
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wrong at present to place the former in the same category as the latter when it comes to 
popular support. Nonetheless, as O’Leary (2001) points out:  
 
Where any bloc is divided over the merits of such a settlement, and where its 
leaders respond more to the threat of being outflanked than they do to the 
imperative of making the new (tacit) cross-ethnic coalition work, it may prove 
impossible to implement the agreement (p. 79).  
 
There is also one major shock on the horizon that threatens to make the general 
political environment less benign. The Executive’s Building a Better Future: Draft 
Programme for Government 2008–11, aims to make Northern Ireland a “peaceful, fair 
and prosperous society.” The linking of peace and prosperity is now going to be put to 
the test. Since 1998, Northern Ireland has experienced an economic boom that has 
produced a tide that has raised all boats. Many began to feel wealthier even if a lot of this 
was based on unearned credit, inflated house prices and a strong pound when measured 
against the euro. This, of course, has now changed. The banking crisis has forced the 
British and Irish governments as well as Stormont to plan for big cuts in public spending, 
and the Northern Ireland economy is very dependent on the public sector. The big 
question is how will a rise in unemployment and increased economic insecurity impact 
on intercommunal relations? This is a disputed area, and disagreements still exist about 
the relationship between the state of the economy and violence. The worry is that Gellner 
(1997), one of most important theorists of nationalism, might have been correct when he 
claimed that individuals who “are affluent and, above all, who believe themselves to be in 
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a situation which will fairly soon improve and continue to do so are much less likely to 
be tempted into violent conduct” (p. 106). The implication is that if the situation is 
reversed, and the economy starts to decline along with peoples’ expectation, then 
violence might become more attractive again. 
 
The Future and the Problem of Contradictory Optimism 
 
Geoffrey Blainey (1988), in his stimulating analysis of the causes of war, once 
noted that they are always the product of contradictory optimism—since each side starts a 
war believing it can win, but all sides cannot be correct in this assessment. Now peace is 
characterized by the move away from zero-sum, win-lose thinking to a positive sum, win-
win mentality, but it is not at all clear that this has happened in Northern Ireland. Indeed, 
what we have here, if we adapt Blainey’s observation, is a peace process based on 
contradictory optimism. On the one hand Unionists were informed that the Belfast 
Agreement would make the link with the UK stronger whilst Republicans were told that 
this was an important first step on the road to a united Ireland. Indeed, O’Leary (2001) 
argues that the main reason that the pro-Agreement Unionists were willing to do a deal 
with republicans was to protect their position with regards to the constitutional status quo 
because “only by being generous now could they reconcile nationalists to the Union” (p. 
73). This is not the way most nationalists viewed it. They have a different view on the 
legitimacy of the partition of the island of Ireland that draws on one of the most powerful 
political discourses of the twentieth century—that of conquest, colonization, 
expropriation of land, resistance, and claims to self-determination 
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 When the DUP agreed to enter a power-sharing arrangement with Sinn Fein after 
the St Andrews Agreement, its leader, the Rev. Ian Paisley also claimed this made the 
Union with Britain stronger. In a “devolution consultation” the party leader called on 
Unionists to support the agreement and claimed:  
 
If you want to save the Union and have a devolved democratic government then 
the changes which the DUP fought for and obtained in this new Agreement, to 
safeguard your British and democratic rights, must be made [emphasis added] 
(DUP, 2006, p. 1). 
 
To support this interpretation the DUP pointed out that Sinn Fein would now have to 
support the police and the criminal justice system, that “all North/Southery is fully 
accountable to Northern Ireland’s elected representatives,” that power-sharing will only 
take place after an end to IRA paramilitary activity is proven, and that “no significant 
decisions can be taken without Unionist approval” (p. 3). Needless to say, Sinn Fein 
continues to adhere to an all-Ireland strategy and remain committed to Irish unity. 
So when it comes to answering the “sovereignty question” we have mutually 
incompatible objectives within the terms of reference established by the sovereign state 
system—Northern Ireland couldn’t be both British and Irish in a constitutional sense. But 
does this matter? Clearly, if all sides are at ease with this ambiguity about the direction 
they are heading in constitutional terms then this may not be a significant drawback. If 
individuals and communities can be British or Irish in a cultural sense then maybe the 
“territorial destiny” of the province is less important.  
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However, there at least two problems with this slightly schizophrenic situation. 
The first is that if there is no general consensus about the future constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland, then how can everyone work for a shared future that has yet to be 
defined and would probably not be supported by both communities if it could be 
explicitly stated? In this way, Northern Ireland is different from, for example, South 
Africa where there is now a general agreement as to what this entity is as a single 
sovereign state. So the vast majority of South Africans were able to work together for a 
new South Africa clear about what this was to be in a constitutional sense. This is not the 
case in Northern Ireland, where the two dominant parties still have radically different 
visions about the ultimate direction they are taking.  
This is why it is hard to accept the idea that what Northern Ireland needs is a 
“shared future” that can be agreed through rational inter-communal dialogue. Instead, 
what the society should be working towards is a modus vivendi, which Gray identifies as 
“liberal toleration adapted to the historical fact of pluralism” (2009, p. 25). It is an 
approach that “has no truck with the notion of an ideal regime” and “aims to find terms 
on which different ways of life can live well together” (p. 25). The end is “not any 
supreme good— even peace.” Rather it is “reconciling conflicting goods” (Gray, 2009, p. 
44).  
The second problem that arises out of the absence of an agreed final destination 
for Northern Ireland concerns the willingness to accept an agreement that leaves this 
issue unresolved. Lack of clarity might be acceptable at some stages of a peace process, 
especially when communities are weary of violence. But living with the “creative 
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ambiguity” enshrined in the Belfast Agreement depends on a strong sense of security and 
contentment with the status quo that might not always be present. 
 
The Past Is Not Another Country 
 
Dealing with the legacy of the past is often considered to be a vital part of the 
transformation of society from violence to peace. Yet there are those who point out the 
inadequate way that this has been addressed in Northern Ireland. The observation by 
Peatling (2004) that “dimensions of bereavement, forgiveness, trauma and remorse, 
remain among the thorniest and most poorly addressed issues in the peace process” (p. 
42) remains relevant today. In fact, there have been a number of diverse approaches that 
indicate uncertainty and maybe fundamental divisions as to how best to approach this 
issue. These have been detailed by Albert (2009), who offers a comprehensive 
description of initiatives since 1998. Indeed the British government began addressing this 
topic even before the Belfast Agreement was signed with two important innovations. The 
first was the creation of the Victims Commissioner, Sir Derek Bloomfield, in October 
1997 (see Smyth, 2000). In the same year the Blair government set up a judicial inquiry 
into the shooting dead of fourteen civil rights protestors in Derry in January 1971. 
Post-agreement initiatives in this area include: the 20 recommendations in the  
Report of the Northern Ireland Victims Commissioner in May 1998; the creation of a 
Minister for Victims in June 1998; the creation of a Victims Liaison Unit in 1998 (later 
incorporated into the Victims Unit in the Office of the First Minster and Deputy First 
Minister); the numerous actions set out in the 2002 Executive strategy for victims entitled 
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Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve; the appointment of Bertha McDougall as the Interim 
Commissioner for Victims and Survivors between 2005 and 2007; the 36 
recommendations of her 2007 Report called Support for Victims and Survivors: 
Addressing the Human Legacy; the creation of four Victims Commissioners in 2008  
(after a failure to agree on the name of a single Commissioner); and the creation of a 
Consultative Group on the Past in June 2007 that produced a controversial report in early 
2009. This became the basis of a public consultation on 94 questions devised by the 
Northern Ireland Office in response to the report’s recommendations. In addition, Albert 
points to a number of other initiatives. These include official bodies such as the Historical 
Enquiries Team that is re-investigating deaths between 1968 and 1998 and numerous 
non-governmental groups engaged in archiving, storytelling or the creation of museums 
(Albert, 2009, pp. 132–137).  
The difficult issues that exist in trying to “neutralize history” in Northern Ireland 
is illustrated by the public reception of the recommendations contained within the recent 
report of the Consultative Group on the Past, usually referred to as the Eames-Bradley 
report after the co-Chairs (available at www.cgpni.org). This made 31 recommendations 
in six areas: the creation of a legacy commission with a fixed lifetime of five years, 
remembering, victims and survivors, societal issues (addressing wider sectarianism and 
reintegrating former paramilitaries with criminal convictions), processes of justice and 
information recovery, and the legacy of the past and reconciliation. However, when the 
report was made public on 28 January 2009 all attention was directed at one proposal— 
that one of payment of £12,000 should be made for everyone who died as a result of “the 
Troubles,” irrespective of the cause of death. This was the idea that all victims of 
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violence should receive a “recognition payment” and it raised objections that “terrorists” 
killed by the security forces did not deserve the same level of sympathy as innocent 
victims murdered by paramilitaries. 
Here we might be witnessing the phenomenon that Mack termed “egoism of 
victimization” (1990), which exists when one traumatised group lacks the capacity to 
empathize with the suffering of other groups. There are at least two responses to this 
phenomenon. The first is to argue that it is wrong to deny or underestimate the validity of 
other people’s feelings. So Das (2007) writes that “to deny someone else’s claim that she 
is in pain is not an intellectual failure, it is a spiritual failure—the future between us is at 
stake” (p. 90). The second response is to point out that it is extremely difficult to draw a 
clear line between victims and victimizers because of the way that one reinforces the 
other. Victimizers often feel themselves to be the victims and are caught up in the victim-
revenge dynamic. 
The British government’s response to Eames-Bradley was to initiate yet another 
round of consultations with the people of Northern Ireland about the 31 recommendations 
To encourage a strong response a website was created that produced an “Response Aid 
Document” and detailed guidance notes for its completion (available at 
healingthroughremembering.info). However, given that there are at least 60 victims and 
survivor groups in Northern Ireland and the strong passions that the issue of remembering 
the past still evokes, it is unlikely that any consultation will find the consensus that has 
eluded the communities until now. 
 
A Way Forward? 
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Maybe the best way to think of the Northern Ireland peace process is not as a 
single process at all, but as a series of interlinked issues. This is a point made by Jarman 
(2008) who argues that the nature of the peace process—no clear victor, no agreement 
about what to do next, and no real conciliation between the communities—meant that the 
post-agreement transition phase “progressed along a number of interlinked but distinctive 
paths.” These paths, the author claims, were “rarely synchronized” (p. 134). Or, as Darby 
(2001) put it, the conflict is “a tangle of interrelated questions” (2001, p. 15). 
The complex nature of the process makes it hard to evaluate in a decisive manner. 
It is a place where citizens have liberty and there is much more equality between the 
communities than in the past, but it is one that still seems to lack a degree of fraternity 
across the intercommunal divide. Although the communities have moved towards the 
extremes in electoral terms, the majority would like to live in mixed neighbourhoods, be 
employed in mixed workplaces and send their children to integrated schools. The 
majority live in segregated estates but also believe relations will be better in five years 
time (Albert, 2009, pp. 174–183).  
In a very useful audit of the peacebuilding elements after 1998, Albert, using a 
transformation framework, argues that there have been positive transformations of the 
context (end of Cold War, deepening of EU integration), structures (new institutions), 
relationships (reduced social injustice), issues (e.g. in the area of language), actors  
(changing attitudes within Sinn Fein and the DUP), and rules and norms (a stronger 
human rights framework) (Albert, 2009). However, as she also notes, Northern Ireland 
remains a highly segregated society where, if anything, the “two communities seem to be 
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drifting further apart” (Albert, 2009, p. 351). To this we should note that the spoiler 
problem has not disappeared, and the assumption that the peace process will be linked to 
generalised increase in wealth is no longer tenable though it is not clear what impact this 
will have. A major concern is that the lack of sustained and meaningful inter-communal 
discourse and the preference for segregated living has produced not a multicultural 
society, but is closer to one that Sen (2006) has termed “plural monoculturalism,” which 
refers to “two traditions co-existing side by side, without the twain meeting.” 
Yet there are also hints of what Galtung has called  “transcending possibilities,” 
based on the potential of the “moderate majority” (2004), which, he believes, makes up 
perhaps 85 percent of the population of Ulster. So one of the conclusions of the report on 
segregation mentioned earlier claims:  
 
The legacy of the Troubles and recent experiences of violence remain factors in 
how people act as social beings, but people are not solely constrained by their past 
and there is some evidence of positive change and greater levels of mixing in 
some aspects of social life in many areas across the north (Hamilton and others, 
2008, p. 154). 
 
There are, of course, many ideas as to how to reinforce this positive trend. 
However, here we can focus on two strategies. The first relates to in-groups and out-
groups. It appears that the nation-state/sovereignty/territorial mentality associated with 
what International Relations specialists call the Westphalian system seems incapable of  
             Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 93 ‐ 
 
resolving (as opposed to settling) the Northern Ireland conflict.1 This is because it seems 
to encourage zero-sum thinking—Northern Ireland is either British or Irish, and it is hard 
to imagine oneself as both British and Irish. How to we move away from such thinking?  
One course might be to stress the way that cooperation over the fulfilment of material and 
non-material needs can change attitudes and behaviour.  
Here we can mention Mitrany’s functionalist idea of a Working Peace System 
(Mitrany, 1943). Written during the Second World War it proposed the erosion of the 
destructive European nation-state state system through the creation of supranational 
bodies dedicated to fulfilling material needs in key areas—an idea that is today found in 
the European Commission. There are echoes of this thinking in Burton’s (1982) idea that 
true resolution requires a paradigm shift to human needs thinking, though his wish to 
portray these needs as objective and universal has provoked opposition. Nonetheless his 
idea that protracted social conflicts, such as that found in Northern Ireland, can find win-
win outcomes by moving from the realm of power politics or legal approaches to basic 
needs fulfilment has a lot to commend it. He claims: 
 
The fact that universal human needs include non-material goals that are in infinite 
supply, opens up means of resolving apparent zero-sum conflicts of interest, 
including problems of change by positive-sum outcomes and, therefore,  without 
violence or coercion (p. 132). 
 
                                                 
1 My thanks to Toshio Kadokura for this point. 
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Also of interest here is Sherif’s (1967) concept of superordinate goals. Sherif and 
his co-experimenters were trying to answer the question how can two groups “with 
hostile attitudes and negative images of the other and each desiring to keep the members 
of the detested out-group at a safe distance, be brought into cooperative interaction and 
friendly intercourse”? (pp. 5–6). As a result of his experiments he concluded that the best 
method for improved relations was the pursuit of what he called superordinate goals— 
which are “compelling for the groups involved, but cannot be achieved by a single group 
through its own efforts and resources” (pp. 5–6) Superordinate goals can be found in 
everything from the pursuit of greater European unity, to actions to protect the 
environment, to joint sporting teams or music groups. Several interesting examples exist 
in Northern Ireland, but there is room for many more initiatives around this strategy. 
There is some evidence, therefore, that hostile groups working together in the 
pursuit of mutually advantageous goals, whether this is at the micro or the macro level, 
can reduce hostile feelings and create new imagined communities. For those who believe 
that such ideas are unrealistic, it might be valuable to reflect on research for the 2007 
Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey that found that an increasing number of people in 
the Province are choosing to describe themselves as “Northern Irish” or “equally Irish 
and British”—a hopeful sign that the British-Irish dualism can be transcended. As the 
report notes, “an increasing number of people are moving away from the traditional 
labels” (University of Ulster News, December 2, 2008).  
The second interesting strategy draws on the work of Richard Rorty (1989, 1999) 
and, in particular, his idea of sentimental education. This is not the place to investigate 
his ideas in depth, but, in essence, what Rorty is calling for is greater inter-subjective 
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understanding through the arts. He believes that when faced with cruel behaviour we 
need to move from “rigorous rationality” to “flexible sentimentality.”  It has been argued 
elsewhere that the marrying of Rorty’s idea of sentimental education with Boulding’s 
idea of “learning sites” offers some interesting avenues that could be taken to address the 
deconstruction of negative attitudes, especially if such initiatives could be incorporated 
within major agents of cultural reproduction in Northern Ireland (Ryan, 2007). These 
would include the media (incorporating the insights of peace journalism), the Arts, 
education, and the family. Linked to this is Sen’s idea that children should live 
“examined lives” when they grow up in multicultural settings, and should be encouraged 
to explore cultural freedom rather than faith-based separatism (Sen, 2006).  
Without the development of significant actions to address the dangers posed by an 
intolerant plural monoculturalism in a society where the communities retain a win-lose 
mentality about the present, have failed to neutralise the hurts of the past and have 
incompatible visions of the future we cannot guarantee the peace process will continue to 
move forward. This should be a cause for concern because, as someone once pointed out, 
no one ever forgets where he or she buries the hatchet.  
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Abstract 
 
 
The sophistication of peace operations and complex humanitarian missions has increased 
in recent decades, resulting in increased international capacity to mitigate organized 
violence and provide relief to suffering populations. With respect to other indicators of 
success, however, international peace strategies still leave much to be desired. By their 
very nature, externally driven efforts tend to leave local actors feeling marginalized and 
disempowered, and unable to fulfill aspirations for cumulative and sustainable 
transformations in the quality of life. The peace that local populations genuinely hope for 
may fail to take root, and dynamics associated with interventionism may replace one set 
of problems with another. To address such problems within existing peace processes and 
to provide a framework for broader preventive action, this paper identifies “localizing 
peace” as a central challenge for twenty-first century peacebuilding efforts. International 
and cross-cultural cooperation remain vital for tackling border-spanning problems and 
structural inequalities, yet the advancement of global peace depends in no small part on 
the enhancement of local peace capacities. Ultimately, peace must be defined and 
constructed locally, and peacebuilding efforts become energetic and sustainable only to 
the extent that they tap local resources, empower local constituencies, and achieve 
legitimacy within particular cultural and religious contexts. By appreciating these 
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realities, international actors can discover more effective means of partnering with local 
organizations and movements, while also deriving new insights into the unity and 
diversity of peacemaking.  
 
Introduction 
 
It has become commonplace for commentators on world affairs to observe that we 
are entering a period of profound social stress and of extreme pressures on often 
ineffective national as well as international governance systems. Globalized patterns of 
inequality, economic volatility, and resource scarcity are exacerbating localized social 
cleavages among ethnocultural groups, in ways that often outstrip the capacities of 
already-weak states to preserve social peace and stability. In some world regions, local 
and national conflicts increasingly spill over borders, presenting severe challenges to 
multilateral initiatives charged with containing violence and establishing security. 
While ambitious and multi-faceted peace operations have helped stabilize deeply 
fractured societies and reduce direct violence (Bellamy and Williams, 2010), few have 
proved capable of addressing root causes of conflict or sustainably empowering the local 
population. Critics of contemporary stabilization and reconstruction missions have 
observed that the top-down nature of major international missions mirrors imbalances 
within the larger world order, and frequently results in a low-quality or “stalled” peace 
(Mac Ginty, 2006). The introduction of a large foreign presence to a conflict zone tends 
to engender dependence on outsiders, friction between “internationals” and “locals,” and 
ambivalence about the trajectory of political change. Because the psychological residues 
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as well as social and economic correlates of violent conflict persist despite the brokering 
of accords by external actors and the initiation of standardized institutional reforms, 
contemporary peace processes often suffer from deficits in the areas of local 
empowerment, ownership, and legitimacy (Donais, 2009). Peace becomes a series of 
events that happen to the general population rather than a participatory initiative that 
enables members of a divided society to tap local resources, rediscover their own 
vernacular language for peacebuilding, and become active agents in the construction of a 
new reality.      
To meet the peacebuilding needs of the 21st century and create a more sound and 
equitable basis for addressing global governance challenges, genuinely empowering 
forms of grassroots mobilization and local-international partnership are needed. Though 
humanitarian missions endorsed by the United Nations and backed by leading states are 
likely to remain necessary, practitioners and scholars of peacebuilding must be careful 
not to resign themselves to a “trouble-shooter” role within a largely Western, “liberal 
peace” (Richmond, 2008) framework that narrows discussion of international conflict 
issues and under-represents actual as well as potential contributions to peace from non-
Western cultures. Instead, they must explore ways of broadening and deepening 
international dialogue about the nature and sources of peace, and underscore the value of 
context-sensitive peacebuilding efforts that seek to activate local resources and revitalize 
indigenous peacemaking capacities. 
As global conversations about peace, governance, and human security move 
forward, there is a vital need to reassert the value of local solutions. In a world of diverse, 
non-interchangeable cultural and religious contexts, there can be no singular, formulaic 
             Localizing Peace 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 104 ‐ 
 
approach to sustainable international peacebuilding. Where homogenizing, generic 
approaches are at best indifferent to local culture and are premised on the need for a clean 
break with the conflict-afflicted past, newer approaches must adopt a humbler attitude 
which regards conflict resolution as a cultural activity and seeks forms of partnership that 
energize and support local efforts. This means rethinking the role of context in shaping 
peacemaking practice, balancing the need for innovation with the necessity of historical 
continuity, and emphasizing the renewable and potentially dynamic nature of local 
cultural resources.  
 
Etic and Emic Approaches to Peace 
 
During the last two decades, increasing numbers of researchers have recognized 
that theories and practices of conflict resolution are culturally constructed and, to some 
extent, context specific. Although modes of training that presuppose universally 
applicable techniques and methods persist, many scholars and practitioners have come to 
appreciate the reality that there are no culture-free approaches to conflict mediation (Abu-
Nimer, 1996; Augsburger, 1992), international negotiation (Cohen, 1991), problem 
solving (Avruch, 1998), or peacebuilding capacity development (Lederach, 1995). 
Emergent, self-critical voices within the field have sought to reframe conflict resolution 
as a cultural activity rather than a technical specialization that transcends culture, and 
have recognized that cultural assumptions are present even in basic constructs of the 
field. Implicit in much of this critical analysis is the notion that, while disciplined inquiry 
may succeed in identifying general principles that apply in multiple contexts, specific 
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applications are not culturally neutral (Avruch and Black, 1994). In the domain of 
international peacebuilding practice, the call to take culture seriously has helped open the 
door to reconsideration of traditional and indigenous methods of peacemaking 
(MacGinty, 2008; Malan, 2005)—forms of peacemaking that generally predate modern 
North American methods of conflict resolution, and that are often present in the living 
memory of populations experiencing protracted social conflict.   
To date, discussion concerning the diversity of peacemaking processes has 
progressed somewhat more rapidly than reflection on cultural variations in the way in 
which peace itself can be understood. Given the extent to which the field of peace 
research derives intellectual coherence and a normative mandate from foundational 
“negative” and “positive” peace concepts, this is not altogether surprising. The field of 
peace and conflict studies has developed a compelling vocabulary for reflecting on the 
substantive as well as value-laden dimensions of peace, contributing a vital distinction 
between formulations of peace as a mere absence of overt violence (“negative peace”) 
and peace concepts that are linked to the presence of conditions for human flourishing 
(“positive peace”). Through such distinctions, peace researchers have begun to develop 
what anthropologists call an etic language for the diagnosis and evaluation of large-scale 
patterns of human behaviour. In contrast to the emic, ethnographic language of “thick 
description,” which privileges the local, vernacular terminology used by “insiders” over 
exogenous analytical concepts, etic language aspires to provide a basis for comparative 
analysis and theoretical generalization (Avruch, 1998, pp. 57–72; Harris, 1968; Headland 
and others, 1990). The relatively new and specialized etic language of peace research has 
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added greater intellectual discipline to academic discussions of topics pertaining to “war 
and peace” while also opening space for the evaluation of existing practices. 
By highlighting the possibility of deliberate efforts to advance a “positive” peace 
among nations and systematically analyzing ways in which the contemporary 
international system falls short of this standard, peace researchers have helped expose a 
common dynamic of power politics, according to which dominant powers attribute 
universal validity to their own conceptions of peace, and invoke these conceptions to 
validate the order over which they have come to preside. As Mac Ginty (2006) notes, 
 
[P]eace is universal in the sense that virtually all social communities profess a 
notion of peace, but these notions of peace do not comprise a discrete and 
coherent set of ideas that can claim unanimous allegiance. Yet, the view that there 
is just one universal peace is persistent, particularly among hegemonic states and 
organizations (p. 17). 
 
Although the language of strategists and statesmen often presents peace as a mere 
absence of war secured through the robust deterrence of military preparedness (a useful 
stance for deflecting calls to demilitarize politics or move towards a more collaboratively 
governed international order), this “minimalist,” status quo peace discourse tends to exist 
symbiotically with other notions that equate “real peace” with “our way of life,” 
conceived in positive and substantive (if also idealized or ideological) terms. While this 
latter tendency may be as commonplace among politically marginalized communities as 
it is among the powerful, the temptation for those who wield great influence is to equate 
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peace with predominance—a stance which excludes alternative perspectives on the 
existing world order, and readily legitimizes war to defend, secure, or extend a 
hegemonic peace. By highlighting the normative shortcomings of “negative,” militarized 
understandings of international peacekeeping and issuing a cosmopolitan rather than 
nationalistic call for cooperative efforts to establish peace as a presence (for example, 
inclusive security, equitable international development, social justice, cultural 
coexistence, and participatory politics), academically based peace advocates have 
mounted a challenge to traditional security politics. They have sought to discipline self-
referential and self-serving notions of peace, and reorganize thought and practice to meet 
the needs of an increasingly interdependent world rendered insecure by the steady 
advance of technological capacities for destruction. 
Given the urgent nature of peace and security debates throughout the Cold War 
era, most peace researchers devoted only limited attention to the cultural foundations and 
resonances of “positive peace” concepts, emphasizing the universal significance of their 
transnational enterprise rather than the underlying diversity of peace constructs among 
the world’s manifold cultural and religious communities. By highlighting the 
shortcomings of militarized approaches to peacemaking and calling for transnational 
commitment to more holistic ways of understanding and advancing peace, modern peace 
researchers have sought to bypass ethnocentric nationalism and foster consensus on the 
bases of a more just, stable, and humane international order. In the process, they have 
provided globally engaged activists and leaders with a genuinely new language for 
talking about peace as something more than the “peace for us” of bounded cultural 
communities and the “peace our way” of hegemonic orders ancient and modern, from 
             Localizing Peace 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 108 ‐ 
 
Pax Romana and the Chinese Middle Kingdom to Pax Britannica and Pax Americana.  
While peace researchers’ contributions are considerable and there is a need for a 
further refinement and diffusion of the etic language of peace and conflict studies, recent 
developments in international affairs suggest a concomitant need to revisit the emic 
dimension of peacemaking. Although past tendencies to analytically bypass emic peace 
concepts have been ameliorated by the decline of Cold War ideological polarization and 
the concomitant rise in awareness of conflict as well as peacebuilding potential inherent 
in ethnic and communal identities, the rich and subtle diversity of cultural and religious 
peace concepts remains an open area for further inquiry. 
 
The Limits of Interventionism 
 
In a world plagued by new identity conflict formations and persistent divides 
between world regions, a search for the universals of peacemaking is no longer sufficient. 
For a growing number of thinkers, the current salience of ethnic and religious identity in 
disputes and the uneven results of international interventions signal a need to abandon 
simplistic dichotomies that oppose the “universal” to the “particular,” and to more fully 
embrace the challenges posed by human diversity. As perceptive observers of indigenous 
as well as religious peacemaking have argued, identities that appear to divide can also 
provide wellsprings of motivation for building bridges (ter Haar and Busuttil, 2005); 
every boundary between people provides a potential line of conflict, yet the character of 
particularistic identities can vary profoundly and there is no inevitability to destructive 
intercommunal strife.  
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To encourage a proper stance of cultural humility and underscore the importance 
of local empowerment and sustainability as well as cross-cultural learning, peace research 
needs to highlight both the unity and diversity of peace and peacemaking. The field’s 
overriding normative aspirations and evolving etic constructs can continue to provide a 
sense of unity, even as researchers more fully engage the diversity of emic approaches— 
that is, the vernacular languages through which particular communities discuss and 
comprehend peace, and the local resources through which they might more sustainably 
ground it in their lived environments and immediate contexts of experience.   
Immersion in local, emic conceptions of peace heightens awareness of the extent 
to which peace is and always has been a contested concept with manifold cultural, 
political, and indeed religious resonances. If we engage in dialogue and listen closely for 
substantive peace constructs with which diverse cultural communities feel a sense of 
historical affinity, it quickly becomes apparent that people in most parts of the world 
intuitively associate peace with their own idealized forms of everyday life, in a manner 
consistent with a larger cultural cosmology (Galtung, 1996). Substantively, peace is often 
equated with “our civilization,” or “our cultural norms, rightly understood.” As a culture-
specific, emic concept expressed in vernacular languages, peace is inextricably tied to 
ideas about sacred values, time-honoured institutions, exemplary individuals, and ideal 
ways of handling differences within a context of shared community. Taken together, such 
elements constitute “local common sense” about peace. This “local common sense” can 
often be instrumentalized within a context of conflict, and transformed into a symbolic 
“way of life” that needs to be defended or propagated throughout the larger world. 
Nonetheless, the “received wisdom” that constitutes a group of people’s implicit 
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knowledge (Lederach, 1995, pp. 44–45) about peace is also a seedbed for creative and 
empowering responses to social strain, inequality, and traumatic historical events.   
In a very real sense, the history of international politics is not merely a struggle 
for power, but also a process of intercultural communication. In the past, this process has 
too often been characterized by open rejection of the value syntheses and peace 
constructs of other cultures, combined with an attempt to supplant or subordinate 
alternative modes of life. As noted previously, there is a tendency for the most politically 
influential states and peoples of every era to assume their own worldview is (or ought to 
be) universal. This perception is linked to a further assumption that “we” have arrived at 
an understanding of peace and social virtue that is superior to competing conceptions, and 
which provides a basis for pacifying as well as “civilizing” missions.  
Differences of time, space, and underlying political motivation notwithstanding, 
similar patterns of self-justification have informed the conquests of imperial Rome, 
earnest nineteenth century belief in the “white man’s burden” or mission civilisatrice, and 
native residential school policies in North America and Australia (Bond, 2008). Despite 
the fact that most of these ventures did not go exactly as planned, there is a valid sense in 
which they were nonetheless “about peace”—at least for their leading protagonists. A 
fairly consistent theme of imperial ventures ancient and modern is the assumption that the 
values which make possible a decent way of life—the peaceful life, understood in 
particularistic terms—are scarce and unevenly distributed rather than abundant and 
accessible to all. The historical prevalence of this perspective on cultural diversity, which 
corresponds with the lower rungs on contemporary instruments to assess cultural 
competence (Hammer, Bennett, and Wiseman, 2003), provides an understandable sense 
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of self-justification to many contemporary thinkers who would rather avoid the subject of 
culture altogether than seek to open up dialogue about similarities and differences 
between ways of life and conceptions of peace.  
If deliberate effort to supplant, subordinate, or repel competing worldviews has 
long been the staple of international politics, less egregious but nonetheless problematic 
efforts to universalize the particular are still commonplace. While the era of open and 
intentional colonialism has passed, the early twenty-first century world order remains 
rather starkly differentiated into zones of affluence and zones of scarcity, with most 
ongoing armed conflicts transpiring in the latter areas. Contemporary forms of global 
governance are underpinned by normative models of development and democratization 
that have been informed primarily by the historical experiences of industrialized 
countries, and multilateral interventions intended to stabilize and reconstruct countries 
afflicted by protracted social conflict that now offer a standardized package of 
authoritative prescriptions linked to democratization, free market reform, human rights, 
civil society promotion, and the rule of law (Richmond and Franks, 2009).  
Despite credible claims that international capacity for complex humanitarian 
missions has increased in recent decades (Human Security Centre, 2006), there are also 
compelling reasons to subject the current formulas for “liberal peacebuilding” to critical 
scrutiny. The difficulties faced by international missions in contexts as diverse as Bosnia, 
Cambodia, Congo, Somalia, and Sudan raise profound questions about the limits of 
“outside-in” or “top-down” approaches to peace consolidation and reconstruction. Noting 
that efforts to “export” peace from one context to another can make things worse or 
merely replace one problem with another, scholars such as Mac Ginty (2006, 2008) and 
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Donais (2009) have called for critical re-examination of new, “one-size-fits-all” 
prescriptions that seek to introduce the same technical, institutional, political, and 
economic solutions in every context, without tapping local social capital and cultural 
imagination, or responding to authentically local priorities. MacGinty and Donais suggest 
that current peacebuilding orthodoxies prevent more flexible responses to local 
conditions and perpetuate the historical dialogue deficit between North and South, West 
and non-West. They liken the liberal peace to an inflexible regimen of reforms and 
institutional fixes that are exported to areas of conflict and implanted without local roots, 
in ways that reflect a serious power imbalance between outsiders and insiders, 
accompanied by paternalism and dependency. Only in the face of setbacks, including 
serious problems pertaining to a lack of local ownership, legitimacy, fit, and 
empowerment (Donais, 2009), have sponsors of international interventions and peace 
support operations begun to consider more focused engagement with existing cultural 
resources, including indigenous approaches to peacemaking, that were hitherto ignored or 
regarded as obstacles (Mac Ginty, 2008).  
 
Tensions between Western and Indigenous Practices 
 
Critiques of current international peacebuilding practice suggest the existence of 
serious and abiding tensions between prevalent, largely Western modes of operation and 
the indigenous norms of societies grappling with protracted conflict, poverty, and 
unfavorable structural positions in the global economy. Not all of the attendant problems 
are amendable to a “quick fix,” but possible solutions and remedial measures are more 
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likely to be effective and sustainable if they relate to local visions and priorities and draw 
upon capacities embedded in indigenous culture. Unfortunately, current predominant 
approaches to peacebuilding and reconstruction often fail to develop dynamic 
partnerships between local and international actors. Awareness of cultural differences and 
sensitivity to power imbalances is necessary to create space for approaches that foster 
genuine intercultural collaboration and complementarity rather than a one-way transfer of 
expertise and prescriptions. 
Western approaches to peace are by no means monolithic, yet exhibit a number of 
characteristics that are distinct from traditional approaches to peace in many non-Western 
societies. In academic thought, a preponderant emphasis has traditionally been placed on 
states and institutions. The end of the Cold War prompted partial intellectual retooling to 
address an apparent resurgence of intrastate conflict organized around ethnic identity, but 
the solutions to problems posed by armed violence are still presumed to be largely 
institutional in nature. Particularly in the American context, peace has generally been 
conceptualized in narrow terms as an absence of war or violence secured largely through 
deterrence, albeit with strong conflict mitigating functions attributed to economic 
liberalism, constitutionalism, and political pluralism. Peacemaking has more often than 
not been approached through an analytical mode of problem solving that seeks to 
disaggregate and isolate different elements of a conflict so as to deal with them separately 
from one another.  
The Western peace research and conflict resolution traditions have never been 
fully integrated into official thinking about international conflict, yet these traditions also 
manifest some recognizable features that differ from common patterns in Asia, Africa, 
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Latin America, and minority North American settings (Abu-Nimer, 1996; Augsburger, 
1992; Keashly and Warters, 2008, pp. 58–61). In approaches to applied conflict 
resolution, the instrumental dimension of conflict receives far more analytical attention 
and applied consideration than relational and identity dimensions. Ideally, conflict 
resolution efforts are intended to foster direct communication between the disputants, if 
necessary with the assistance of a neutral and professional third party. Constructive 
communication is characterized by self-disclosure of underlying interests and needs as 
well as by problem solving that seeks to “separate the person from the problem.” 
Whereas emotional ventilation is acknowledged as a potentially useful prelude to 
conciliatory behaviour, emotion is largely viewed as a distorting factor that must be 
controlled or reduced. Solutions to conflict are sought through abstractive, analytical 
thinking, leading to the rational and perhaps also imaginative formulation of cooperative 
mutual gains (“win-win”) agreements that advance or integrate the most important 
individual interests and needs of the disputants. It is acknowledged that there may be 
multiple stakeholders, but preserving the autonomy and self-determination of the 
principal parties takes priority over more diffuse notions of community interest or social 
harmony. Mutual satisfaction with an agreement is understood to be the most important 
factor determining sustainability, and the needs driving conflict behaviour are presumed 
to be universal and culturally invariant rather than culturally conditioned or prioritized 
(Burton, 1990). 
Another strong emphasis of Western conflict resolution theory and practice is 
technique. Successful conflict resolution is presumed to be less a matter of character or 
personality than of acquired skill in using methods, procedures, and formal process steps 
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that are understood to be context neutral and potentially universal in application. 
Enhancing capacity for conflict resolution requires development of professional 
specialization and formal training or certification. Because mediator impartiality and 
process neutrality are vitally important, the third party is expected to be an outside 
professional, equally distanced from each disputant. Relatively little attention is typically 
devoted to the social identities (for example, status, ethnicity, race, class, caste) of 
disputants and mediators; the parties to the conflict meet as individuals, and evaluate the 
fairness of a process in terms of its more or less formal and symmetrical character. It is 
generally assumed that all parties have basically the same capacity to narrate their own 
story, without the need for extra facilitative effort or engagement to give voice to 
marginalized persons or vulnerable groups (Wing, 2008). The identity or worldview of 
the mediator (and its resonance or dissonance with the identities and worldviews of 
disputants) is not flagged as a key determinant of outcomes. Age, wisdom, and life 
experience are less important for effective peacemaking than good communication skills 
and creative, “outside the box” thinking; in principle, anyone can become a mediator. 
While the emphases Western peacemakers place on institutional reform, multiple 
advocacy, analytical problem-solving, individual self-determination, formal procedure, 
and skill development are not altogether unwelcome in changing non-Western contexts 
(young urban professionals may be highly receptive), there are usually strong currents of 
countervailing opinion about the bases for social peace. Traditional non-Western 
coexistence models, for example, place considerably less emphasis on individual choice 
and political pluralism than on regulated forms of cultural pluralism – that is, on regimes 
for mutual accommodation among the particular, discrete identity groups to which 
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individuals in society are held accountable. Self-expression, direct communication, and 
personal authenticity are valued less than consideration for face saving in a context of 
long-term social relationship (Augsburger, 1992; Ting-Toomey, 1994). Criteria for 
selecting mediators are often strikingly different, and tend to value formal training far 
less than other qualities and characteristics (Abu-Nimer, 1996). 
Although most cultures define contexts in which conflict is functional, positive, or 
necessary, preserving or restoring communal harmony is a central consideration in 
traditional dispute resolution processes throughout much of the world (Augsburger, 
1992). Peacemaking is generally understood to be a highly communitarian process, in 
which trusted leaders or go-betweens are used rather than outsiders with whom disputants 
have no relational history. In cases of serious conflict, broader community involvement is 
typically deemed vital—not only to witness solemn oaths or contribute to deliberations, 
but also to bring appropriate social sanctions of disapproval/approval and 
pressure/support to bear on the situation, ensuring that the peace will be kept. The loss of 
face associated with publicly recognized wrongdoing serves as a key deterrent for 
misbehaviour, yet cooperation with communal processes of accountability, reparation, 
forgiveness, and reconciliation provides a powerful means of reintegrating offenders. 
Positive responses to appeals by mediators and the community to forgive or forgo 
retaliation may enhance honour and social prestige. 
The worldviews within which traditional conflict resolution processes are 
embedded often attribute a central role to spirituality. Whereas in contemporary Western 
contexts spirituality is a largely private affair to which public discourse may at times 
allude (as in the “value talk” of North American politicians), non-Western cultures are 
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more likely to regard spirituality as a legitimate and even necessary aspect of public 
expression that applies quite directly to conflict resolution. Whether the process in 
question is a Middle Eastern sulha (reconciliation) ritual (Abu-Nimer, 2003, pp. 92–100; 
Funk and Said, 2009) or a South African truth commission inspired by theological 
precepts as well as a social solidarity ethic of ubuntu (Tutu, 1999), shared beliefs are 
readily invoked and traditional wisdom provides peacemakers with proverbs and other 
reference points for counselling disputants (Lederach, 1995, pp. 78–81). Peacemaking is 
not first and foremost a cerebral, analytical process; emotional engagement, symbolism, 
and ritual play a significant and openly acknowledged role. Relevant ceremonies, 
religious observances, and symbolic objects or actions create a context within which 
relational transformation becomes both possible and expected (Schirch, 2005). 
Third-party roles vary in accordance with the severity of the conflict, but 
traditional cultures have “dispute resolution spectrums” that are similar in some respects 
to those present in industrialized societies. In simple disputes, effort to redress a wrong or 
resolve a conflict may start with an informal go-between (direct confrontation being less 
desirable than in individualistic cultures). For higher-stakes conflicts, mediation-
arbitration hybrids are common; in many instances, religious, community, or political 
leaders act as judges. Large-scale conflicts require intervention by more distinguished 
and authoritative third parties, but at all levels of social organization and in virtually all 
processes certain basic qualifications for a would-be peacemaker tend to be similar, such 
as maturity in age, knowledge of precedents and traditions (oral as well as written), and 
reputation for good judgment. Agents of reconciliation make active use of narrative and 
storytelling as well as various forms of persuasion and emotional appeal, yet the idea of 
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“skills training” is less central to preparation for a third party role than emulation of 
exemplary figures and assimilation of collective wisdom.  
Non-Western approaches, of course, are neither static nor monolithic. While 
traditional processes are still actively utilized in many contexts, indigenous peacemaking 
practices change over time and are in some cases rendered inoperative by social change. 
Whereas many tight-knit, communitarian cultures once relied heavily on systems of 
conflict management in which one of the greater penalties was banishment, the threat of 
being ostracized or expelled carries less weight in a context of rapid urbanization. In 
many world regions, the combined impacts of colonialism, cross-cultural encounter, 
modernization, and conflict have disrupted traditional social relations and corresponding 
modes of dispute resolution, creating an anomic situation in which old methods of 
conflict regulation have become attenuated but not fully displaced by functional and 
culturally valid alternatives. Quite frequently, “old” and “new” procedures for handling 
conflict coexist, with state legal institutions based on Western models developing 
alongside traditional and customary institutions.  
The role that traditional and indigenous approaches to conflict resolution play in 
many societies is too important to either romanticize or discount. In some settings, such 
as the Acholi region of northern Uganda, tradition provides a framework for meeting 
grave new challenges such as the reintegration of child soldiers through a well-
established ritual known as mato oput (Wasonga, 2009). In Somaliland, customary 
dispute resolution processes provided an indispensable means for mobilizing elders to 
restore dialogue and social order, even as the rest of Somalia fell into disarray (Yusuf and 
Le Mare, 2005). In many cases, however, emerging social strata regard traditional 
             Localizing Peace 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 119 ‐ 
 
methods as marginal to their modern, urban existence, and associate them with beliefs 
and forms of authority that are no longer embraced and trusted. Nonetheless, when the 
subject of reconciliation or “restorative justice” is broached, traditional approaches can 
provide powerful metaphors with authentic cultural resonance, together with a repertoire 
of principles and symbolic practices that might be adapted to new circumstances.  
Even when authentically traditional methods cannot easily be applied, cultural 
realities often dictate locally grounded, indigenous responses to conflict that differ from 
Western and North American methods, and which fall beyond the purview of standard 
peacebuilding practices. In tight-knit societies accustomed to protracted intercommunal 
conflict and relational approaches to conflict resolution, injunctions to “separate the 
person from the problem” or focus on universal human needs often fail to resonate. Even 
if traditional methods must undergo considerable adaptation to meet new challenges, they 
nonetheless offer cultural resources that are familiar, and that give attention to affective 
issues such as trust and emotional transformation as well as to larger matters of group 
affiliation, shared values, social duty, and collective memory. 
  
Emergent Themes 
 
To truly privilege the local in international peacebuilding, a great deal of new 
thinking will be required. The challenges are both intellectual and practical, and will 
require innovative research and theoretical synthesis as well as reflection on the policy 
frameworks of governments, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs. The idea of 
giving more weight to the local, however, is not altogether new, and has precedents in a 
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number of different strands of thought in peace research and development studies. It is 
even possible to speak of a number of emergent themes in the peacebuilding field that 
can contribute to a new agenda of “localizing peace,” in which peace-promoting activities 
are conducted as much as possible with local materials and resources, in a manner that 
activates latent cultural energies, creates a genuine sense of ownership and 
empowerment, and heightens prospects for sustainability. These emergent themes 
include: (1) understanding peace as a locally constructed reality, (2) viewing culture as a 
resource rather than as a constraint or afterthought, and (3) recognizing that outsiders are 
most likely to make positive contributions when they act as facilitators rather than as 
directive, all-knowing headmasters. 
Peace as a locally constructed reality 
Since the publication of Lederach’s Preparing for Peace, scholars and 
practitioners of international peacebuilding have demonstrated increasing appreciation for 
the premise that “understanding conflict and developing appropriate models of handling 
it will necessarily be rooted in, and must respect and draw from, the cultural knowledge 
of a people” (1995, p. 10). While this wisdom has by no means been integrated in all 
peace and reconstruction practices, analysts of grassroots social peacebuilding have 
increasingly recognized that peace has a cultural dimension and that commitments to 
peace take shape within the collective imagination and historical traditions of a people 
(Boulding, 2000; de Rivera, 2009). While ideas about peace and conflict need not be 
locally rooted and completely indigenous to be of use to individuals and groups in any 
given context, it remains true that every cultural community has its own vernacular 
language for conflict and conflict resolution, along with its own set of commonsense 
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values and standards which give the concept of peace substance and legitimacy (Oetzel, 
and others, 2006).  Exogenous concepts must always be related to indigenous 
understandings and aspirations if peacebuilding is to become something more than a 
foreign enterprise implemented from the top down with little popular participation and 
buy-in.  
In every language and culture, peace-related words take on distinctive meanings 
and overtones as a result of historical experiences, ongoing public conversations, and (in 
many if not most cases) associations with religious texts and traditions. Because this 
vocabulary supplies locally rooted understandings of what peace is, drawn from a 
cosmology or worldview with which people resonate, it is among the most basic of raw 
materials for peacebuilding. Fortunately for advocates of comprehensive approaches to 
peacebuilding, indigenous peace vocabulary often denotes far more than a mere absence 
of war or violence, by suggesting an existential condition characterized not just by basic 
physical security, but also a presence of factors conducive to human flourishing. In the 
Abrahamic religious context, for example, Semitic words such as shalom and salam 
embrace a range of meanings that includes safety as well as right relationship, well-being, 
and wholeness. In South Asia, the Sanskrit word shanti emphasizes the inward dimension 
of peace, while still evoking a presence of positive conditions associated with physical 
health, wellness, and sound action. Such terms do not determine the operative meaning of 
peace in political discourse, but they do provide the “deep context” for thinking about 
and generating commitment to peace at a grassroots as well as individual level. They 
establish potential connections between external processes and the deeper aspirations of a 
people, and may also provide a litmus test through which local populations evaluate the 
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authenticity and worthiness of a peace process.  
A broad, intercultural approach to peacebuilding seeks to engage rather than 
bypass or ignore local meanings of peace. Far from being a distraction from applied work 
or an invitation to cultural stasis, exploring traditional peace vocabulary and its current 
significance for members of a society can provide a vital way of eliciting shared visions 
and value priorities, and relating them to realities of conflict in a manner that is 
conducive to action. Engaging emic peace concepts can be part of a larger process that 
involves tapping local knowledge (Lederach, 1995) and establishing collaborative local-
international relationships that empower rather than impose (Donais, 2009). 
Sound peacebuilding practice begins with recognition that there are limits to the 
extent to which any external cultural group or political entity can bring peace to another 
community or polity. While there are many ways in which external actors can and should 
provide needed support to societies emerging from violent conflict (Jeong, 2005), stable 
and lasting peace cannot be enforced on or built for others. Whatever role external 
coalitions may play in mitigating destructive conflict, sharing expertise, or reforming 
international policies that place strain on fragile social ecologies, peace must ultimately 
be constructed locally on a foundation that is recognized as legitimate. Ideally, peace 
ought to be built in accordance with a locally negotiated plan using as many local 
materials and skills as possible, so that the population in question acquires a sense of 
ownership, need satisfaction, and capacity for continued upkeep. In horticultural terms, a 
viable and sustainable peace in any given context is a peace with local roots that springs 
from its own native soil and receives care from skilled and committed local cultivators. 
While in some cases international support may be necessary to create a provisional 
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greenhouse or even to supply water and fertilizer to survive drought and soil depletion, 
long-term prospects for growth remain poor if the tree itself is not well-adapted to the 
climate and regarded as a desirable species. 
In light of these considerations, agents of peacebuilding must guard against a 
culture-blind epistemology that over-generalizes from particular experiences (Walker, 
2004), and against the unwitting cultural imperialism that inheres not only in “have 
technique will travel” approaches to conflict resolution practice but also in efforts to 
prescribe and export the same institutional solutions to all societies (Mac Ginty, 2006). 
Genuinely respectful and productive partnerships are likely to be informed by use of 
cultural empathy as a tool of analysis, and by efforts to use discussion of cultural 
particularities as a bridge to strategizing about appropriate ways and means. Such 
partnerships recognize that local actors must own the peace that is to be built, and are 
only likely to be committed to the result if it reflects their own priorities, meanings, and 
aspirations.  
 
Culture as a Resource 
Sophisticated analysts of culture recognize that, while it is the matrix within 
which peacebuilding practices take form, it is not a static, monolithic, or deterministic 
structure (Avruch, 1998). When people become self-aware with respect to their cultural 
inheritance, it can be understood and engaged as a resource rather than construed as an 
obstacle or as an unchanging whole to be defended at any cost (Lederach, 1995; Donais, 
2009). Authenticity and continuity with the past can be maintained, even as some 
traditions are consciously maintained and others are subjected to critique or adaptation.   
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In many respects, peacebuilding is a process of cultural introspection and 
reconstruction – a process of generating social dialogue that encourages critical reflection 
on existing realities, re-evaluation of present value priorities, and initiation of new, 
shared projects that reduce the gap between real and ideal. An essential part of 
peacebuilding projects, therefore, is balancing cultural innovation with cultural 
continuity. There is a need for change, but it must proceed on an authentic and locally 
valid basis or rationale. It must discover new meaning, relevance, and applicability in 
known values and beliefs (Richards and Swanger, 2009). 
Utilizing culture as a resource can begin with recognition that cultural and 
religious heritages are multivalent, and provide complex sets of practices, values, and 
precedents that can be applied in divergent (including peaceful as well as combative) 
ways (Appleby, 2000). For example, any cultural community with deep historical roots is 
likely to discover multiple precedents for relations with outsiders or for processes of 
collective decision-making. Viewing culture as a resource provides the basis for a 
dynamic view, freeing groups of practitioners to “seek the best” within their heritage and 
thereby avoid the alienation that ensues when cultural traditions are either suppressed in 
the pursuit of forced modernization or not allowed to grow and change. It also creates 
scope for empowerment through critical reappraisal of the past, re-appropriation of life-
affirming values, utilization of existing skill sets, and broad-based participation in 
communal dialogue.  
When culture is understood as a resource and source of inspiration but not as a 
rigid mold or invariant template, the potential for genuinely sustainable, effective, and 
empowering peacebuilding initiatives increases dramatically. The sustainability of 
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contextually grounded peace efforts is a function of the fact that indigenous cultural and 
religious resources (in contrast to resources brought by intergovernmental and 
international non-governmental organizations, or by development agencies from foreign 
nations) are intrinsically renewable through the application of local skills and knowledge. 
They have greater prospects for effectiveness, because local materials are more likely to 
be accepted and to have a multiplier effect than imports which are regarded as foreign. 
They are empowering because they enable local change agents to advance peace using 
tools and symbols that are immediately accessible, familiar, and culturally legitimate. 
The pursuit of local solutions to the problems of peacebuilding need not exclude 
external involvement, resources, and support, nor does it presume that local traditions are 
not in need of refinement. Indeed, if local resources were fully developed and 
operational, the local peace would already be made. “Localizing peace” should not be 
confused with “turning back the clock” or fully restoring traditional institutions that no 
longer command a broad social consensus. Insofar as large-scale violent conflict has a 
destabilizing effect on social institutions, damaging the networks that were once 
responsible for conflict management, cultural resources may have to undergo 
considerable adaptation or revitalization before they can become operative in a changing 
social milieu (Jeong, 2005, pp. 182–184). Moreover, some local traditions may exclude 
or marginalize voices—for example, those of women, children, or members of outcaste 
groups— that are vital to the consolidation of a high-quality, sustainable peace 
(Anderlini, 2007). In such cases it is crucial for outside parties to become familiar with 
indigenous currents of dissent and proposals for change and renewal. No society is 
perfect or completely harmonious, to such an extent that it has nothing to learn from 
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others, or from internal critics. Culture is inherently contested, open-ended, and 
interpretive, and the pursuit of complete cultural autarky is no more the way to peace than 
narrowly focused efforts to implant standardized solutions from other societies. 
 
Outsider as Facilitator 
As Donais (2009) has observed, “outsiders too often take the legitimacy of 
themselves and their programs as self-evident without seriously considering the degree to 
which, for local actors, legitimacy must be rooted in their own history and political 
culture” (p. 20). While it is true that outsiders often possess knowledge and experience 
that has much potential value, it is also true that locals possess an expertise relative to 
their own situation that no outsider can fully encompass. Much of this expertise may be 
intuitive or based on “folk knowledge” (Boulding, 1978, p. 124) that is subject to bias, 
but it is nonetheless knowledge and it is not necessarily more fallible than academic or 
policy models derived from the experiences of foreign nations and cultures.  
Given these realities, there is wisdom in Lederach’s (1995) counsel to balance 
prescriptive and elicitive modes of training and to direct consultations organized by 
outsiders towards the identification and development of locally resonant models. The 
point is not to abolish the role of the outside expert or consultant, but rather to develop a 
humbler mode of operation in which the outsider functions as a facilitator or midwife 
whose overriding goal is to help local actors discover their own resources, abilities, and 
context-specific solutions. In this respect, the international peacebuilding practitioner can 
adopt elements of a maieutic or Socratic approach to pedagogy, in which dialogue is at 
the core of a mutual learning process and there is no assumption that the person speaking 
             Localizing Peace 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 127 ‐ 
 
is necessarily wiser or more capable of profound reflection on vital issues than those who 
are being engaged.  
When outsiders share their own models for peace and peacebuilding, it is 
important to clarify also the historical experiences and cultural assumptions from which 
these models emerge, so as to better encourage discussion of how practices might be 
specially tailored to the given context. The experiences of reflective practitioners indicate 
that there is no set of conflict resolution practices that works equally well in every 
setting; while general principles may translate, methods and techniques are often culture-
specific. Moreover, people are more likely to become empowered when drawing upon 
their own cultural vocabulary and discovering indigenous resources that can be applied to 
meet local needs. In this respect, the peacebuilding field can benefit from insights of the 
appropriate technology movement, which seeks to make development practice more 
innovatively responsive to the immediately experienced needs, available resources, and 
existing knowledge of people living in modest circumstances, and less centered around 
the transfer of gadgets and technologies from industrialized countries – technologies 
which often require an extensive support infrastructure and may offer little immediate 
benefit to the majority of people in a subsistence economy (Lederach, 1995, pp. 27–29; 
Schumacher, 1966, 1973). Similarly, the most appropriate peacebuilding methods in a 
given cultural context may be updates of traditional or indigenous methods rather than 
imported Western or North American models predicated on a number of culture-specific 
assumptions about social interaction.  
By acting as a facilitator rather than as a headmaster, the international practitioner 
can create a space within which new applications of known principles might emerge. 
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Because these applications build upon that which is familiar, they stand a greater chance 
of being diffused throughout a social setting than foreign imports. Moreover, because the 
models being tapped and refined are of indigenous origin, they are more likely to be in 
harmony with local culture and to contribute to the strengthening of social capacity. 
  
Activating Local Resources 
 
At the core of the “localizing peace” agenda is concerted effort to activate local 
cultural resources in response to locally felt needs and aspirations. A key premise of the 
approach is that both international peacebuilders and local populations often 
underestimate or neglect local resources, and fail to appreciate ways in which capacity to 
deal with conflict constructively might be enhanced through a process of cultural 
introspection and renewal. While the principle of localism should not be applied with 
ideological purism or excessive rigidity—peacemakers in all parts of the world can 
benefit from cross-cultural learning—there is a need for further thinking about the nature 
of readily available “local materials” and resources, and for reflection on the many 
different types of resources that can be constructively utilized to enhance the vitality, 
sustainability, legitimacy, and resilience of peacebuilding efforts.  
Though religious and cultural identities often serve as markers of “difference” and 
are at least partially co-opted by the systems of confrontation that develop amidst 
protracted conflict, they are also sources of values, beliefs, and narratives that can be of 
profound importance for peacemaking (Coward and Smith, 2004). In many parts of the 
world, the vernacular language for speaking about peace and conflict is infused with 
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religious content, and conversations about aspirations toward peace and reconciliation 
almost inevitably lead toward discussion of religious values, texts, and traditions. 
Indigenous peacemaking events regularly feature references to religious scriptures and to 
the words of exemplary spiritual figures, and may also—like the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission—evoke a sense of religious symbolism and ritual (Shore, 
2009). 
The broader sweep of historical experience should also be recognized as a local 
peace resource. Mining this experience can bring to the surface not only memories of past 
conflicts and traumas, but also narratives of conflicts resolved, stories of peacemaking, 
and knowledge of indigenous (and often informal) processes of community dispute 
resolution. People’s familiarity with traditional peacemaking stories and methods may 
provide a basis for rich dialogue with respect to the values, skills, and processes that are 
required to make peace, articulated in the cultural vernacular rather than in the 
vocabulary of international social science or diplomacy. In some settings, such dialogue 
may direct attention to past peacemaking methods that have been marginalized during a 
current conflict, but which nonetheless constitute a valuable frame of reference for 
renewed efforts. As Lederach (1995) notes, the language, metaphors, and proverbs people 
use to describe their reality can be an especially rich source of insight into implicit 
knowledge, and can provide a basis for surfacing local models of peacemaking. 
Local social capital and commonsense knowledge should also be regarded as 
resources. When taking inventory of local assets, a wide variety of existing institutions, 
organizations, social movements, skilled individuals, and stakeholders merit recognition. 
On-the-ground experience with the dynamics of a unique political situation is also an 
             Localizing Peace 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 130 ‐ 
 
identifiable resource that newcomers do not possess, as is the detailed, fine-grained 
knowledge that people have of their own reality, needs, and immediately available 
means. 
Awareness of the value inherent in local cultural resources has begun to increase 
in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding communities, yet there remains a profound 
need for research-backed efforts to develop practical frameworks for identifying, tapping, 
and harnessing these resources to enhance capacity for local solutions to challenges of 
social conflict and human security. Because every culture has unique strengths when 
compared to other cultures, attention to diverse peace traditions has the capacity to enrich 
peacemaking at a global level. Comparing the peace traditions of multiple societies can 
contribute to the discovery of cross-cutting themes as well as positive precedents that 
might help reinvigorate peace practices in other contexts (Fry and others, 2009).  
In some cases local resources may need to be rediscovered or revalorized. The 
legacy of Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy (1900–1989) provides a powerful illustration 
of what is possible when a profound and dynamic concern for human needs—in 
particular the needs and dignity of the poorest—provides motivation for active 
partnerships grounded in respect for traditional materials, motifs, values, and skills 
(Serageldin, 1985). Fathy, now recognized for his considerable contributions to the 
appropriate technology movement and to forms of architecture that creatively synthesize 
traditional and modern elements, found motivation for his work in a learned scepticism of 
homogenizing tendencies within modernist architectural practices that sought to 
universalize Western styles of building, without regard to local culture, climate, and 
needs. Rather than follow a larger trend toward embracing imported, standardized forms 
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of design, Fathy sought inspiration in the “vernacular architecture” of his own society— 
architecture which was not only culturally authentic, but also uniquely adapted to 
environmental conditions and built with readily available, energy-efficient materials, 
such as mud brick. Entering into a mutually rewarding partnership with rural 
communities, Fathy endeavoured to update traditional designs to suit the needs of 
contemporary Egyptians, while continuing to draw upon traditional materials and existing 
skill sets that could be applied to the task at hand in a manner conducive to self-reliance. 
Amidst his creative efforts to make architecture serve human needs, restore cultural pride, 
and advance universally significant values, Fathy was fond of pointing out that “human 
beings are not interchangeable” (Serageldin, 1985, p. 17)—there is no single mode of 
design that can work for all societies and all individuals. In addition, he found 
significance in the fact that the word “tradition” comes from the Latin tradere, which 
literally means “to carry forward” or “to transfer,” and suggests a “cyclical renewal of 
life” (Steele, 1997).  
Examples such as Fathy’s provide a compelling illustration of what might be 
gained by more consciously embracing diversity and the principle of localization in peace 
research and applied peacebuilding. Affirming the desirability of multiple “nodes” for 
theorizing and practice – and for non-identical yet mutually relevant ways of working for 
peace – holds potential for making the field more creatively responsive to peacebuilding 
challenges. It also opens space for new advancements in peacemaking knowledge:  every 
cultural community arguably has values, insights, and practices that can contribute to the 
development of peace within their own cultural milieus, and which can arguably 
contribute to a larger, “mosaic” approach to international or global peace based on 
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inclusive intercultural dialogue. Different communities have the potential to contribute 
their own “local exceptionalisms”—that is, their own distinctive ways of operationalizing 
universally recognizable values such as peace, human dignity, communal solidarity, and 
harmony with the natural environment—to a shared and richly cosmopolitan inquiry into 
the unity and diversity of peacemaking.  
 
Implications for Practice 
 
The potential value of localized peacemaking approaches is already receiving 
recognition in the field of transitional justice, and is generating new conversations about 
possibilities for complementarity between Western and indigenous practices. As Mac 
Ginty (2008, pp. 128–129) has noted, traditional and indigenous approaches to peace 
have the potential to address deficiencies in “orthodox Western approaches,” by engaging 
the “affective dimension of peacemaking” in a culturally appropriate manner, and by 
balancing the top-down, elite-focused aspect of conventional intervention programs with 
a more genuinely participatory and bottom-up dynamic. In settings as diverse as Rwanda, 
East Timor, and Afghanistan, many international missions have recognized limits to the 
reach and practicality of conventional methods, and have sought to learn about, create 
space for, and encourage adapted applications of traditional dispute resolution, mediation, 
and consensus building practices. To the extent that practices such as Rwanda’s village-
level gacaca courts (Villa-Vicencio, and others, 2005), East Timor’s Nahe Biti 
community reconciliation process (Mac Ginty, 2008, pp. 127–128), and Afghanistan’s 
Loya Jirga (“Grand Council”) are now receiving recognition by Western diplomats and 
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policy thinkers, new conversations are emerging about the most appropriate way to tap 
the strengths of the indigenous without depriving it of authenticity and legitimacy 
through co-optation or contamination (Mac Ginty, 2008). The subject appears to defy 
simple, formulaic solutions, yet any prospectively fruitful effort to mainstream “the 
local” in peacebuilding practice must begin with an effort to identify guidelines and 
criteria. The following suggestions are necessarily preliminary and incomplete, and are 
offered in the hope that they will inspire further discussion about how best to advance the 
development of a “localizing peace” agenda for sustainable peacebuilding.  
Arguably the most important prerequisite for locally empowering peace practice 
is a compelling and dynamic vision. The operational implications of ideas such as “peace 
as a locally constructed reality,” “culture as a resource,” and “outsider as facilitator” need 
to be articulated in greater detail, in relation to the types of time commitment and results 
criteria that are appropriate to this type of engagement. Concepts such as sustainability, 
capacity building, appropriate technology, and local ownership are not alien to 
peacebuilding and development practice, yet pressure to show quick, measurable results 
often subverts efforts to pursue these goals through long-term relationship building and 
the pursuit of custom-built, context-specific solutions to local problems. Making the case 
for a “local-friendly” approach to international peace and development work, on the 
grounds that it genuinely is practical and effective, will no doubt require considerable 
effort by on the part of researchers, as well as political courage and communicative 
competence on the part of administrators. The fact that local resources are more 
“renewable” and predictably available than international resources bears repeating, as 
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does the commonsense insight that lasting cultural change is the work of viable 
grassroots movements and not a matter of short-term service delivery.  
Localizing peace also requires considerable forethought about how international 
personnel—be they employees of intergovernmental organizations or NGOs— are 
trained and prepared for service in culturally diverse contexts. Working effectively within 
another cultural frame requires not just familiarity with models of cultural competence or 
incentives for learning local language and history, but also forms of training that utilize 
suitable case study materials. Organizations will also need to develop guidelines for work 
in the field that enumerate principles for localizing peace—for example, exploring local 
cultural and religious traditions with interest and respect, applying cultural empathy as a 
tool of analysis, using culture as a bridge by asking about how things would “normally” 
or “ideally” be done, linking localized needs assessments to elicitive exercises intended 
to access implicit cultural knowledge and promote empowerment, initiating a “cultural 
inventory” of resources for peacebuilding, fostering discussion about how to strengthen a 
local culture of peace by adapting and updating past practices; and so forth. 
In addition to following such general principles of preparation for culturally 
competent and empowering peace practice, it is also important for international 
practitioners to carefully consider ways in which they might use their own resources—
including culture, status, and networks as well as material assets—to bolster local efforts 
that already show promise. While there are certainly cases in which a local NGO’s 
relationships with external parties create suspicion on the part of local and national 
governments, there are also cases in which the respect or concern shown by internationals 
can strengthen the hand of local organizations and create more space in which to move 
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and pursue peacebuilding, development, and social service activities. In such situations, 
the added visibility and profile associated with international partnerships can be enabling.   
While it is crucial that local peace initiatives develop a genuinely local base of 
support, individuals and organizations from North America or Europe can nonetheless 
play a mediating role between local projects and international sources of project funding, 
assistance, and information. In addition to providing relevant contacts, internationals can 
consciously choose to redirect the media spotlight so that local efforts are illuminated for 
a larger audience. They can expedite access to international conferences and workshops, 
thereby creating opportunities to share local experiences and expertise with a larger 
audience, for the benefit of all. Helping local partners connect with or build regional and 
global networks is another valuable contribution. With respect to regionalism, local 
movements that operate within the same overarching cultural and political milieu can 
learn from and support one another over the long term, while also benefitting from 
contacts with regional intergovernmental organizations and with region-specific offices 
of the United Nations. At the global level, local movements can derive considerable 
inspiration from affiliations and communications with like-minded groups in other world 
regions. Some local organizations allow overseas partners to open “friends of” offices to 
share their story with a wider audience and provide various forms of assistance and 
solidarity. 
Concern to tap authentic cultural resources should not distract international 
peacebuilders from opportunities to share varieties of expertise that are genuinely desired, 
in a spirit of cultural exchange (Donais, 2009). With respect to conflict resolution 
methods and approaches as well as other types of knowledge (for example, 
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communications and media strategy, fundraising, evaluation), models and experiences 
should be shared with the caveat that what works in one cultural milieu or organization 
probably will not apply in all contexts. Training in conflict resolution can be used as an 
opportunity for two-way learning, as can discussion of matters such as approaches to 
strategic planning and public education. Opportunities can also be sought to build bridges 
between local organizations and actors operating in different world regions. In the 1990s, 
for example, members of an emerging Lebanese Conflict Resolution Network (assisted at 
the time by the US-based NGO, Search for Common Ground) found great meaning in an 
opportunity to explore conflict resolution with a South African trainer.  
Yet another way in which internationals can support local partners is by assisting 
with the publication of relevant materials. Expediting the printing of locally 
contextualized or produced training materials, for example, can be highly beneficial. In 
some cases, translations of materials from the local language into English or another 
major international language can also be helpful, as a means to sharing local experiences 
more widely and generating greater profile for distinctive peacemaking efforts. This can 
be part of a broader effort to help give voice to local partners in international as well as 
national forums.    
Not all local practices, of course, are an aid to peace. Efforts to support the 
localization of peace must acknowledge that some local practices may no longer be 
experienced as positive, relevant, and life-giving. The local is not always better than the 
non-local, and workable solutions are often a result of cross-fertilization among cultures. 
In addition, the intrinsically interpretive nature of culture can present many opportunities 
for creativity and dynamism. Processes of reform in any culture almost always involve 
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sifting through traditions for foundational values that can be understood and applied in 
new ways, providing a bridge between past and future.   
 
Conclusion 
 
For internationally mobile peacebuilders from contexts such as North America 
and Europe, localizing peace means being willing to learn and to be enriched by what 
“the local” has to offer. This necessarily begins with cultural self-awareness, but leads 
towards an attitude of complementarity, within which there is recognition that there can 
be no generic solutions to conflict and development challenges. Even within the same 
world region, one locality’s solutions may not transfer effectively another. Nonetheless, 
the sharing of one’s own solutions can provide an impetus to creativity for others, and 
may even inspire a principled form of cultural eclecticism. 
As an agenda for research and practice, localizing peace underscores the limits of 
standardized Western approaches to peacebuilding without negating the necessity of 
global engagement, responsibility, and collaboration. International and cross-cultural 
cooperation remain vital for addressing the border-spanning problems of the 21st century. 
However, the process of seeking greater consensus on the character of global peace 
cannot proceed independently from efforts to support the grounded construction of 
diverse “local peaces”—contextually viable peace capacities which reflect the cultural 
distinctiveness of lived human experience, and which will ultimately make up the 
foundation stones for a more genuinely inclusive and multicultural global peace project. 
Insofar as successful peacebuilding is rooted in shared meaning and purpose and not in 
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techniques and institutions alone, peacebuilding efforts are likely to become energetic 
and sustainable only to the extent that they tap local resources, build community, and 
respond directly to locally felt needs for dignity, authenticity, and well-being.  
By more fully appreciating and engaging local resources for peace, practitioners 
of international conflict resolution stand not only to become more effective agents of 
cultural empowerment and to enhance the vitality of peace processes, but also to benefit 
from discoveries of resonance and complementarity among diverse peacemaking 
traditions. Rather than encouraging isolationism in the pursuit of peace, the aspiration to 
localize peace constitutes an effort to make peace real at the level of lived human 
experience as well as at a broader, more global level. It invites theorists and practitioners 
alike to broaden the cultural parameters of their field, with the understanding that 
bringing more voices to the table is itself a peace process—a process of acknowledging 
and respecting the many parts, without which a greater whole cannot be envisioned or 
realized.  
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Rethinking Reconciliation: 
The Lessons from the Balkans and South Africa 
Mitja Žagar 
 
Abstract  
 
Reconciliation, described as coming to terms with the past, is considered an 
important component of normalization and development in post-conflict societies. 
The international community and some political elites promote it as a desired 
approach to (re)establishing trust and cooperation, ideally leading to clean slate 
situation, which might be possible only if all sides are fully committed to the process 
and unconditionally accept its outcomes. Reality, however, is often different. 
Exploring concepts, practices and experiences in the Balkans and South Africa the 
contribution studies successes, problems and failures of reconciliation. It attempts to 
rethink and re-conceptualize reconciliation and develop alternative approaches.  
 
Introduction 
 
Often reconciliation is viewed as an important (if not necessary) component of 
successful processes of normalization and reconstruction in post-conflict societies, 
particularly as a tool that might help in healing painful psychological wounds by 
promoting justice, responsibility and re-establishing trust and cooperation in post-
traumatic situations. Particularly since World War II and its tragic experiences, the 
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international community, some political elites and several nongovernmental 
organizations have also shared this view and have promoted and favored reconciliation as 
a preferred approach to the management and resolution of crises and conflicts. It is also 
viewed as an adequate foundation for the future development of diverse and asymmetric 
post-conflict societies, particularly those that were characterized as divided societies. 
Consequently, in different parts of the world and in diverse situations reconciliation was 
initiated, introduced and carried out or—at least—attempted with various degrees of 
success. 
These cases offer opportunities to study specific situations and backgrounds, 
expectations, concepts, approaches and practices that were employed, as well as their 
impacts in both shorter and longer terms. This should be considered particularly 
important in cases that initially are declared successes, while in a longer term 
deficiencies, shortcomings and problems of the processes might become evident. 
Consequently, one needs be aware of the time dimension in any assessment of 
reconciliation as well as the historic dynamics and consequences that it might generate in 
time. My research into reconciliation and diversity management in post-conflict 
situations followed such an approach and focused on the testing of the working 
hypothesis that reconciliation can be a useful approach to normalization, reconstruction 
and development in post-conflict societies, which can be successful only if all relevant 
actors in a certain environment agree with it, truly accept it with all consequences and 
fully commit to the process and its success. However, in my view reconciliation cannot 
replace legal justice and the role of police and judiciary in the prosecution of perpetrators 
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of crimes and atrocities, but can only complement them taking into account the cultural 
specificities of a certain environment. 
Considering the limitations mentioned above the traditional concepts, nature and 
contents of reconciliation need to be reexamined and rethought, as well as (new) 
alternative concepts and approaches developed. My research, particularly in the Western 
Balkans but also in other post-conflict societies, shows that it is especially important to 
(re)establish communication, (re)build (at least) basic economic and social infrastructure 
and trust, as well as develop and constantly reconfirm common interests as the basis for 
the future common existence, cooperation and development of all distinct communities in 
those environments. Consequently my second working hypothesis is that if reconciliation 
can contribute to these goals it should be embraced and introduced. However, if 
reconciliation does not contribute to these short and medium term goals and particularly 
if it proves to harm their realization, it is not productive to insist on it or introduce it. In 
other words, I would consider reconciliation an approach and a possible tool for the 
realization of goals specified above that contribute to normalization and strengthening 
stability in post-conflict situations. 
This article explores the diverse concepts, backgrounds and practices of 
reconciliation in the Balkans considering also cases and experiences from other parts of 
the world, particularly from South Africa. It combines qualitative and quantitative 
approaches and methods and draws on official documents, media reports, other materials, 
and scholarly works on reconciliation. To a large extent my research and interpretation of 
its results are based on a considerable number of (in-depth) interviews (in the past two 
decades more than two hundred interviews in all countries of the Balkans, more than 
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twenty with interviewees from South Africa and a considerable number from other 
countries including Argentina, Australia, Canada, East Timor, USA etc.). It also draws on 
several hundred conversations world-wide with scholars, politicians, public officials, 
civic society activists and public opinion leaders, particularly those who were in different 
capacities involved in reconciliation, as well as with a few individuals who directly 
participated in the processes of reconciliation in different environments. These interviews 
and conversations provide very interesting insights into reconciliation in specific 
environments. They illustrate the diverse views and evaluations of those processes and 
their outcomes and impacts in respective societies. These complement and often 
contradict traditional views, approaches and evaluations, including those presented by the 
scholarly literature. 
To provide the point of reference and establish the basis and framework for the 
analysis of reconciliation in specific environments this article continues with the 
elaboration of (simple) working definitions of reconstruction, normalization and 
reconciliation (as social phenomena and processes). The following section discusses 
specific situations and conditions in the Western Balkans considering the existence of 
necessary preconditions for reconciliation, particularly the readiness and commitment of 
relevant actors, as well as existing questions regarding the possible nature and contents, 
procedures, institutions and actors, results and consequences of reconciliation. 
Comparison with other environments and cases of reconciliation, particularly with South 
Africa is used to analyze why initiatives and attempts to start and successfully complete 
reconciliation processes in the Balkans failed and continue to fail. Testing the hypotheses 
the article also explores possible modifications and evolutions of the current concepts of 
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reconciliation as well as alternatives to reconciliation that would contribute to the 
successful normalization, reconstruction and diversity management in post-conflict 
societies. 
 
Normalization, Reconstruction, and  
Reconciliation in Post-Conflict Societies:  
Concepts, Definitions and Their Characteristics 
 
 
The very title of this section includes a few complex concepts (describing even 
more complex social phenomena) that need to be explained and defined to avoid possible 
misunderstandings and to provide an adequate point of reference and theoretical 
framework for my further analysis. What follows are simple working definitions of those 
concepts that I presented also to my interviewees and partners in conversations after I had 
asked them for their own descriptions and/or definitions of those phenomena. This way 
they were better able to understand and answer my questions as well as to explain their 
perceptions and views regarding respective concepts and phenomena. Simultaneously, 
these working definitions, based on the available scholarly literature as well as my 
previous and current research findings were (and still are) instrumental in making my 
research more focused and operational. These working definitions evolved throughout 
my study and still continue to evolve in the light of new information and findings. The 
same is true also for the methodology. 
The first concept that requires definition and additional explanation is the concept 
of post-conflict societies, used in this text to describe those societies in which conflicts of 
high intensity, and particularly violent conflicts, have just been terminated or (at least) 
deescalated and frozen. Although it is problematic to speak of post-conflict situations 
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and/or societies, since conflicts can always (re)appear in every diverse/plural 
environment, this term is often used by international organizations (for example, UN, 
World Bank, OSCE etc.), diverse projects (for example, United Nations University – 
World Institute for Development Economics Research and their Global Governance and 
Conflict project, Social Science Research Network – SSRN) and in scholarly literature. 
(See, for example: Brinkerhoff, ed., 2007; Fairbanks and Brennan, 2005; Lambach, 2007; 
Making Peace Work, 2004) From the analysis of conflicts and diversity management, and 
considering the probability of diverse conflicts in all plural environments as well as the 
life-cycles of specific conflicts and the likelihood of their escalation,  I would suggest 
that every internally diverse society can be observed and determined simultaneously as a 
pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict society. However, traumatic experiences of violent 
conflicts, particularly wars, large scale violence, atrocities (against civilian population) 
and war crimes dramatically interrupts the normal life of people and tend to influence and 
transform societies that have experienced them. Consequently, rather than using a general 
concept of “post-conflict societies” in such cases it might be more appropriate and 
precise to speak of “post-violent-conflict societies” at a certain historic time immediately 
following the cessation and/or end of respective violent conflicts. Such an approach 
would indicate that in every society several diverse (low intensity, protracted, emerging) 
conflicts still exist and – if they are not managed and/or resolved adequately – may 
escalate and even transform into high intensity violent conflicts. In other words, we could 
say that “post-(violent)-conflict societies”—if they do not manage diversities, crises and 
conflicts properly—could be just a transitory pre-conflict stage before the new escalation 
of conflicts in a certain plural/diverse environment.  
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The concept of a post-conflict (particularly post-violent-conflict) situation and/or 
society can be a useful analytical tool for the analysis and classification of conflicts in 
diverse environments. In the context of conflict management and resolution it can be used 
in determining, analyzing and explaining the phases in life-cycles (processes) of 
particular conflicts in diverse environments that are instrumental for the elaboration and 
development of effective long(er)-term strategies for diversity management at all levels. 
These diversity management strategies should provide for stability and peace in those 
environments by setting the frameworks for the engagement and coordination of all 
relevant actors (states and their institutions, international organization, civic society and 
its actors as well as individuals) that can contribute to the prevention of possible 
(uncontrolled) escalations and intensification of conflicts and their transformation into 
violent conflicts as well as to the successful and possibly democratic management and 
resolution of crises and conflicts. (Žagar, 2009, pp. 463–472) 
Normalization can be described simply as a process of restoring and developing 
(the feeling and perception of) normalcy in environments affected by intense, escalated 
and particularly violent conflicts that in different ways can impact upon every dimension 
of (human) beings and relations and the very fabric of societies. This process 
encompasses all activities, programs, policies and strategies that can reduce the possible 
negative consequences of escalated conflicts, and can contribute to stability, peace and 
development in their respective environments. In this context reconstruction and 
reconciliation can be important components of normalization. 
As a component of the process of normalization the process and concept of 
reconstruction can be defined simply as the rebuilding, reparation and reconstruction of 
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damage in all spheres of life and societies caused by violent and particularly military 
conflicts. Usually, reconstruction in a particular environment is framed and materialized 
in several concrete policies, programs and projects. Although the focus is usually initially 
on immediate humanitarian aid and later on economic and material reconstruction and 
rebuilding to establish the necessary economic and social infrastructure (such as 
transportation, energy, housing, public services – including health and education),  I insist 
that the process of reconstruction should encompass all spheres of life and societies that 
are damaged by intense conflicts. (See, for example: Anderlinia and El-Bushra, 
2004/2007). My research shows that, frequently, nonmaterial damage(s) caused by 
conflicts might be more difficult and time consuming to repair and/or compensate than 
any material damage. Often it proves impossible to rebuild and reconstruct relations and 
social structures destroyed and/or damaged by intense and violent conflicts in particular 
environments, which then requires building and development of new ones that, hopefully, 
can replace (or ideally even improve) those that were destroyed. The necessary 
preconditions for such processes of (re)construction, (re)building and development 
include functional and open communication (with information-sharing that improves 
adequate knowledge about other distinct communities), mutual trust and the cooperation 
of all relevant actors. 
In this context, transitional and post-conflict justice should be mentioned as an 
important factor in restoring and preserving peace and stability, as well as of trust and 
cooperation building in post-conflict societies. Transitional and post-conflict justice can 
encompass various efforts, forms and activities such as the prosecution of perpetrators of 
war and other crimes and atrocities, purges, banishment and expulsion, as well as non-
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retributive justice, such as restitution, reparations to victims, rehabilitation, and diverse 
forms of reconciliation, particularly truth commissions. Ideally these actions should be 
based on the principle of the rule of law in democratic settings or in societies that are 
committed to democratic development and democratization, and all forms of post-conflict 
justice should be based on laws passed by competent democratic representative 
institutions (parliaments, legislative bodies). These should precisely define and regulate 
material law, procedures and institutional frameworks including the powers, rights and 
duties of the competent institutions. Although amnesty and exile can contribute to de-
escalation of conflicts’ intensity and can help in establishing peace in certain 
environments and historic circumstances, abstaining from post-conflict justice might have 
destabilizing effects in a longer term. (See, for example: de Brito, Gonzalez-Enriquez and 
Aguilar (eds.), 2001; Elster, 2004; Galtung, 2001; Lie, Binningsbø and Gates, 2007; 
McAdams, 1997) 
From this perspective reconciliation could be described simply as a specific form 
of non-retributive post-conflict justice that might be a useful tool in the process of 
normalization. However, concepts and practices of reconciliation are far more complex 
and, in many ways, problematic in their efforts to reach a broad agreement (particularly 
of those sides opposing each other in the conflict) regarding the (historic) “truth”. 
Consequently, in search of a compromise acceptable to all involved parties, processes and 
efforts of reconciliation should attempt to consider, recognize and reconcile diverse views 
and perceptions of history, the role of history, history teaching and various interpretations 
of history. (Marko-Stöckl, 2008, pp. 3–4) 
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The concept of reconciliation as a possible component of the process of 
normalization and “social reconstruction” in post-conflict societies can be described as “a 
process that reaffirms and develops a society and its institutions based on shared values 
and human rights” thereby enabling former belligerent groups and individuals to find and 
develop new ways of living together peacefully, based on mutual respect, tolerance, 
cooperation and inclusiveness. (Weinstein, and Stover, 2004, p. 5) In other words, 
peaceful coexistence and restoration of normalcy in a diverse society that was torn apart 
by a conflict requires the ‘building of (working and cooperative) relationship’ that 
corresponds to  Lederach’s minimal definition of reconciliation as a process that includes  
critical components such as truth, justice, mercy, and peace. (Lederach, 2004, p. 151) To 
stress the temporal dimension and complexity of the process of reconciliation, it can be 
said that: 
 
Reconciliation is not an event but a process. It is not a linear process. It is a 
difficult, long and unpredictable one, involving various steps and stages… the first 
stage is replacing fear with non-violent co-existence; the second step is building 
confidence and trust, and the third step is achieving empathy. (Ilievski, 2008, 6) 
 
Galtung summarizes reconciliation after violence in a simple equation: “Reconciliation = 
Closure + Healing; closure in the sense of not reopening hostilities, healing in the sense 
of being rehabilitated” (2001, p. 4) In his view the best results can be achieved when all 
parties in a certain environment, especially those that were involved in a conflict, agree to 
cooperate in resolution and reconstruction. 
             Rethinking Reconciliation 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 154 ‐ 
 
My research findings confirm such a view. The full agreement of all relevant 
actors that participate in the process as its parties, particularly their full acceptance and 
commitment to reconciliation, are the necessary—although not always sufficient—
(pre)conditions for its success. In other words, based on the views of my interviewees, 
every successful attempt of reconciliation requires that before the formal and actual start 
of the process all participating parties should agree, at the very least on: 
• The reasons for reconciliation, as well as the principles and declared main goals 
of reconciliation, 
• The parties that should participate in the process, 
• The content(s), particularly on precisely defined historic period(s) and (traumatic) 
events that are to be addressed by the process of reconciliation, 
• The institutional framework, structure and organization, most frequently in the 
form of Truth Commissions (or, possibly, public hearings/meetings) that might be 
given administrative and expert support by diverse state and public institutions, 
for example by public administration, judiciary and police (particularly in the 
phase of investigation), as well as by civic society and its actors (such as NGOs, 
churches, as well as others, including economic enterprises), 
• The exact competences, rights and duties of the institutional structure and its 
institutions,   
• The procedural and material rules of reconciliation, particularly the rules of 
procedure and conduct of participating parties, procedures and criteria for the 
establishment of individual responsibility of perpetrators, as well as the conduct 
of individuals—both perpetrators and victims—including the formal and symbolic 
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acts of confession of perpetrators, acceptance of individual’s guilt and 
responsibility, and forgiveness expressed by victims, 
• The formal consequences of confessions and acceptance of individual guilt and 
responsibility, particularly formal criminal amnesty of perpetrators, 
• The time-frame (duration of reconciliation), particularly the deadline when the 
process of reconciliation and all activities within it should be completed, 
• The process of reporting and evaluation in particular phases and at the end of the 
process of reconciliation. 
The likelihood that such agreements would provide an adequate basis for 
reconciliation depends on the specific situation, the relations between the parties and the 
balance of power in the post-conflict environment. It is believed that this likelihood 
increases in environments committed to (re)building democracy, tolerance, peaceful 
coexistence and cooperation. Reconciliation might be more likely in post-conflict 
situations and societies where a clear-cut division between parties exists and where 
victorious sides request and promote such a process. On the other hand, reconciliation is 
less likely in environments and post-conflict situations where it is impossible to identify 
victors and losers clearly, where there are diverse and opposing interpretations of history 
and traumatic experiences, where there are several opposing interests, and where one or 
some sides oppose reconciliation or demand concessions (such as exculpation or 
amnesty) that are unacceptable to other parties. Reconciliation might be even less likely 
or, at least, more complex and uncertain in ethnically plural post-conflict societies, where 
ethnicity becomes a dividing line and the process is perceived as interethnic 
reconciliation, particularly in cases when certain parties reject it. Namely, reconciliation 
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is impossible without the consent and participation of all parties that need to agree “to 
face recent past objectively” (Petričušić, Kmezić, and Žagar, 2008, 5). 
Taking into account possible social impacts, my research developed a working 
definition of reconciliation that saw it as a tool for diversity, crisis and conflict 
management that could contribute to normalization and stability in internally diverse 
societies, particularly those considered divided-societies. As such, 
 
reconciliation is a specific process that leads to the commonly acceptable and 
accepted (re)interpretation of the past, especially of specific shared traumatic past 
developments. In a way it is a past-oriented and usually painful process of healing 
that, however, has several present- and future-oriented goals and impacts. Ideally, 
it can create the formal basis and conditions for peace, coexistence and 
cooperation in the present and future and for the necessary social cohesion that 
enables elaboration and realization of common interests (Žagar, 2007/8, p. 401). 
 
In this context the importance of the temporal dimensions and limitations of 
reconciliation should be stressed—both in terms of exactly defining and agreeing upon 
the historic periods it addresses, as well as in determining the exact duration of the formal 
processes of reconciliation and their deadlines. Traditionally, all temporal dimensions of 
reconciliation should be exactly defined and, normally, limited to a certain, relatively 
short period. Reconciliation should follow conceptual, procedural, material and 
institutional frameworks and foundations as well as time-frames determined by the 
legislation and political decisions that should be agreed upon and accepted by all relevant 
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actors. Often we can detect fears that processes of reconciliation can result in possible 
threats to stability if they are not limited to a relatively short time. There are also fears 
that reconciliation “can become a never-ending, permanent process that constantly 
reinforces certain historic traumas.” (Žagar, 2007/8 (©2010), p. 401) However, 
successful diversity management in plural and particularly divided societies demands the 
development and utilization of effective approaches, mechanisms and procedures that can 
address, prevent, manage and resolve problems and tensions in intercommunal and 
interethnic relations. If this can be done in peaceful and democratic ways, it might 
prevent escalations of crises and conflicts, and particularly their traumatic consequences. 
In this context revised and transformed concepts of permanent reconciliation, as well as 
other adequate alternative solutions that can successfully address and manage interethnic 
and other intercommunal relations and problems, would be particularly welcome. (See 
also: Redekop, 2002) 
The consensus reached by the parties that participate in reconciliation regarding 
the process of reconciliation—its nature, principles and contents, formal, procedural and 
institutional framework, procedural and material rules, as well as its goals and 
outcomes—can serve as the basis for  future coexistence and cooperation in internally 
diverse post-conflict societies. In the process of reconciliation perpetrators should: come 
forward and confess their wrongdoings (usually violence, crimes and/or atrocities); 
express and accept their guilt, responsibility and remorse; and ask their victims for 
forgiveness, which, ideally, the victims are expected to accept at least formally. Such 
reconciliation can be viewed as a process of purification and consensus building that 
             Rethinking Reconciliation 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 158 ‐ 
 
could contribute to the reduction of social tensions and historic traumas in post-conflict 
societies.  
 
Potentials, Expectations, Successes, and  
Problems of Reconciliation: 
Experiences from the Balkans and South Africa 
 
My research in reconciliation started in the second half of the 1980s when I 
entered the field of peace and conflict studies and focused my research on the theory and 
practice of crises and conflicts, the determination of their life-cycles, and the responses of 
particular environments to crises and conflicts, particularly into their prevention, 
management and/or resolution. In this context I examined reconciliation as a possible tool 
of conflict analysis, prevention, management and resolution, as well as diversity 
management in plural societies that can be used effectively especially in the phase(s) of 
de-escalation of high-intensity and particularly violent conflicts. (Žagar, 2007) Soon I 
discovered that regardless of certain communalities and similarities each crisis and 
conflict was a specific and unique case that should be analyzed, treated and managed as 
such. Although these specific cases can be studied comparatively in order to determine 
specific differences and communalities among them, one should be very careful in 
interpreting and generalizing the findings. Detected differences and specificities often 
prove more important and decisive than similarities and communalities. Additionally, in 
every environment that I studied I detected a substantial gap between the normative 
framework on the one hand and the actual situation and practice on the other hand which 
further complicates comparison and makes any generalization rather inadequate or even 
impossible. Considering all the problems and weaknesses as well as limitations of the 
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research findings, however, comparative research still proves to be the most applicable 
and useful approach.  
These considerations and limitations apply also to my case studies and 
comparative studies of reconciliation in different environments in the Balkans 
(particularly in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia) 
and in South Africa, as well as to my presentations, interpretations and generalization of 
research results in this article. Consequently, this text should not be treated as a detailed 
analysis and presentation of reconciliation in respective states, but rather an attempt to 
present a common framework, adequate tools and yardsticks for analysis in these 
environments. 
If there was the will, consensus and commitment to start, and successfully bring 
to completion, the process of reconciliation in South Africa immediately after the 
abolition of apartheid, they have not existed and still do not exist in the Balkans. Of 
course, there are still discussions about reconciliation in different circles and 
environments, as well as many initiatives—particularly external (including those of the 
international community)—to try to start it. This is the reason that 
 
[r]econciliation often appears in political declarations and diverse documents 
from the region and related to the Western Balkans. Usually, these documents 
speak of reconciliation in the context of human rights, protection of minorities, 
refugee return, reconstruction, post-conflict development, democratization and 
consolidation of democracy, peace and stability, etc., and state that reconciliation 
could contribute to these goals. However, not only do they fail to define 
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reconciliation’s principles and goals, but they also fail to define the process and 
procedure of reconciliation (Žagar, 2007/8, p. 402). 
 
Consequently, my initial consideration is that there is no consensus regarding 
reconciliation in the region. Although it is often being discussed as the desired and even 
necessary precondition for “normalization” and long-term peace and stability, nobody has 
defined precisely what reconciliation in the Balkans and in every individual state in the 
region should be and in which way it should be implemented. Aside from general 
political statements of international and national leaders there are no substantive and/or 
institutional conditions in place that are necessary for a successful process of 
reconciliation. There is no consensus about the historic developments, events, issues, 
actors and periods that should be addressed by such a process. As indicated, we could 
question the very existence of the basic preconditions for reconciliation—the willingness, 
agreement and readiness of all relevant factors to engage in the process. For, “there is 
neither adequate legislation nor informal agreements on procedure, institutions and 
criteria for the evaluation and reconciliation. Additionally, general and specific goals and 
expected outcomes (consequences) of reconciliation are not adequately determined” 
(Žagar, 2007/8, p. 404). 
High hopes that the international community and a part of civic society in the 
Balkan countries and outside the region will invest in initializing reconciliation at least in 
individual countries do not seem to be very realistic. It seems that they ignore past 
experiences from different environments and historic circumstances in all parts of the 
world that inform us that reconciliation failed to produce expected results if the internal 
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will and consensus regarding it and commitment to it did not exist or were weak. This is 
particularly true when reconciliation was initiated, imported or even imposed from 
outside. 
Not surprisingly, such criticisms appeared in many interviews in which 
interviewees expressed their views that successful retributive post-conflict justice, 
particularly effective criminal justice—expressed in effective, strict and consistent 
prosecution and conviction of all perpetrators of war and other crimes, regardless of their 
background and position—would be the preferred and necessary precondition for 
(re)establishing peace and stability, tolerance, trust, coexistence and cooperation in 
individual countries as well as in the region. They also expressed fears that reconciliation 
might cement and legitimize (in their view illegitimate) gains and spoils of war(s), but 
particularly the existing situation of a balance of power based on ethnic divisions. 
Although it is believed that successful reconciliation contributes to community relations, 
peace and stability in an environment that was torn by a conflict, it might produce exactly 
opposite results. Paradoxically, reconciliation that is perceived as a tool for ensuring 
peace and stability (as its preconditions) requires an already stable situation and a mutual  
acceptance by all sides involved in the process of communication, tolerance and 
coexistence. Portrayed as a two way process, reconciliation inherently presupposes 
certain missionary elements deriving from Christian theologies and requires forgiveness 
(on behalf of victims). Consequently, sometimes reconciliation might be perceived as an 
institutional design that rewards the bad guys (perpetrators of wrongdoings) and does not 
ensure adequate justice for victims. These characteristics, along with the ideological 
nature of reconciliation, might be particularly problematic in multiethnic, multicultural 
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and multi-religious environments. Here diverse cultures, ideologies and religions might 
have different views of justice and forgiveness, but particularly of confession and 
absolution. Furthermore, failed reconciliation might become an important additional 
generator of conflicts. 
The current concepts and practices of reconciliation can be problematic and even 
counterproductive if they are attempted in environments where it is unclear which sides 
were victorious and which were losers, where several diverse and even opposing 
interpretations of history and past traumatic experiences exist, and where all sides 
committed certain wrongdoings in the time of intense and violent conflicts, particularly if 
there is a dispute which of the sides involved were the victims and which perpetrators of 
certain wrongdoings. In such cases it is often almost impossible to reach a consensus or 
even compromise regarding the past and commonly acceptable interpretations of this 
past. The task is even more difficult if reconciliation is attempted simultaneously with the 
process of (democratic) transition in a post-conflict society, faced also with the dilemmas 
of transitional justice and a still unstable democratic set up of the society. Additionally, in 
such situations there might be several kinds and dimensions of justice and truth, often 
several truths—such as judicial, political and moral justice and truth. (See, Žagar, 2007/8, 
p. 402) 
In the circumstances that existed in the Balkan countries it proved impossible to 
reach consensus regarding the procedural and institutional framework of reconciliation. 
Consequently, no adequate formal framework and no organizational structure were 
determined and established in these countries. Usually, in such situations “Truth 
Commissions”, which have the mission to establish the truth and responsibility of 
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perpetrators, are formed and function as key reconciliation institutions. Their 
compositions, modes of operation, roles, powers and competences can differ in different 
environments and should be adjusted to specific circumstances and needs in these 
environments. Regardless of the existence of a collective blame associated with a certain 
party or collective entity that is seen as the main perpetrator of wrong-doings and/or 
atrocities in a certain environment, reconciliation requires the establishment of individual 
(or at least individualized) personal responsibility and accountability. Consequently, 
reconciliation can be viewed as the undoing of past wrong-doings through the 
perpetrator’s recognition of responsibility and accountability and remorse on the one side, 
and through victims’ forgiveness on the other side. Among the main preconditions for a 
possible success of the process we could list (at least) a certain level of normalization and 
the beginning of reconstruction, the return of refugees and displaced persons and the 
introduction of adequate measures for the protection of minorities. 
In comparison with other environments where reconciliation has been attempted 
and carried out with various levels of success, particularly South Africa that is often 
considered a model case, I would conclude that reconciliation failed and does not exist in 
the Balkans. Moreover, reconciliation has not even been started—regardless of the 
diverse initiatives and aspirations, including those of the international community. My 
research findings show no enthusiasm from relevant actors who are expected to 
participate as parties (with diverse roles) in the process of reconciliation. Often they 
doubt that reconciliation could bring any positive results in their respective environments 
and sometimes express their fears of possible negative outcomes and consequences for 
their distinct communities and/or themselves personally. Particularly they fear that 
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reconciliation, because of its likely failure, would not contribute to peace, stability and 
normalization in respective societies, but rather to instability and the escalation of 
conflicts. In any case, as also many interviewees pointed out, their fears and opposition to 
reconciliation seem to be stronger than possible incentives to start it and/or expectations 
of its potential benefits. 
Although each of the countries in the Balkans is a very specific and unique case, 
certain common observations, characteristics and similarities can be summarized in the 
following main conclusions: 
• Political will and the readiness to start the process of reconciliation in most 
countries of the region do not exist or are very limited. Consequently, rare 
statements of politicians calling for reconciliation should be considered lip-
service to please the international community and potential donors (who continue 
to promote the idea), rather than the actual desire to start the reconciliation. 
• Consequently, there are no serious attempts to determine and agree upon the 
content(s), procedures and institutions, as well as the normative and institutional 
framework, which would be necessary to start the process. 
• Frequently there is a dispute regarding the actors that should be involved in the 
process of reconciliation and their roles (conditioned by diverse perceptions and 
evaluations of historic events and their consequences, as well as by the lack of 
recognition of responsibility of diverse actors for their actions and their 
outcomes).  
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• There is also disagreement regarding the necessity and role of post-conflict 
justice, particularly criminal justice and the necessity of possible abolition for 
those perpetrators who participate in reconciliation. 
• There is no consensus regarding the desired outcomes and long-term goals of 
reconciliation, which would provide the basis for peace, stability, normalization, 
and the future cooperation of all actors. (See, Žagar, 2007/8, 404-405) 
In comparison with the Balkans, and regardless of certain problems with the 
process of reconciliation, South Africa has been and (largely) still is considered to be a 
success. (See, for example, Adam and Moodley, 1993; Adam, Moodley, and Slabbert, 
1999; Gibson, 2002; Gibson, 2004; Gibson and Gouws, 1999; Gibson and Gouws, 2003) 
In South Africa the volume of the work, the involvement of people and the results of the 
process presented and summarized in the reports of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission are impressive. (See, THE TRC REPORT, 1998/2009) Although 
reconciliation did not fulfill all expectations, it is (still) believed that the process of 
reconciliation and its results contributed substantially to: reducing (in some cases rather 
intense) tensions and divisions; coming to terms with a traumatic past; building peace and 
stability; and the integration of all segments into post-Apartheid South African society. 
This is also the official position.  
However, my interviews and several conversations in South Africa, including 
those with people in streets, showed that by 2010 much of the initial enthusiasm and 
optimism regarding reconciliation and the successful democratic transformation have 
disappeared to a large extent. There are more and more cracks in a once optimistic 
picture. No doubt, the elimination of Apartheid, reconciliation and process of democratic 
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transition changed, transformed, integrated and improved South Africa in the 1990s. Yet 
they did not eliminate deep divisions, social and economic injustice and inequality, 
exclusion and marginalization (particularly of poor, predominantly black populations in 
diverse environments) or racism (that exists in the forms of traditional, internal and 
reverse racism). These problems continue, sometimes with greater intensity. On the one 
hand many victims believe that the perpetrators of wrongdoings were not punished 
adequately, while the victims were not compensated adequately (both in material and 
nonmaterial sense). On the other hand, perpetrators seem to be less disappointed with the 
process, although a few considered it an unnecessary and nonproductive humiliation that 
did not produce the desired results. 
 It should be mentioned that the reconciliation process only addressed 
wrongdoings and injustices that were brought to its attention in the determined time 
period and, consequently, did not discuss all wrongdoings, crimes and injustices during 
this time. Additionally, diverse problems, wrongdoings, crimes and injustices have 
continued and the competent institutions of South Africa do not always address them 
properly and adequately. Obviously, it was impossible to continue reconciliation 
indefinitely or transform it into a permanent process that would deal with all relevant 
problems and injustices as they appear. Consequently, adequate alternative formal 
concepts, approaches and institutions/mechanisms that could complement and assist 
democratic institutions of the country in dealing properly with these problems should 
have been developed—which South Africa failed to do. Among the main problems that 
might need to be addressed Terry Bell listed: adequate social and economic development 
that should take into account the environment (including climate problems) and social 
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justice; growing economic and social injustice and exclusion; gender and class issues; 
adequate integration; and a lack of social infrastructure and services, particularly the 
access of the poor to education, health and social security. He also mentioned corruption 
and crime that in many ways are the negative consequences of the inability to properly 
address all these problems. Luckily, he said the award of the 2010 World Cup and its 
positive economic effects to a certain extent helped in neutralizing a worse economic 
crisis. 
 
Conclusion:  
Reconciliation Rethought and  
Alternative Solutions 
 
The discussion of reconciliation so far confirms the hypothesis that it can be a 
useful approach to and tool for normalization, reconstruction and development in post-
conflict societies. However, this requires the full acceptance, agreement, and commitment 
of all parties. It can successfully complement state institutions in the prosecution of 
perpetrators of diverse wrongdoings in a certain historic time, but cannot replace them. In 
this context the temporal dimensions (the determined period that is addressed) and 
limitations (the exactly determined duration of the process of reconciliation) of traditional 
reconciliation reduce   its applicability and efficiency as a tool of crisis and conflict 
prevention, management and reconciliation, particularly as an adequate tool for 
permanent diversity management in plural societies. I would argue that for such a role 
reconciliation should transform into a permanent ongoing process that takes into account 
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a broader social and historic context. It could become a permanent process for screening 
and evaluating social relations that would detect and point to undesired and problematic 
developments and actions in a certain environment. In this context, the process should 
constantly re-examine and confirm the will of all parties to participate in the process, as 
well as basic principles and values that are agreed upon in these environments. 
Simultaneously, it has to determine directions and strategies of future development.  
Traditional reconciliation seems to be an appropriate tool for dealing with 
traumatic experiences and problems that should not be forgotten, but it should also 
consider important lessons that could contribute to the prevention of such and/or similar 
events in the future. Traditional concepts should also recognize that all historic events, 
including traumatic ones, have their prehistory and broader social contexts that are 
relevant for reconciliation. Additionally, such historic events might have several 
consequences in diverse spheres of life and society that might last for several generations. 
All this should be taken into consideration in determining the time frame. 
I can confirm also the hypothesis that reconciliation should be introduced only 
when it is expected to contribute to peace and stability in a certain post-conflict 
environment. However, traditional concepts of reconciliation should be transformed 
and/or complemented by alternative approaches that can (re)establish communication, 
(re)build (at least) basic economic and social infrastructure and trust, as well as develop 
and constantly reconfirm common interests as the basis for the future common existence, 
cooperation and development of all distinct communities in those environments. 
Consequently, reconciliation should always be considered and evaluated as a possible 
tool for normalization and peace- and stability-building in post-conflict societies. 
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Among alternative and/or complementary approaches and mechanisms that can 
contribute to long-term peace, stability and democratic development in particular post-
conflict societies I have mentioned normalization and diversity management, with the 
prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts as key components. 
Normalization is a process of creating conditions of mutual recognition and acceptance, 
tolerance, coexistence and (hopefully equal) cooperation in a certain plural and diverse 
environment that should be the basis for determination and realization of common 
interests. It can include also different segments of diversity management and should 
stimulate the development of adequate procedures and mechanisms for the peaceful and 
democratic management and resolution of crises and conflicts based on the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination, and human rights—including minority rights. If 
normalization is a transitional approach and concept that can be utilized in crisis 
situations and post-conflict societies, diversity management represents a permanent 
process that addresses issues of recognition, regulation, management and adequate 
protection of all socially relevant diversities in a certain environment. It can be described 
“as a set of strategies, policies, concepts and approaches, programmes, measures and 
activities that should ensure equality, equal possibilities, participation and inclusion in all 
spheres of social, economic and political life (both public and private life) for all 
individuals and communities within a society, especially for immigrants, persons 
belonging to national and other minorities, marginalized individuals, minorities and other 
distinct communities.” (See, Žagar, 2006/7, 320) 
My conclusion regarding reconciliation in the Balkans would be that it does not 
exist, since it is not even spelled out and accepted as a realistic goal. Considering the 
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rather negative attitude towards reconciliation by relevant social and political actors as 
well as people in the countries of the region it might be more productive to speak, 
instead, of normalization or a democratic political process that could provide a stable 
basis for power-sharing and cooperation, particularly in determining and realizing the 
common interests of all individuals and distinct communities in these environments. 
These elements are important components of diversity management that in the long term 
might prove to be the most adequate approach and mechanism for the region and its 
countries. 
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The Role of the European Union as a Peace Builder:  
 
Northern Ireland as a Case Study 
 
 
Paul Arthur 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The United Kingdom and Ireland joined the European Economic Community in 1973 at a 
time when bitter communal conflict engulfed Northern Ireland. It appeared to be a 
deviant case in a modernising Europe anxious to unleash the shackles of the first half of 
the twentieth century. In fact the unusual conjunction of conflict within a disputed region 
of the British/Irish archipelago and joint membership of the European Community 
offered an opportunity to move beyond the excessive intimacy of an ancient quarrel 
through different temporal and spatial lenses. This article addresses the issue of dealing 
with minority grievances in an inter- and intra-state dispute by analysing the role of 
functional regimes and the deliverance of “peace in parts” through the changing context 
of statehood within Europe where sovereignty may be divisible and borders more 
permeable. It will conclude that the EU has made an essential contribution to the 
changing relations between Britain and Ireland and to conflict management within 
Northern Ireland. 
      
 
Introduction 
 
 
In 1979 the United Nations Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination 
and the Protection of Minorities published the Capotorti Report. It addressed the 
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desirability of bilateral treaties between states most directly concerned and deserves to be 
quoted at some length: 
 History shows that the minority problem can poison international relations. 
 However, with the new standards set by the United Nations in the framework  
 of human rights, minority groups can now play a positive role in international 
 relations. When their rights are guaranteed and fully respected minority groups 
 can serve as a link between States. The Special Rapporteur strongly believes 
that bilateral agreements dealing with minority rights concluded between States 
where minorities live and the States from which such minorities originate 
(especially between neighbouring countries) would be extremely 
useful. It must be stressed, however, that co-operation with regard to the rights of 
members of minority groups shall be based on mutual respect for the principle of 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States concerned and non-
interference in their internal affairs (Para. 618, recommendation 10b). 
 
This fits neatly with one conception of the EU’s approach to conflict resolution—its 
potential through practices of “Europeanization” that create a European public sphere in 
which incompatibilities can be peacefully communicated through creating a framework 
for a European identity that makes the cost of conflict across borders too high to continue 
and that feeds into the recognition of shared needs and the creation of common identities 
(cited in Hayward, 2006, p. 262).  
Many of the contentious issues that are addressed in the 1998 Belfast Agreement 
are to be found in Recommendation 10 (b) and are an illustration of the extent to which 
             Rethinking Reconciliation 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 178 ‐ 
 
the British and Irish governments have dealt successfully with outstanding historic 
grievances within the European Union. After all, as Boyle and Hadden assert, the 
European Community was established “principally as a means of breaking down historic 
enmities. Member states are bound to recognize their existing boundaries and are 
expected, with the assistance of their fellow members, to resolve any outstanding 
difficulties by sharing resources across national frontiers and by channelling the 
potentially dangerous forces of traditional nationalism into a broader communal 
framework” (1986, p. 47). In the context of the Northern Ireland problem the Community 
offered two other advantages: one was the “changing context of statehood”; and the 
second was that the “EU system offered a far more benign external environment for small 
states, including Ireland, than traditional balance of powers systems or empire”. The 
result was that joint “membership of the EU altered the context of  British/Irish relations 
in a radical manner by providing the Irish economy, polity and society with a highly-
institutionalised and rule-bound context which it could adapt to economic and political 
internationalization” (Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008, pp. 198–9). One example concerns 
the pattern of Irish exports: “In 1971, the UK market absorbed 61 per cent of Irish 
exports; the proportion had fallen to 25 per cent by 1998” (p. 199). It also offered in part 
a route to a solution of the Northern Ireland problem. In one of the early interventions 
(the European Parliament’s (EP) 1984 Haagerup Report) it sought to address “one of the 
gravest political and social problems existing in the Community”—3,375 people were 
killed between 1969 and 1994 as a result of the conflict in a population of less than 1.7 
million. That is precisely what this article will address by examining the period until the 
signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. 
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When Jean Blanchard described Ireland as an island behind an island he was 
alluding to the fact that the neighbouring island of Britain had had a disproportionate 
influence on Ireland, an influence based on a colonial history that stretched back to the 
seventeenth century at least. That state of mind is best encapsulated by Edmund Burke in 
his Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, when he writes that when “any community is 
subordinately connected with another, the great danger of the connection is the extreme 
pride and self-complacency of the superior, which in all matters of controversy will 
probably decide in its own favour” (1777). It calls to mind the concept of the Prospero 
complex evolved by the radical French historian, Octave Mannoni, when he argued that 
the coloniser has created a neurotic sense of inferiority in the coloniser. 
This theme is developed in Joseph Lee’s study of Irish politics and society in the 
twentieth century where he examines a dependency syndrome that curbed the Irish 
psyche and a collective mentality that strove after security. The former he said was quite 
natural in that a “small occupied country, with an alien ruling class, culturally penetrated 
by the language and many of the thought processes of the coloniser, was bound in large 
measure to imitate the example of the powerful and the prosperous” (Lee, 1989, p. 627). 
The result, Lee asserts, was that when allied to the “elusive but crucial psychological 
factors that inspired the instinct of inferiority, it shrivelled Irish perspectives on Irish 
potential” (629). 
Lee was published in 1989 at a time when the Irish economy was in the doldrums; 
emigration (particularly of the educated young) was on the rise; and there was no sign of 
an end to the Northern Ireland conflict. Contrast that with a more recent publication 
where Ireland was judged to be the most globalized country that ever yet was seen and 
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the Economist ranked Ireland’s “quality of life” as the best in the world in 2004 (Foster, 
2007, pp. 4–5). Admittedly the “Celtic Tiger” is in serious recession at the time of 
writing; but, on the other hand, the seemingly intractable conflict in Northern Ireland has 
come to an end. Indeed some hold it up as a model of conflict resolution to be applied 
elsewhere in the world. 
Various explanations have been adumbrated to explain the sloughing of fatalism 
in Ireland and a more expansive and inclusive approach to life. This article intends to 
look at one aspect of this relative success through an examination of the experience of 
nearly four decades of participation in “Europe”. When the United Kingdom (UK) of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
January 1973 it was accompanied by the Republic of Ireland (henceforth Ireland). Their 
joint accession was to change the British-Irish relationship fundamentally and was to 
contribute towards a greater understanding in their approach to solving the Northern 
Ireland problem. We will examine both of these aspects. 
 
Attitudes in the UK and Ireland to European accession 
 
 
Ireland 
The UK and Ireland entered the EEC in different frames of mind. There is some 
evidence to suggest that Ireland entered more positively. In his first major policy speech 
in 1973 the Irish Foreign Minister Garret FitzGerald told the Dail (Irish parliament) that it 
was time to formulate new general guidelines for future foreign policy because of the 
movement “towards greater interdependence” in the world economy; “the evolving 
situation in Northern Ireland”; and the “accession of membership to the European 
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Communities”. In a book he had published the previous year he stated that “although it 
would be wrong to look at this as a panacea for the Irish problem, which will always 
remain one to be settled by Irishmen in Ireland, such influence as membership of the 
(European Community) will have is likely to be uniformly directed towards the path to a 
united Ireland” (FitzGerald, 1972, p. 104). 
“Interdependence” was the key word. The Irish were conscious of their humble 
position in the world economy and of the need to find new markets. Public opinion was 
strongly in favour of membership because it expected to benefit from the CAP (Common 
Agricultural Policy) and from European regional development funds. In a 1972 
referendum 83 per cent endorsed the decision to join. At another level the Irish 
government indicated through a White Paper published in 1972 that its modest 
international profile enabled it to read the message of the effect of the progressive 
informal encroachments of international linkages on national autonomy, and so it drew 
the distinction between independence and sovereignty. It acknowledged that as “a very 
small country independent but with little or no capacity to influence events abroad that 
significantly affect us” Ireland enjoyed very little economic sovereignty. 
That was a lesson that had been hard learnt during the course of twentieth century 
Anglo-Irish relations. An American analysis of the Irish economy in 1952 had concluded 
that the country’s dependence on Britain was so strong as to be incompatible with the 
status of political sovereignty. The era of protectionism was brought to a close with the 
signing of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement in 1965. Henceforth economic 
nationalism and self-sufficiency was to be replaced with close economic ties with the UK 
and ultimately within the EEC. The stark message was that “the national interest was the 
             Rethinking Reconciliation 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 182 ‐ 
 
only valid criterion in policy formulation. Everything else, even sovereignty, which was 
merely a means towards serving the national interest, must be subordinated to that 
decisive consideration. The other member states of the EEC had already “accepted the 
limitations involved on their own national freedom of action because they consider that 
their national interests are best being served by membership”” (Lee, pp. 463–4. All 
quotations from the 1972 White Paper are extracted from Lee). The Irish intended to be 
communitaire. They demonstrated this at an early stage when they decided that they 
would stay in the Community notwithstanding any decisions the British made when the 
UK held a referendum in 1975 to decide whether to remain or not. Similarly it joined the 
European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978 when the British did not. They did this 
despite the fact that it had “the potential to drive a wedge between the two parts of the 
island” (Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008, p. 200). The extent to which they were successful 
is acknowledged in the conclusion to an Irish White Paper on Foreign Policy (1996): 
“Irish people increasingly see the European Union not simply as an organisation to which 
Ireland belongs, but as an integral part of our future. We see ourselves increasingly as 
Europeans.” This was the response to Lee’s historic sense of inferiority. Garvin puts it in 
perspective when he comments that Ireland’s engagement with Europe was part of “a 
very deep longing for an alliance, a friendship that was non-imperial and psychologically 
satisfying, combined with a culturally determined wish to be self-sufficient and to be true 
to no one but one’s collective self” (p. 200). 
It might be said Ireland was simply following an international system that 
recognised the erosion of boundaries based on the universal recognition of territorial 
sovereignty through growing interdependencies: “Thus, while political systems are 
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boundary- maintaining, markets—although dependent  for their creation upon political 
power and economic networks—are not.” The result has seen contradictory traits in the 
international system where in place of spheres of responsibility and of abstention we now 
have functional regimes. They “unbundle” the “package of rights inherent in territorial 
sovereignty.…Functional regimes, it was hoped, would not only downgrade the 
importance of  national boundaries, but could, through the expansion of transboundary 
co-operative networks, lead to ‘peace in parts’” (Kratochwil, 1986, pp. 43–50). In this 
and other respects “Europe” may serve as a new type of conflict management device. 
 
Great Britain 
There is little or no evidence that the UK entered the EEC with the same 
perspectives. According to Christopher Tugendhat, “the British entered the Community 
in an unemotional frame of mind” (1986, p. 33). It was not until a June 1975 
referendum—an unusual occurrence in British constitutional practice—when in a large 
turnout the British voted 2:1 to accept the conditions of membership that it became clear 
that there was some enthusiasm for the idea of Europe. Nonetheless the poll disguises a 
culture of mistrust about “the continent”—evident in its refusal to get involved in the 
original European Coal and Steel Community in 1950 because, to quote Lord Plowden, 
“We’d won the war and we weren’t ready to form any special links with the continent” 
(p. 118). A change of mind and two rejected applications made during the 1960s did not 
enhance the UK’s love affair with the EEC. The Community was suspicious of the UK’s 
“Atlanticism” so that its 1962 application was vetoed by President de Gaulle because “in 
his view, Britain would constitute a Trojan horse for the United States, on the one hand 
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impeding Western Europe’s emergence as a unified entity under French leadership, and, 
on the other, leading ultimately to an Atlantic community under American “hegemony”” 
(Jordan and Feld, 1986, p. 114). It underlines what William Wallace (1991, pp. 67–80) 
detects as a fundamental Anglo-Saxon/European faultline which cuts across the main 
British political parties. 
In addition British (and Irish and Danish) entry to the Community occurred at a 
time when global economic conditions had deteriorated: “the first stage of the 
Community’s development coincided with the optimism and burgeoning prosperity of the 
1960s. Britain’s accession, by contrast, came just as that boom was about to end with the 
first oil shock, and its first year of membership coincided with the worst recession since 
the 1930s” (Tugendhat, 1986, p. 117). Nor was she entirely satisfied with the cost of 
membership. The Community represented the UK’s first permanent peacetime 
engagement on the continent of Europe since the Reformation, and she was not in 
control. She was not tuned into the idealism that had launched the EEC; and, unlike her 
other alliances, the EEC was the only international organisation of which she was not a 
founder member. In these circumstances scepticism was not altogether unexpected. 
 
Northern Ireland 
The UK and Ireland joined the community at a time of worsening conditions in 
Northern Ireland and it was a factor in the negotiations leading to accession. Robert 
Ramsay, a senior Northern Ireland civil servant, was convinced that at this time “the 
threat from the French was decisive; the Stormont government was sacrificed on the altar 
of his [Heath’s] European ambitions.” This assertion is based on a key policy document 
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drawn up for the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann, in meetings he was 
having with the British and Irish in the spring of 1972. Ramsay quotes from the document 
at some length where the French are contemplating “the worsening situation and the 
appeals to us from Dublin...the deterioration in the situation in Northern Ireland, if it 
continues will be likely to weigh heavily on the good functioning of the Community and, 
consequently, will affect ourselves, even if indirectly. Moreover, we cannot easily show 
ourselves to be disinterested in a matter which brings into conflict two friendly 
neighbouring countries” (Ramsay, 2009, pp. 102–105). Ramsay was alluding to the 
imposition of direct rule by the Heath government in March 1972 on the back of a 
security disaster known as Bloody Sunday when British paratroopers killed thirteen 
unarmed civil rights’ marchers. The Northern Ireland government had vigorously 
opposed direct rule. 
Indeed “Europe” was one of the fissures in the internal politics of Northern 
Ireland from the moment that the UK sought membership. Generally, nationalists placed 
greater emphasis on the political significance of Community integration and believed that 
EEC membership could internationalise the Irish question. During negotiations they were 
to attack the Northern Ireland government’s supine role when it came to crucial decisions 
taken by the UK government. They noted, for example, that during the negotiations of 
1961-63 the chief British negotiator, Edward Heath, refused to countenance a permanent 
Northern Ireland observer in his delegation. On the other hand unionists distinguished 
between the economic and political effects. They took some comfort from the fact that 
Ireland had no choice but to apply once the UK had applied; and that rather than lead to a 
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united Ireland, membership would mean that the Republic was merging once again with 
the rest of the archipelago (Aughey and Hainsworth, 1982, pp. 94–114). 
More specifically there were four issues in the terms of entry that agitated the 
local politicians: they were (a) about Northern Ireland’s peripherality—the “two seas” 
problem; (b) concerns about the future of agriculture; (c) concerns about the cost of living 
and especially the estimated rise in food costs; and (d) the Safeguarding of Employment 
Act (1947). The first three were non-contentious. The last said much about the sectarian 
nature of Northern Irish society and the “threat” from Europe. The Act had been passed 
ostensibly to give preference to local people in an area of high unemployment as well as 
“to keep out workers from the Irish Republic”. It acted as a sort of economic and political 
cordon sanitaire “because unionists worried about being “swamped by southern workers. 
In 1962 one unionist backbencher asked rhetorically “can anyone doubt that if our 
Safeguarding of Employment Act is granted a few more years to live it will only be a few 
years and that ultimately our British Ulster will crumble under peaceful penetration from 
the south” (p. 102). 
In many ways this was the nub of unionist objections to the European 
adventure—it would expose the permeability of the Irish border. This sense of foreboding 
would have been enhanced by the actuality of membership itself because it illustrated a 
new asymmetry in Anglo-Irish relations whereby Ireland entered the Community with 
precisely the same status as the UK—in place of the old subordination the luxury of 
being a co-ordinate. But it was not a luxury which Northern Ireland was to enjoy. EEC 
accession coincided with the imposition of direct rule. Both indicated the new impotence 
of unionism.  
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The UK’s 1975 referendum demonstrated that scepticism was alive and well in 
Northern Ireland. Only one other region of the UK polled a higher negative attitude 
towards the Community—though it has to be said that a small majority in Northern 
Ireland endorsed membership. The UK “Yes” vote was 67.2 percent. Only Shetland and 
the Western Isles voted “No” although Northern Ireland’s yes” vote of 52.1 percent was 
the smallest pro-European vote among the national segments of the UK. That was an 
underlying trend. Its more strident voice was to be found in the Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP) whose leader (and Moderator of the Free Presbyterian Church), Rev. Ian 
Paisley, fought the first direct elections to the European Parliament as a “free and fearless 
Protestant and loyalist voice.” He topped the poll with an overwhelming vote which he 
attributed to a “twentieth century miracle” engineered by the mysterious providence of 
God. In a series of sermons, “The Common Marker Prophetically Considered,” his basic 
theme was that that the EEC was part of the “growth of the Antichrist and is in the 
political sphere what the Roman Church is in the religious. Its main purpose is to assist 
Romanism in its campaign for world domination.” Hence his opposition to continuing 
membership is part of the Free Presbyterian eschatology (Bruce, 1986, pp. 226–9). In 
addition the DUP was fundamentally opposed to British membership because it entailed, 
they believed, loss of sovereignty and it challenged the distinctive Christian moral 
standards of Northern Ireland. 
While this view may have modified somewhat in more recent times it remains the 
fact that the DUP topped the polls for the European Parliament at every election until 
2009—when it was badly split. The position of what was then the largest party in 
Northern Ireland, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), was slightly more complicated. It 
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made a tactical error in 1979 in running two candidates. Only one was elected and he 
occupied the third (and last) seat. As a result there is a sense that the UUP has played 
second fiddle to the DUP in Europe. Their views were closer to the British prime 
minister’s (Margaret Thatcher) Euroscepticism. In his foreword to the 1989 European 
election the party leader, James Molyneaux, identified with the “clear line [she drew] 
between cooperation and the surrender of sovereignty”; and he treated with contempt 
“Mr. Heath’s lofty dismissal of nation states and their replacement by a supranational 
Euro State”: his ambitions went no further than “improving economic cooperation and 
expanding commerce within a greater Europe and a wider world.” 
Both unionist parties shared the sceptical camp with their arch rivals, Sinn Fein 
(SF), the political wing of the IRA. In 1979 it urged its supporters to boycott the election; 
in 1984 its candidate said that he would use the European Parliament to attack the British 
presence in Northern Ireland and to highlight instances of British injustice and repression; 
and in 1989 SF advised negotiated withdrawal from membership because it had been “a 
disaster for Ireland”. It was not until 2004 that SF won a seat—incidentally it won one in 
Dublin as well to add to its lustre as being an all-Ireland party and hence transcending 
partition. 
SF’s victory in 2004 was at the expense of the SDLP, a party that had come 
second to the DUP in every election since 1979. Unionists were aware that when directly 
elected contests for the European Parliament were instigated the Irish government had 
lobbied successfully to ensure that Northern Ireland returned three MEPs and that 
elections were held under the STV system of proportional representation. The third seat 
was to ensure that the minority community was represented at the European Parliament. 
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The SDLP’s only candidate from 1979-2004 was John Hume, a committed European. At 
the 1994 European election he took 28.9 percent of the vote the highest the party had ever 
achieved; and in 1999 (on a higher turnout) he delivered the party’s highest tally. 
Hume was noted for what he called his single transferable speech, a variation on 
the theme of unity in diversity or e pluribus unum, both of which he extracted from US 
and European constitutional evolution. It became known as “Humespeak”  and was 
synonymous with “Eurospeak” “and has been conducted in terms of “post-nationalism,” 
“consent,” “community,” “interdependency,” and an “agreed Ireland” with increased 
frequency throughout the 1980s and 1990s” (McCall, 1999, p. 107). At the heart of 
Hume’s (1996) argument was that the Community was a highly successful model of 
conflict resolution and that its institutions could be replicated to assist in the British- Irish 
peace process: 
 
 Europe itself has suffered centuries of bloody conflict. In this century alone, 
the peoples of Europe have been locked in the savagery of two world wars with a 
bitterness and slaughter that go far beyond anything that we have 
experienced on this island. Yet, fifty years after World War II, as a result of an 
agreed process, that have been able to create one parliament to represent them, 
one community—and the Germans are still Germans, the French are still French. 
They have a unity in diversity (pp. 58–9). 
 
 The British-Irish quarrel was European in origin and Europe could help to find a 
solution. Further, Ireland had a contribution to make because as the only state in the EU 
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“to have been colonised rather than to have colonised, we should be able to promote an 
intelligent empathy  with the under-developed countries whose people can benefit most 
effectively from European Union policies” (p. 117). He was attracted by an entity that 
had evolved from an agreement on coal and steel towards a Europe of the Regions, and 
one that had relevance to the Northern Ireland conflict. One was the growing integration 
of the European Union “based on the realisation that the democratic nation state is no 
longer a sufficient political entity to allow people to have adequate control over the 
economic and technological forces which affect people’s opportunities and 
circumstances.” The second was its expansion into Central and Eastern Europe “which 
has opened the prospect of the Common European Home” (p. 111).  
He believed that Europe had contributed already to finding a solution to the 
Northern Ireland problem. The Anglo-Irish Agreement signed on 15 November 1985 
brought much closer political and security cooperation between the two states and was 
registered at the United Nations as an international treaty. One of the most important 
aspects of the Agreement was the structures that had been agreed and these “reflected 
those of the European Union. That was no accident”: 
 
 The intergovernmental conference established by the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
 was charged to address and resolve important problems in Northern Ireland 
and could work to promote co-operation and co-ordination of policies in both 
parts of Ireland for the benefit of the entire island. Comprised of ministers from 
both governments it was the equivalent of the European Council of Ministers. Its 
secretariat was analogous to the European Commission. The agreement also 
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provided for an inter-parliamentary tier comprising elected representatives of 
political parties in Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Through 
this feature, broader considerations and criticisms than those of the two 
governments could enhance the operation and  development of the process offered 
by the Anglo-Irish framework. This parliamentary tier had a role similar to that of 
the European parliament (p. 47). 
 
While the structures may have replicated European institutions there is no evidence that 
Europe had officially endorsed such a policy. This became evident in the early 1990s 
when the British government was attempting to kick start serious negotiations among 
Northern Ireland’s political parties. The SDLP proposed a six-member Commission 
which would appoint a cabinet to run the various Northern Ireland departments. Three of 
the Commissioners were to be elected by a single transferable vote for a three-seat 
Northern Ireland constituency—shades of the system for direct elections to the European 
Parliament. The other three Commissioners were to be elected by the British government, 
the Irish government and the European Community. But Jacques Delors, President of the 
European Commission, was not prepared to consider it: “… I don’t feel the European 
Commission has a duty to interfere in the internal problem of a country, of a province” 
(Murray, 1998, p. 191). We shall return to these competing perspectives. 
 
European Input into the Peace Process 
 
 
It is difficult to put precise dates on the life cycle of a peace process because 
much of what it entails is open to differing interpretations. One commentator has 
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suggested that the seeds were sown when Pope John Paul II visited Ireland in 1979. In a 
homily he delivered on 29 September before 250,000 people he pleaded “[O]n my knees 
I beg you to turn away from the paths of violence and return to the ways of peace” 
(Coogan, 1995, p. 194). Some time later a dialogue between a senior priest and Sinn Fein 
President, Gerry Adams, was entered into. There is evidence in Adams’s The Politics of 
Irish Freedom (1986) that republicanism was contemplating moving away from armed 
struggle towards a political process; and in 1988 Sinn Fein and the SDLP entered into 
prolonged discussions on the means and the ends towards Irish unity. These talks did not 
succeed but the fact that Sinn Fein was prepared to engage in such activity suggested that 
it was moving beyond the status of sect (that entailed reinforcing ones moral certitude by 
talking only among the saved) towards a more inclusive consideration of wider political 
realities. This was to be followed by further discussions, some of them covert, with the 
British and Irish governments (discretely), and then at a personal level between John 
Hume and Gerry Adams. By 1994 enough trust had been garnered to enable the IRA to 
declare a cessation of violence on 30 August followed by loyalist paramilitaries on 13 
October. But trust was not embedded and the IRA returned to violence in 1996. It was 
only a massive general election victory by Tony Blair’s Labour Party in 1997 that 
conditions were considered to be ripe enough for intense political negotiations. This 
culminated in the Agreement of April 1998 that led to Irish republicans in government 
with unionists for the first time in Northern Ireland’s history. Over a decade later there 
was not yet unanimity that a peace settlement had been delivered.   
It is useful at this stage to consider the concept of the “ripe moment,” first devised 
by William Zartman (1989). One analyst suggests that it is “composed of a structural 
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element, a party element and a potential alternative outcome—that is, a mutually hurting 
stalemate, the presence of valid spokespersons, and a formula for a way out” (Schulze, 
1997, p. 93). But she refines this by suggesting that “there probably is no such thing as 
one ‘ripe moment’ but that there are a number of ‘moments’ which makes resolution 
more likely than others…it is more useful to consider the ‘ripe moment’ as a process 
rather than a specific point in time—such as the ceasefires of 1994.” We want to examine 
some of these “moments” within a European context. In that respect it is worth while 
recalling some words from a speech given by European Commission President, Romano 
Prodi, in Paris in May 2001; “the genius of the founding fathers lay in translating 
extremely high political ambitions…into a series of more specific, almost technical 
decisions. This indirect approach made further action possible. Rapprochement took 
place gradually. From confrontation we moved to willingness to cooperate in the 
economic sphere and then on to integration.”  
To examine the role of joint membership of the EU on managing the conflict we 
need to pay some attention to political conditions on the ground. The imposition of direct 
rule in 1972 led to the short-lived experiment of power-sharing from January to May 
1974. The British government was wary of any further bold constitutional innovations for 
the rest of the decade and the result was political stasis and continuing insecurity. A 
change of direction began in 1980 when a series of British-Irish summits (encouraged by 
U.S. diplomacy) were undertaken culminating in the signing of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement in 1985. This marked the end of a decade of instability in British-Irish 
relations, the effects of which were felt even at the European level (as when Ireland 
refused to endorse EU trade sanctions during the Falklands/Malvinas war (Arthur, 1983, 
             Rethinking Reconciliation 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 194 ‐ 
 
p. 172). Yet meetings of the European Council were used to build positive and 
cooperative intergovernmental relationships: “The momentous Milan European Council 
in 1985 opened the way not only for the Single European Act (SEA) but also the Anglo-
Irish Agreement” (Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008 p. 201). 
The success of the Milan meeting demonstrated the new realism in Irish foreign 
policy that “involved elevating the economic dimension…and demoting the principles of 
nationalism, self-identity, the right to self-determination, anti-imperialism and religious 
liberty” (O’Corcora and Hill, 1982, p. 260). Common membership had removed much of 
the claustrophobic bilateralism of the ancient quarrel. One Irish official on the staff of the 
European Commission commented that the “effects of common United Kingdom and 
Irish membership of the Community and particularly their attitudes to the emerging 
Community are so great that Anglo-Irish relations can hardly usefully be discussed 
except in that context…it substitutes an agreeably wider embrace for what has been an 
excessive intimacy” (Gallagher, 1985, p. 35). In short, Europe created a positive 
psychological space shorn of negative historical baggage. It enabled the Northern Ireland 
problem to be internationalised. 
The fruits were evident in the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. It has been referred to 
as “a unique experiment [which] may itself serve as a future precedent for the protection 
of cross-border minorities and neighbouring States’ cooperation including the field of 
security”. He quotes an Irish academic lawyer’s opinion that “it will be seen by 
international lawyers as an important new legal model for consideration, adaptation and 
possible application in other similar international situations of disputed sovereignty over 
territory” (Symmons, 1990, pp. 221–2). The Agreement was a short document of only 
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thirteen articles and was boosted by a strong institutional framework (shades of Hume’s 
assertion earlier). Article 2 (a) established a British- Irish Intergovernmental Conference 
which would be concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between “the two 
parts of the island of Ireland” and would deal “on a regular basis with: (i) political 
matters; (ii) security and related matters; (iii) legal matters including the administration of 
justice; (iv) the promotion of cross-border co- operation”. Article 10 (a) realised the 
potential of promoting economic and social development to regenerate a beleaguered 
economy by “considering the possibility of securing international support for this work”. 
The governments of US, Canada and New Zealand contributed to an International Fund 
for Ireland (IFI)—Europe was to follow later. The sums were relatively small but, as an 
earnest of international good-will, the symbolism was significant. The special problems 
of the Northern Ireland conflict were recognised in the decision to spend approximately 
three-quarters of the resources there, with the remainder going to the six border counties 
of the Republic. In the fourteen years following its foundation the IFI was associated with 
investing £1.1 billion. The British and Irish parliaments ratified the Agreement in 
separate votes and it was registered under Article 102 of the UN Charter. In many 
respects it was a forerunner of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. 
An impediment to the burgeoning British-Irish relationship could have been a 
report (Haagerup) from the previous year but that needs to be set in context. An EP 
Resolution of May 1981 had established the parameters of EU influence on the conflict 
when it recognized that the Community had “no competence to make proposals for 
changes in the Constitution of Northern Ireland”. That was of fundamental importance. 
Haagerup was concerned with modest ambitions—essentially to see how the EU could 
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assist in addition to the economic support already rendered within its regional policy and 
social fund. Its sine qua non was adumbrated on the importance of increasing cooperation 
between the British and Irish governments. So it was concerned with recommending 
power-sharing within Northern Ireland and in creating an integrated economic plan for 
the region. In that respect it complemented the 1985 Agreement. Accordingly the only 
unique and independent contribution the EU can make is to “provide the inspiration for 
the people of Northern Ireland to oppose and reject violence” (Hayward, 2006, p. 272). 
This was an important exhortatory message to send because with the passing of 
the Agreement in 1985 and the British government’s determination to withstand unionist 
rejection of the Agreement the conflict was entering into a new phase where the political 
process was beginning to subordinate the armed struggle. The position of the Community 
was unequivocal: it was not in the business of talking to the “extremes”: “[I]n contrast to 
the Council of Europe, whose explicit focus on human rights led it to act in relation to 
controversial issues in the Troubles such as the use of internment, the EU was unwilling 
or unable to engage with those on the margins of the political sphere until the late 1990s” 
(p. 279). The change is implicit in the 1998 Agreement when the “extremes” (SF and the 
DUP) become part of a new Northern Ireland Executive; and after 2007 when those two 
parties control the Office of First Minister/ Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). 
If we can assume that the life cycle of a conflict entails analysis, negotiation and 
implementation and that the Northern Ireland conflict enjoys a new political dispensation 
it is helpful to analyse the continuing role of the EU’s indirect incremental approach 
“under four headings: the EU as a political arena, EU policies and reports on Northern 
Ireland, the EU as a model of negotiated governance and the EU in Northern Ireland” 
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(Laffan and O’Mahony, p. 202). It may not be surprising that the three political parties 
who consistently returned members to the EP (DUP, SDLP and UUP) retained their 
initial positions toward the Community in the years after 1979. John Hume did most to 
appropriate the idealism of the European founding fathers through his membership of the 
EP’s Socialist Grouping whereas the unionist parties displayed differing levels of 
scepticism. But that could not disguise the fact that the “EU was not just an external party 
to Northern Ireland but an additional arena of politics above the UK and Irish states; 
Northern Ireland was part of this evolving and increasingly complex layer of politics and 
economics” (p. 203). So, one of the more heartening aspects of membership of the EP 
was the degree of collaboration among the three MEPs on policy issues relevant to 
Northern Ireland such as agriculture and programmes of social and economic 
improvement in Belfast and Londonderry. One of their more notable collaborations 
centred on the creation of the Peace and Reconciliation fund, an issue to which we shall 
return. One of the less publicised ventures was an exercise in Track Two Diplomacy that 
led to the establishment of a Northern Ireland Centre in Europe (NICE) in 1991 following 
two discreet meetings (under the auspices of academics) in the US and France in January 
and August 1990 with the four constitutional parties in the run up to the establishment of 
the SEA. NICE was a proactive exercise, an example of civil society at work and the 
product of positive engagement by politicians who were reputed to be ruled solely by 
negative instincts (Arthur in Popiolkowski and Cull, 2009, pp. 24–9). 
Policies, reports and debates fall loosely into three categories—the controversial, 
politically sensitive cross-border issues, and the functional—none of which are totally 
self-contained. We have discussed the impact of the Haagerup Report that caused some 
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controversy among unionists. Earlier debates and decisions indicated that the Parliament 
was paying closer attention to aspects of the conflict. One was a debate on the hunger 
strikes in 1981, and the second was a condemnation of the use of plastic bullets in 1982. 
The cross-border dimension was in place as early as 1975 with the establishment of the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and an EU regional policy keen to 
alleviate obstacles to the development of border areas. Hence a 1983 Economic and 
Social Committee (ESC) report on Irish Border Areas recommended a strengthening of 
cross-border initiatives. In addition the Commission ranked Northern Ireland and the 
Republic as priority areas for structural fund monies, and Northern Ireland was 
recognized as a region deserving of special treatment (Objective One status). By the 
1990s a Community Initiative called INTERREG was designed specifically to promote 
cross-border cooperation and integration across the Community. We shall discuss its 
implications later. 
In addition to the rhetoric of integration Laffan and O’Mahony (p. 211) suggest 
that participation in the EU offered alternative models of politics and political order. 
Since these go to the heart of much of what is discussed in this article it deserves to be 
quoted at length: 
 
First, the iterative and intensive EU Treaty negotiations, with no final settlement 
in prospect, underlined the adequacy of partial agreement. Second, the investment 
in the EU in building institutions drew attention to the importance of institutional 
innovation in promoting collective action and in socializing political actors into 
new procedures and norms of policy-making. Third, the emphasis in the Union of 
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problem-solving pragmatic politics was a useful antidote to the zero-sum 
bargaining of politics in Northern Ireland. Fourth, the sharing of sovereignty in 
the EU highlighted the divisibility of sovereignty in contemporary Europe. The 
language and style of politics in the EU—partnership, problem-solving, 
innovation, unending negotiations—offered a way of doing things which 
characterises the implementation of the [1998] Agreement as it becomes a living 
settlement. The institutions of the Good Friday Agreement...echo a number of the 
institutional and procedural features of the EU.  
 
This is as pithy a statement on the changing mores, political culture, political institutions 
that have overtaken Northern Ireland as one is likely to find. It has released opportunities 
for the identification of areas. The Peace and Reconciliation Fund (1995–99) “enabled 
people to see the potential for cooperation when the dynamic was changed. It was an 
important validation and endorsement of the ceasefires and created political space for 
new developments. It forced politicians and wider civil society to take on the 
responsibility of resource allocation” (p. 212).      
The 1998 Agreement was about inclusivity, about process, about setting the 
conflict in its wider temporal and spatial context to fashion a solution. The 
implementation period has not been without its problems but the actors have learnt from 
their past mistakes and their new understandings. They have resorted to the use of 
technical committees to deal with highly contentious issues such as a root and branch 
reform of policing. They have engaged in constant negotiation and renegotiation. They 
have made use of investment opportunities such as the IFI and have built on those 
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through the creation of the EU Peace programmes in Northern Ireland and the Border 
Counties—the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace 1) and 
the Programme for Peace and Peace and Reconciliation (Peace II)—that were designed to 
complement the political efforts at peacebuilding but also were a specifically designed 
conflict transformation tool providing all levels of society, but particularly those at the 
grassroots ‘with an unprecedented opportunity for meaningful involvement in the 
transformation of the Northern Ireland conflict. Peace 1 and II ran from 1995 until 2006 
and delivered 1062 Euromillions through the use of a social inclusion agenda and 
decentralised local delivery mechanisms (Buchanan, 2008, pp. 387–409). Peace III is 
designed to run until 2013. That demonstrates above all the tenacity and commitment of 
the European project and fulfils Romano Prodi’s assertion for the founding fathers’ 
genius for the indirect approach. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In 1973 a Brussels think tank Pro Mundi Vita perceived the Northern Ireland 
conflict as a bitter communal struggle based on religion and national identity: “One has to 
go back to the seventeenth century to find [a war] in which both sides find their focus of 
cohesion and of antagonism in a version of the Christian faith.” The language is 
bewildered and forlorn. This was a conflict that did not belong to the modernising thrust 
of the new Europe recently escaped from the horrors of the two great European wars. In 
the intervening years other conflicts on the European mainland surfaced, testimony to the 
entrapped and frozen violence of deeply entrenched ethnic divisions. 
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The intractability of the Northern Ireland conflict seemed to fit that pattern. But 
through the pursuit of a policy of “peace in parts” and recognising the changing nature of 
statehood in Europe policies and attitudes were revisioned and reformed; the political 
lexicon was adjusted; the political culture restructured; and there was a fundamental shift 
from zero-sum to win/win. This article has attempted to identify some of the factors that 
induced a new realism and pragmatism. It is aware that some of the more significant 
dynamics have been ignored—not least the role of American diplomacy and the lessons 
learned from other conflicts— but it is impossible to disagree with the conclusion of 
Laffan and O’Mahony (p. 217): 
 
Without the embeddedness of both states in the wider system of European 
integration and without the model of politics offered by the EU, it is unlikely that 
both states and other political actors could have found the political capacity and 
institutional models to craft the Good Friday Agreement. The EU made an 
essential contribution to the changing relations between Britain and Ireland and to 
conflict management in Northern Ireland.  
 
There are those that maintain that Europe is “turning away from power, or to put it a little 
differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and 
transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace 
and relative prosperity, the realization of Emmanuel Kant’s “perpetual peace” (Kagan, 
2003). This is meant to be a critique. In fact it can be read as a perfectly reasonable 
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appreciation of the positive role that Europe can play—and has played in relation to the 
Northern Ireland conflict.  
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Abstract 
 
 
Most international donors believe that promoting economic development deescalates 
ethnic conflict, thus enhancing the prospects for peace as ethnic communities negotiate 
settlements and bridge their political divisions. However, little empirical research has 
addressed the potential effects of external economic assistance in the rebuilding of those 
societies. This study explores the perceptions of a representative sample of Northern Irish 
citizens on their awareness of the activities of International Fund for Ireland and the 
European Peace I fund toward economic development, the perceived equity of its 
distribution, and its contribution to building peace in Northern Ireland. 
 
Introduction 
 
Economic assistance is an accepted mode of conflict intervention to build the 
peace dividend in divided societies (Galtung, Jacobson, and Brand-Jacobson, 2002; 
Pearson, 2001). Economic assistance can serve as an important component of eclectic 
peacebuilding models to win the peace, empower the grassroots, and build sustainable 
development in post-conflict societies (Byrne, 2001). However, economic assistance on 
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its own is not a panacea to resolve deep-rooted protracted ethnopolitical conflicts (Byrne, 
2008). Within the context of the Northern Ireland peacebuilding process, economic 
assistance from the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and European Union (EU) Special 
Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation or Peace I fund, is attempting to tackle 
structural inequalities, bridge the sectarian wall, and transform the civic culture by 
drawing grassroots support for the peace process (Byrne and Irvin, 2001, 2002).  
This article covers an important subject, given that the statistical measurement of 
people’s perceptions of both funding agencies in Northern Ireland had not been 
undertaken before our survey. The objective of this article is to examine the public’s 
awareness of external economic assistance on economic development, as well as the 
perceived equity of its distribution. This article presents univariate and multivariate 
statistical analysis on the issues of public awareness of external economic assistance in 
Northern Ireland, as well as the perceived equity of its distribution. The importance of 
this study is not being overemphasized. We have little empirical evidence of the impact 
of the economic resources from both funding agencies to transform the conflict (McGarry 
and O’Leary, 1995). This article finds that public awareness of external economic 
assistance on economic development, as well as perceived equity of its distribution varies 
across religion, gender and political affiliation of respondents in Northern Ireland. 
The article employs data from a public opinion survey. In 1997, before the 1998 
Belfast Agreement and the return of devolved government to Northern Ireland, we 
commissioned Ulster Marketing (now Millward Brown Ulster) to conduct our public 
opinion survey as part of its omnibus series to assess the public’s perceptions of both 
funds. Ulster Marketing has carried out frequent public opinion polls in Northern Ireland 
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over the past 20 years to elicit people’s opinions on a broad array of socioeconomic and 
political issues (Irwin, 2001). Our survey focuses on public awareness of external 
economic assistance in Northern Ireland, the perceived equity of its distribution, and its 
effectiveness in mitigating political violence. 
The article is organized as follows: The first section discusses external economic 
assistance and the Northern Ireland conflict followed by a brief methodological note. The 
second section presents the statistical analyses of the data. Section three presents a 
discussion of the results from section two, and section four concludes.  
 
Economic Assistance and the  
Northern Ireland Conflict 
 
 Conflict resolution and peacebuilding will not be successful unless it promotes 
human and socioeconomic development (Pearson, 2001). The International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank have made economic aid conditional on post-conflict states 
integrating democratic values into the civic culture as well as promoting liberal economic 
policies (Lederach, 1997). Socioeconomic development is needed to tackle chronic 
unemployment, a root cause of protracted ethnic conflict (Byrne, 2001). Economic aid is 
not a panacea, however, and may in fact serve to heighten group egotism, not reduce it 
(Ryan, 1996). Foreign investment rebuilds the economic infrastructure creating 
employment opportunities, but often ignores relationship-building skills, thus potentially 
 heightening destructive stories (Senehi and Byrne, 2006). During the 1920s, populist 
Unionist policies increased unemployment among alienated Nationalists, and prevented a 
             The Perception of Economic Assistance  
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 208 ‐ 
 
working class alliance across ethnic divisions (Bew, Gibbon, and Patterson, 1979, 1995). 
Any redistribution of political power or economic resources was perceived as a threat to 
the hegemonic position of Unionists (Maney, 2005). The Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (NICRA) protested to level the playing field for Catholic Nationalists to have 
fair access to employment and housing opportunities (Maney and others, 2006). The 
resulting Loyalist violence against NICRA escalated the conflict, which spiraled into 
ultimate chaos (Wright, 1987). The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) eventually 
attacked British troops sent to Northern Ireland to restore order. 
Northern Ireland’s economy is public sector dependent, subsidized, and reliant on 
the British Exchequer (Dixon, 2001). British economic policy sought to stabilize and 
manage, rather than tackle the underlying roots of the conflict (Bew and Patterson, 1985).  
Alienation, unemployment, sectarianism, and lack of hope left Republican and Loyalist 
working class males feeling despondent and distrustful of British government intentions, 
serving to burgeon the ranks of rival paramilitary groups (Irvin, 1999). 
In 1994 after reciprocal ceasefires by the PIRA and the Combined Loyalist 
Military Command, the EU established the EU Peace I program to lay the foundations for  
sustainable and durable peace (McCall and O’Dowd, 2008). The IFI was set-up in the 
wake of the 1985 Anglo Irish Agreement (AIA) to encourage economic development,  
and to promote contact, dialogue and reconciliation between Unionists and Nationalists.  
The EU Peace I fund (1994-1999) was replaced by EU Peace II funding, which was 
phased out in 2006. The Special EU Programs Body (SEUPB) was established to 
administer all EU aid under the peace programs. 
The EU Peace I fund and the IFI has worked to reduce structural inequalities and 
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uncertainty, empower the grassroots in disadvantaged areas, and has, in general, 
supported the peace process (Byrne and Ayulo, 1998). Both funding agencies have also  
sought to promote reconciliation and social inclusion by nurturing socioeconomic and 
rural regeneration in a sustainable way that consolidates the peace process (Byrne and 
others, 2006; Irvin and Byrne, 2002). The peace through development approach in 
Northern Ireland, however, has met with mixed results (Byrne and Irvin, 2001, 2002).  
Is there a link in Northern Ireland between prosperity and the fact that peace is the 
end of the long war? The role of economic assistance coupled with the cooperative 
partnership of both governments and the international community that resulted in the 
1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) is critical to building peace over the long-term. The 
British and Irish Governments built confidence-building mechanisms into the GFA to 
address the distrust felt by both communities such as: (1) reform of policing, (2) 
decommissioning of paramilitary arms, (3) prison release, and (4) emergency legislation 
and the withdrawal of the British military (Wilford, 2000). In 1994, the EU created the 
Peace I fund to shore-up the political process and build the peace dividend. In addition, 
the provision of economic assistance through the IFI, President Clinton’s visits to 
Northern Ireland, and his appointment of Senator George Mitchell to facilitate a 
mediation of all of the political parties and paramilitaries, resulted in the Catholic 
community and a slight majority of Protestants supporting the 1998 GFA (Byrne, 2007). 
While he was President, “Bill Clinton acting as a primary mediator set-up political 
inducements to get all of the parties to the table, as well as expanding the economic pie 
by providing economic aid for impoverished areas through the IFI” (Byrne, 2002, p.139).  
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 The most difficult stumbling block in the current stalemate is overall mistrust of 
the process, indicative of mainstream Unionist distrust of the decommissioning of 
paramilitary arms, the restructuring of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the prisoner 
release of convicted paramilitaries, and shrinking confidence in the pro-agreement 
Unionism of the UUP (Aughey, 2000; Dixon, 2001). The GFA includes one community 
negotiating with a political party that has been vilified as terrorists in the past, and 
another community that has abandoned support for political violence in pursuit of the 
goal it has been fighting to achieve over the past thirty years (Cox, Guelke and Stephen, 
2000, p.5). In addition, deprivation and poverty are a deep-rooted cause of the conflict. 
We argue that if external economic assistance is to assist in reducing poverty and 
inequality, popular awareness about these funds should be expanded. The first step 
towards the road to development is to make people aware of the opportunities for funding 
their projects, and make sure the distribution of the funds is equitable across community 
groups. Unbalanced distribution of international funds could further escalate the tension 
between the two major communities in Northern Ireland. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
A representative sample of 610 adults (18+) were interviewed from August 6 to 8, 
1997 by fully trained and experienced interviewers, according to the definitive quality 
standards of the Interviewer Quality Control Scheme (IQCS). All interviewing was 
carried out face-to-face at 50 sampling points selected at random throughout Northern 
Ireland. Interviews normally took place in the respondent’s home. The sample was 
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controlled by gender, age, class, and religion. The sample yielded motorists, housewives 
and/or heads of households, and city and rural residents. 52 percent of the sample is 
female and 48 percent is male, while 62 percent of the sample is Protestant, and 34 
percent is Catholic. Further, 45 percent of the sample is in the professional class category, 
21 percent is in the skilled labor category, and 34 percent is in the unskilled labor 
category. We employ univariate analysis and discrete choice regression models (binary 
probit/logit and ordered probit/logit) to analyze our sample. We use discrete choice 
models in our regression analysis because our dependent variables are categorical 
variables.  
Perceived Equity of IFI 
 
This section presents the perception of respondents toward the fairness of the IFI fund 
across the whole sample. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of perceived fairness of the IFI 
funds across both communities. It is interesting to note that 49 percent of the sample did 
not respond or were unsure about the fair distribution of the IFI across both communities. 
According to Figure 1, about 50 percent of the respondents abstained from expressing an 
attitude toward the equity of these funds, which could be as a result of unfamiliarity with  
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Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey 
the funds or hostility toward one or more of the funding agencies. In the past, Protestants 
perceived the IFI as an agency that provided U.S. blood money to the people of Northern 
Ireland (Byrne and others, 2006). Figure 1 suggests that about 30 percent of the 
respondents perceive that the distribution of the IFI funds were fair. Among the sample, 
20 percent expressed that the distribution was not fair, and 10 percent assessed the 
distribution to be neither fair nor unfair.  
Next we report the distribution of perceived fairness of the IFI funds across 
different categories of the society. Table 1 reports the relative frequency distribution of 
perceived fairness of IFI funds between the communities by religion, economic class and 
gender. As far as the distribution across economic class is concerned, respondents from 
the professional class are more likely than respondents from other groups to rate the 
distribution of the IFI fund across communities to be fair. The P-value of the Pearson chi-
square is below 0.05, which indicates that the rows and columns of the contingencies are 
independent and it is worthwhile to interpret the cells in the contingency table.  
Table 1.  
Distribution of perceived fairness of IFI funds by religion, economic class and gender. 
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Very 
fair 
Quite 
fair Neutral 
Not very 
fair 
Not 
fair 
Don’t 
know 
Economic Class       
Professional 14 71 14 23 22 123 
Skilled 1 25 10 15 11 67 
Semi Skilled 6 34 11 22 30 109 
Pearson Chi-square 17.6 (P-value =0.024) 
       
Sex       
Male 11 53 17 20 19 24 
Female 8 39 9 26 18 24 
Pearson chi2(5)  1.99 (P-value=0.741) 
       
Religion       
Protestant 6 66 23 49 51 182 
Catholic 15 57 10 9 12 128 
Pearson Chi2(10)   37.43 P-value=0       
Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey 
 
 
Table 1 suggests that male respondents are not more likely to perceive the distribution of 
the IFI funds as fair compared to their female counterparts. The p-value of Pearson’s Chi-
square is higher than 10 percent, which implies that the distribution of perceived fairness 
across gender is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that there is no statistical 
difference in the perception of the fairness of the IFI funds across gender. As far as the 
perception of the fairness of the IFI funds across religious affiliation is concerned, the 
Chi-square test in Table 1 indicates that more Catholics, in terms of percentages, rate the 
fairness of the distribution to be “very fair” and “quite fair” than Protestants. Protestants 
may be of the opinion that the U.S. and the EU are interfering in their internal affairs 
through both funding agencies, whereas Catholics perceive the aid as critical to tackling 
poverty and alienation. On aggregate, Protestants are more likely than Catholics to rate 
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the distribution as unfair. These conclusions of the univariate analysis are also reinforced 
by the multivariate analysis we conduct in the subsequent sections. 
Table 2.  
Distribution of perceived fairness of IFI funds between communities by political party 
 
Political  party 
Very 
fair 
Quite 
fair Neutral Not very fair 
Not 
fair 
Don’t 
know Total 
Ulster Unionist Party 2 22 5 21 20 53 123 
Democratic Unionist 
Party 1 8 4 9 7 19 48 
Alliance 1 16 3 1 1 15 37 
Progressive Unionist 
Party 0 3 0 4 9 6 22 
Unionist Democratic 
Party 1 4 3 1 2 8 19 
UK unionist (UKUP) 0 1 0 1 1 3 6 
Conservative Party 0 1 0 4 1 6 12 
SDLP 7 34 7 4 7 42 101 
Sinn Fein 6 10 3 3 1 23 46 
Women’s Coalition 0 1 0 0 0 4 5 
Undecided/not sure 3 8 4 4 7 44 70 
Would not vote 0 17 6 6 7 69 105 
No reply 0 5 0 2 0 7 14 
Total 21 130 35 60 63 299 608 
Pearson chi2(60) 90.063     Pr =0.005 
Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey                     
 
 
Table 2 reports a Chi-square test for the distribution of perceived fairness of IFI 
funds between communities by political party. The Pearson chi-square suggests that the 
rows and columns of the contingencies are independent. The supporters of the 
Unionist/Loyalist block are far more likely to view the distribution of monetary funds 
from the IFI as more unfair, than those supporting the non-confessional Alliance Party 
and the now defunct Women’s Coalition block or the Nationalist Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP) and Republican Sinn Fein (SF) block. In other words, on average 
the supporters of SDLP and SF seem to rate the distribution to be fairer than the others. 
One would assume that the Loyalist Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), and the now 
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defunct Ulster Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) supporters would also rate the 
distribution of the funding to be fair.  
Table 3 reports the ordered logit model for perceived equity of the IFI. Note that 
in the ordered logit model estimated in Table 3, the sample size is reduced to 309 because 
of the exclusion of respondents who did not want to express their views on the fairness of 
IFI, and the “don’t know” responses. Fortunately, the exclusion of the non-responses 
does not alter the main conclusions. The regression analysis suggests that not all of the 
variables are correlated with perceived equity. More specifically, perceived fairness is 
positively correlated with those voting for the Alliance Party than for the other political 
parties. Further, the perceived equity of these funds is negatively correlated with those 
respondents with UUP and PUP party affiliations. That is to say, all things remaining 
constant, the supporters of UUP and PUP political parties have a relatively negative 
attitude towards the distribution of IFI funds. By and large, the probability of rating the 
fairness of the IFI funds is positively associated with SDLP and SF party membership.  
As far as the coefficients of the economic class variables are concerned, Table 3 
reports that the coefficient for the dummy variable for respondents from the professional 
class is negative and significant at the 5 percent level of significance, suggesting that the 
respondents from the professional economic class are more likely to perceive the 
distribution of the IFI fund as fair, compared to respondents from the semi-skilled class.  
Moreover, the results in Table 3 shows that the coefficient of gender is not statistically 
significant at less than the 10 percent level of significance. Overall, the results from the 
regression analysis tend to support the conclusions from the chi-square analyses in the 
previous sections. 
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Table 3.  
Ordered logit models of fairness  
 
 IFI Fund EU Peace I Fund 
  Coefficient SD Coefficient SD 
Gender -0.009 0.222 0.222 0.242 
Professional -0.740 0.251 0.044 0.270 
Skilled 0.148 0.305 -0.430 0.351 
     
UUP 0.622 0.313 -0.696 0.332 
DUP 0.462 0.400 -1.156 0.500 
Alliance  -1.115 0.465 0.367 0.490 
PUP 1.742 0.553 -2.455 0.635 
UDP -0.208 0.599 -0.046 0.649 
UKUP 0.696 1.044 -1.051 1.078 
Conservative 0.835 0.714 -1.262 0.766 
SDLP -0.944 0.348 0.250 0.381 
Sinn Fein -1.628 0.497 0.939 0.500 
Woman Coal -2.042 1.849 -0.907 1.649 
     
Age 0.006 0.006 -0.087 0.095 
Catholic 0.705 0.627 0.705 0.627 
     
Ancillary parameters     
Cut Point 1 -3.129 0.472 -1.629 0.593 
Cut Point 2 -0.208 0.412 -0.705 0.581 
Cut Point 3 0.356 0.414 0.150 0.578 
Cut Point 4 1.479 0.426 3.293 0.633 
     
N 309  268  
Lr Chi 2(14) 71.17  50.570  
Likelihood -407.92  -345.45  
Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey 
 
 
Perceived equity of EU peace I fund 
So far we have considered the perceived equity of IFI funded projects. Now we 
turn to the EU Peace I funded projects. Table 4 depicts the distribution of perceived 
equity towards the EU funded projects by religion, gender and economic class. As in the 
case of the perceived fairness of IFI funds, Table 4 clearly demonstrates that there is a 
large number of “don’t know” responses.  
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Table 4.  
Perceived fairness of EU Peace I fund by religion, gender and economic class 
 
  Very Fair Quite Fair Neutral 
Not Very 
Fair 
Not 
Fair 
Don’t 
know 
Religion       
Protestant 1 18 8 8 8 58 
Catholic 6 27 7 3 4 54 
Other/refused 0 24 5 5 10 57 
Pearson  Chi2(10) 22.73      
       
Sex 4 27 7 5 8 49 
Male 2 16 7 7 6 62 
Female       
Pearson Chi22(5) 15.70 (P=0.008)     
       
Class       
Professional 5 21 6 8 9 51 
Skilled 1 16 6 13 12 52 
Semi Skilled 2 13 7 10 14 54 
Pearson chi2(10) = 5.51 (P=0.702)         
Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey 
 
 
Table 5 reports that the perceived fairness of the EU Peace I fund is not free of the 
religious affiliation of respondents. The data in Table 5 suggests that the percentage of 
Catholics who perceive the distribution of the EU Peace I fund to be fair is higher than 
the percentage of Protestants who perceive the distribution of the EU Peace I fund to be 
fair. As far as gender is concerned, more male respondents seem to rate the distribution of 
the EU Peace I fund to be relatively fair, compared to their female counterparts. The data 
in Table 5 also indicates that the perceived fairness of the EU Peace I fund does not seem 
to vary across the economic class of respondents. The Chi-square test shows that the 
differences across economic class are not statistically significant at less than the 20 
percent level of significance. 
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Table 5 reports the Chi-square test for perceived fairness of the EU Peace I fund 
between communities by political party. The Chi-square test shows that there is a 
statistically significant variation in the distribution of perceived fairness across the 
political party spectrum. The supporters of the SDLP seem to rate the distribution as 
“quite fair” more than any other group. The other cells can also be interpreted likewise. 
Also notice that the non-response rate is more than 50 percent; more correctly, 3 
respondents preferred to respond “I don’t know”. Besides, there are many people who 
would not vote and don’t know how to rate the fairness of the EU funded projects.  
Table 5.  
The distribution of perceived fairness of EU Peace I fund  
 
Political party Very fair 
Quite 
fair 
Neither 
fair nor 
unfair 
Not 
very 
fair 
Not 
fair 
Don’t 
know Total 
Ulster Unionist 
Party 1 28 10 13 13 58 123 
Democratic 
Unionist  0 5 3 4 4 32 48 
Alliance 2 11 5 1 1 17 37 
Progressive 
Unionist 0 1 1 3 6 11 22 
Unionist 
Democratic Party 0 5 3 0 1 10 19 
UK Unionist 
(UKUP) 0 1 1 0 1 3 6 
Conservative 0 1 1 3 0 7 12 
SDLP 6 24 6 5 6 54 101 
Sinn Fein 6 11 5 1 1 22 46 
Women’s Coalition 0 1 0 0 1 3 5 
Undecided/not sure 1 19 2 1 4 43 70 
Would not vote 0 18 8 4 3 72 105 
No Reply 1 4 0 1 0 8 14 
Total 17  129 45 36 41 340 608 
Pearson chi2(40) = 70.8353 Pr = 0   
Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey 
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 Next we examine the perceived fairness of the EU Peace I fund across religion, 
gender, political party affiliation, and economic class by employing multivariate analysis 
in Table 6. Before discussing the results in Table 6 an explanation on the effective sample 
size is in order. The “I don’t know” responses were excluded from the effective sample. 
We only use the responses that make sense for regression analysis. Besides, the fact that 
the dependent variable is a categorical variable makes the ordered logit/probit model 
more appropriate for the multivariate analysis.  
The second column of Table 3 reports the marginal effects of an ordered probit 
model at mean values. The interpretation of the marginal effects is straightforward. For 
instance, the probability of a male person perceiving the EU Peace I fund to be fair is 
more than 22 percent higher than a female counterpart. As far as one’s political affiliation 
is concerned the supporters of PUP, DUP, and UUP are more likely to perceive the 
distribution to be unfair than the supporters of other political parties. Table 3 suggests 
that the supporters of the SDLP and SF are more likely to perceive the distribution to be 
fair, than the supporters of other political parties. Note that gender was a significant 
variable in the case of the IFI funds, but not in the perceived distribution of the EU Peace 
I fund. The cut points are also significant suggesting that there is a reasonable ordering in 
the responses. 
 
Perceived Awareness of the  
IFI and the EU Peace I Fund 
 
 In this section we present the perceived popular awareness of both the IFI and EU 
Peace I fund in our sample. Table 6 reports the perceived awareness of the IFI funds 
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across religion, gender and economic class. As far as gender is concerned Table 6 
suggests that  
Table 6.  
Perceived awareness of IFI Fund by religion, gender and economic class 
 
 No Yes 
Religion   
Protestant 26% 74% 
Catholic 17% 83% 
Other/refused 29% 71% 
Pearson  Chi2(10) 6.06 0.05 
   
Sex   
Male 16% 84% 
Female 29% 71% 
Pearson Chi22(5) 16.06 (P=0.000) 
   
Class   
Professional 14% 86% 
Skilled 26% 74% 
Semi-skilled 32% 68% 
Pearson chi2(10) = 5.51 (P=0.702) 
Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey 
 
 
males are more likely to be aware of the IFI program than females. This can be explained 
in part by the network effect that men enjoy by assuming leadership positions in society, 
such as leadership of NGOs. Table 6 reports the Chi-square test for the distribution of 
awareness of the IFI across class is also statistically significant which implies that 
respondents from the Professional class are more likely to be aware of the IFI than the 
other classes. Likewise respondents from the DE (semi-skilled) class are less likely to be 
aware of the IFI than the respondents from the other two classes. Moreover, Table 6 
indicates that the distribution of the perceived awareness of the IFI Fund is not the same 
across different religious groups. Catholics are less likely to be aware of the IFI funds 
             The Perception of Economic Assistance  
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 221 ‐ 
 
than Protestants. Overall, Table 6 suggests that more than 70 percent of the respondents 
are aware of IFI funds in Northern Ireland. 
 Next we present the results from a probit model to examine any systematic 
association of awareness of the IFI with respect to the different variables. In other words, 
this section examines the determinants of the awareness of the IFI in Northern Ireland. 
The explanatory variables in the regression analysis are: class, religion, political party 
affiliation, gender, and age. As is common knowledge in the econometrics literature, the 
coefficients of the probit model are not marginal effects, and for this reason we report the 
marginal effects in Table 7.  
Table 7.  
Probit model of awareness of IFI Fund  
 
Variable  dF/dx Std. Z P>|z| 
Professional 0.149 0.039 3.830 0.000 
Skilled 0.103 0.054 2.050 0.040 
CATHOLIC* 0.276 0.108 2.540 0.011 
GENDER 0.018 0.032 0.580 0.562 
Political Party     
UUP 0.074 0.052 1.520 0.129 
DUP 0.028 0.072 0.410 0.681 
ALLIANCE 0.143 0.087 1.870 0.062 
PUP 0.113 0.113 1.130 0.260 
UDP -0.108 0.070 -1.080 0.278 
UKUP 0.080 0.197 0.450 0.652 
CONSERVE 0.064 0.140 0.500 0.621 
SDLP 0.158 0.060 2.940 0.003 
SINN FEIN 0.166 0.085 2.220 0.026 
Woman Coalition 0.334 0.242 1.580 0.114 
     
     
Log Likelihood -275.5    
LR Chi (15) 44.5    
N 608    
Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey 
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Note:  dy/dx refers to marginal effects. The marginal effect for a dummy variable is a discrete change of dummy 
variable from 0 to 1  
     
According to Table 7, the probability of being aware of the IFI is about 15 percent 
higher for SDLP and SF supporters than supporters of other political parties. Recall that 
the SF variable was also significant in the regression analysis in Table 3, suggesting that 
SF supporters are more likely to perceive the distribution to be fair than supporters of 
other political parties. As far as the class identifiers are concerned, both the dummy 
variable for professional class and that of a skilled economic class are significant at less 
than the 5 percent level of significance. The probability of being aware of the IFI fund is 
about 11 percent higher for a respondent from the professional class than the respondents 
from the semi-skilled class. When we look at the dummy variables for religious groups 
Catholics have a higher probability of being aware of the IFI, by about 27 percent than 
non-Catholics. The other coefficients can be interpreted likewise. 
So far the analysis has focused on the awareness of the IFI funds. Now we turn to 
the respondents’ awareness of EU Peace I fund. The relative frequency distribution of the 
perceived awareness of respondents about the EU Peace I fund by religion, political 
affiliation and gender. Overall, Table 8 indicates that there was a low level of perceived 
awareness of the EU Peace I fund in Northern Ireland. Note that unlike the low level of 
overall awareness of the EU Peace I fund, the overall level of awareness of IFI funds was 
about 70 percent. According to the data in Table 8, there is no statistically significant 
difference on the awareness of the EU Peace I fund across economic class and religious 
affiliation. The variations in the perceived awareness of the EU Peace I fund across 
economic class and religious affiliation could be attributed mainly to a chance process.  
Table 8.  
Perceived awareness of EU Peace I fund  
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 Category Yes N0 
Political Party   
Ulster Unionist Party          6.5 93.5 
Democratic Unionist Party          0.0 100.0 
Alliance  Party         13.5 86.5 
Progressive Unionist Party            0.0 100.0 
Unionist Democratic Party           15.8 84.2 
UK Unionist (UKUP)          33.3 66.7 
Conservative          16.7 83.3 
SDLP          7.9 92.1 
Sinn Fein           6.7 93.3 
Women’s Coalition           20.0 80.0 
Undecided/not sure          2.9 97.1 
Would not vote           7.6 92.4 
No reply            7.1 92.9 
Chi-square 33.47   Pr = 0.095  
Religion   
 Protestant         7.2 92.8 
Catholic          6.7 93.3 
Other/refused          9.5 90.5 
Chi square 2.12   Pr = 0.71  
Economic Class   
ABC1        119.0 1152.4 
C2           2.2 46.1 
DE        9.4 155.5 
Chi square 5.77   Pr = 0.22  
Gender   
Male       10.2 89.8 
Female         4.3 95.4 
Chi-square 8.9342   Pr = 0.011  
Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey 
 
However, Table 8 indicates that the null hypothesis of no dependency between gender 
and awareness of EU Peace I economic assistance could be rejected at less than 5 percent 
level of significance and that the percentage of males who are aware of the EU Peace I 
fund is higher than that of females. As far as political party affiliation is concerned, Table 
9 suggests that there is a noticeable difference in the awareness of the EU Peace I fund 
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with regards to the political party affiliation of the respondents. Among all the 
respondents the supporters of UK Unionist Party register the highest level of awareness 
about the EU Peace I fund, followed by supporters of Women’s Coalition and the 
Conservatives. 
Next we present the results of the multivariate analysis. Table 9 reports the probit 
model where the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, which indicates the 
respondent’s awareness of the EU Peace I fund. If a respondent is aware of the EU Peace 
I fund, then the value of the dependent variable is one, otherwise it is zero. Table 9 
indicates that a male respondent has a higher probability of being aware of the EU Peace 
I fund than a female counterpart, ceteris paribus. Moreover, Table 10 shows that the 
probability of one’s awareness of the EU Peace I fund is not free of political affiliation. 
More specifically, the supporters of UUP, UKUP, Alliance, UDP, and the Women’s 
Coalition parties are more likely to be aware of the EU Peace I fund than other political 
party supporters. What is more interesting is that the Women’s Coalition and UKUP are 
significant only for the EU Peace I fund. Recall that the coefficients of UKUP and the 
Women’s Coalition party were not significant in the regression model for awareness of 
IFI funded projects  
 
Table 9.  
Probit model for the awareness of EU Peace I fund 
 
  dF/dX Standard Error Z P>|z| 
AGE 0.001 0.001 1.54 0.123 
Gender 0.069 0.024 2.96 0.003 
Political Affiliation     
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Ulster Unionist Party          0.001 0.030 0.03 0.973 
Alliance  Party         0.088 0.069 1.64 0.101 
Democratic Unionist Party     0.127 0.104 1.67 0.095 
UK Unionist (UKUP)          0.233 0.198 1.71 0.086 
Conservative          0.116 0.122 1.28 0.199 
SDLP 0.023 0.036 0.69 0.489 
Sinn Fein           0.004 0.045 0.08 0.934 
Women’s Coalition           0.288 0.237 1.77 0.077 
Catholic 0.053 0.070 0.76 0.45 
Economic class     
Professional 0.029 0.026 1.16 0.246 
Skilled -0.026 0.027 -0.86 0.389 
Log Likelihood -136.54    
LR Chi(14) 26.51    
Pseudo R2     = 0.09 
N 537    
 Observed P=0.08 
Predicted P =0 .06 (at x-bar) 
 (*) dF/dX is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. X-bar is mean value of the variable Z and 
P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
Dependent variable awareEU1 =1 if a person is aware of EU Peace I funds, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Discussions 
 
Economic assistance skilfully administered, may play a pivotal role in nurturing a 
milieu conducive to the political rather than violent transformation of conflict (Byrne, 
2008). Our hypotheses that Protestant Unionists and Catholic Nationalists equally 
perceive that economic assistance from both funds is fairly distributed across both 
communities and that both communities have equal awareness of these funds is rejected. 
When we look across the gender spectrum, our analyses show that more males are aware 
of, and perceive the distribution of funds as fair, than females. This could be explained by 
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men’s access to, and knowledge of, the funding agencies, more men are in positions of 
power and privilege in society and are in “the know” than women, suggesting that 
women must be empowered to take on more leadership roles in society to build a culture 
of peace. 
 Both aid programs have played a role in building support for the peace process 
itself among previously deprived segments of the population, such as the Catholic 
Nationalist community, which may impact their level of support for the emerging new 
Northern Irish institutions. Catholic Nationalists see more positive economic assistance 
that may be a result of their economic status, their relatively greater support of peace, or 
both, and may impact their perceptions of the Protestant Unionist community, and the 
peace process. This may be the reason why Catholics are more aware of and seem to 
perceive the distribution of resources as more fair relative to Protestants. 
 Further, a lower level of recognition of the EU Peace I fund by Protestant 
Unionist respondents may suggest that the lower level of EU funding in Protestant areas 
could be due to a lack of a comprehensive community infrastructure in comparison to 
similar Catholic communities. Moreover, fewer unemployed Protestants than Catholics 
perceived the distribution of IFI funds between both communities to be very fair. This 
finding is especially pronounced when comparing the Unionist-Loyalist block to 
supporters of the Nationalist-Republican block. Protestants initially boycotted the IFI 
post-1985 Anglo Irish Agreement (AIA) on the grounds it represented blood money from 
the U.S. (Guelke, 2000). 
 In general, Protestants find the distribution of the EU Peace I fund and the IFI to 
be unfair perceiving Catholics to be receiving all of the benefits (Arthur, 2001). This 
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finding may also be related to the accessibility of the application process. The Protestant 
Unionist community’s perceived injustice of EU Peace I funding resulted in an assertion 
that the funding was going into Catholic Nationalist areas (Byrne, Thiessen, and Fissuh, 
2007; Matic, Byrne, and Fissuh, 2007). The EU responded that Catholic Nationalist areas 
were more organized and had greater civic capacity, and hence made more successful 
bids (O’Dowd and McCall, 2008) 
 This may suggest that there is a potential for ideological conflict that could be 
driven by these funds. Instead of resolving the conflict, these funds may spur another 
round of conflicts in Northern Ireland (McCall and O’Dowd, 2008). Economic gains for 
Protestants must not perceive Catholics as deficits that promote isolation and 
sectarianism rather than intergroup cooperation (Honaker, 2005). For example, a 
nationally representative sample of 1,000 respondents in a post-2003 Northern Ireland 
Election Survey found that Unionists shared a strong belief that the 1998 GFA benefits 
Nationalists at the expense of Unionists (Dowds, Hayes, and McAllister, 2005). These 
disillusioned respondents pointed to the dysfunctional nature of the Executive and the 
Belfast Assembly as a critical cause of their dissent. Moreover, Unionists are coupled 
with a drive for survival, exemplified by Paisleyism and a “historic culture of fatalism, a 
culture of suspicions of the intentions of those outside that Unionist family and even 
more suspicious of the intentions, even the best intentions of those within it” (Aughey, 
2000, p. 185). By 2002, only one-third of Protestants supported the GFA (MacGinty, 
2003). 
 In 1994, the EU involved extensive community group consultation in the 
development of the peace package. Yet, far fewer respondents are aware of either the EU 
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Peace I or IFI funded projects within their respective communities. The professional and 
skilled classes demonstrate a greater awareness of both funds suggesting perhaps that the 
skills to access the allocation of economic assistance remains confined to certain classes. 
The bureaucratization of the process was certainly borne out in interviews with 
community leaders. Both funding agencies are committed to targeting the areas of 
greatest needs. The empowerment of the grassroots is critical to the longevity of the 
overall peace process (Fitzduff and O’Hagan, 2002). Thus, the funders need to streamline 
the application process in a user-friendly way.  
 
Conclusions 
Economic assistance from both funds may be making a difference in addressing social 
exclusion, poverty, inclusiveness, cross-community contact, and sustainable economic 
development. However, the people of Northern Ireland should be aware of these funds 
and perceive that they are evenly distributed across the protagonist communities. It is 
worth remembering that the people of Northern Ireland have to deal with their past as the 
transgenerational oral transmission of historical traumas perpetuate the conflict and 
become the basis for “retaliatory mimetic violence” (Wright, 1987). Similar to what 
occurred in South Africa with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the 
people of Northern Ireland need to recognize their suffering and use new cross-cultural 
rituals to heal from these traumas, or sow the seeds of future conflict (Byrne, 2008; 
Senehi, 2008). As part of this mechanism, both communities should perceive that these 
funds are fairly distributed and none of them should feel neglected. Moreover, 
transformational conflict resolution or peacebuilding can also help the public learn about 
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the root causes of conflict (identity, culture, poverty) and society’s unequal power 
structure, as well as to develop civic education skills (Galtung, Jacobson, and Brand-
Jacobson, 2002). Thus, the process is psychologically, socially, and politically 
empowering for the participants because it builds self-esteem, self-confidence and self-
efficacy, teaches problem-solving and listening skills, and forges a critical consciousness 
(Schwerin 1995). Reconciliation and cooperative relationships must embed changes at 
the personal, relational and structural levels to fulfill the basic human needs of the people 
(Lederach, 1997). Equality in opportunities should be part of any intervention 
mechanism. 
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A Hermeneutics of Blessing as a Meta-Requisite for Reconciliation: 
 
John E. Toews’ Romans Paradigm as a Case Study 
 
 
Vern Neufeld Redekop 
 
Abstract 
 
Within an overall framework of reconciliation as a transformation of mimetic structures 
of violence to mimetic structures of blessing, teachings of blessing are needed throughout 
the process. “Teachings” are considered as paradigmatic stories, principles, insights, 
and practical wisdom that are derived both from religious traditions and the human 
sciences. “Blessing” refers to that which contributes to sustained human well-being at 
the individual, collective and relational levels. A hermeneutics of blessing is a deliberate 
interpretive endeavour directed toward the generation of teachings of blessing. It can be 
used with any particular source and the insights can be both direct and inverse, 
identifying what is helpful and not helpful for reconciliation processes. John E. Toews, 
biblical scholar specializing on the book of Romans in the New Testament, is examined 
as someone practicing a hermeneutics of blessing. His paradigm of Romans shows how it 
can be viewed as a letter addressing an identity-based conflict involving Jews and 
Gentiles. A set of practical teachings of blessing is synthesized from Romans 12 to 15, 
using the Toews hermeneutical paradigm. 
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Introduction 
 
A paradox of reconciliation is that it appears wonderfully simple when it happens 
but is profoundly complex when its structure is considered as a whole. If one tries to 
force reconciliation at the wrong time one can do further violence to those already hurt 
through destructive deep-rooted conflict. However, it is possible to advance 
reconciliation as a process and as a goal (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004), but to do so 
demands wisdom, sensitivity, and insight. In extraordinary cases, certain people, like 
Nelson Mandela, develop the wisdom, sensitivity, and insight to advance reconciliation in 
particular contexts. My hypothesis is that a methodology grounded in a hermeneutics of 
blessing will generate the requisite understandings, attitudes, and spirit to provide the 
impetus for reconciliation in particular contexts. I would further argue in corollary 
fashion that the results of an exercise of a hermeneutics of blessing in one context will 
produce results that are heuristically and practically useful in other contexts. 
 The argument for a hermeneutics of blessing builds on a concept of reconciliation 
I advanced in From Violence to Blessing (Redekop, 2002), a framework for reconciliation 
I applied to Rwanda (Redekop, 2008), and development of the concept of teachings of 
blessing (Redekop, 2007a). The conceptual progression will be as follows. First I will 
develop the concept of reconciliation as a transformation of mimetic structures of 
violence to mimetic structures of blessing. (“Mimetic” is derived from the Greek word 
mimesis from which we get “imitation”; my use is derived from the work of René 
Girard.)  I will then offer a framework for reconciliation, one component of which will be 
meta-requisites. One of these meta-requisites will be shown to be teachings of blessing, 
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which I will define. Second, I will develop the concept of a hermeneutics of blessing, 
showing how it functions within an ethical vision of blessing. Third, I will show how a 
hermeneutics of blessing is manifest in the exegetical work of John E. Toews in relation 
to the book of Romans of the Christian New Testament. Significantly, he frames the book 
of Romans as a conflict resolving text. Fourth, I will show how Toews paradigm can be 
used to identify teachings of blessing and how these might have application in different 
contexts. 
 Allow me to position this research within the field: I am writing as a scholar-
practitioner in the field of conflict studies. I am also a practical theologian in the context 
of deep-rooted conflict and reconciliation. As such, I recognize the scandal, for some, of 
attempting to draw insights from a religious text within a largely secular field. In the light 
of this recognition, I offer the following caveat. Methodologically I am not arguing on the 
basis of the authority of a biblical text; rather I am suggesting that within the field of 
conflict studies we look for relevant insights where they can be found and that if archaic 
texts offer archetypal narratives and teachings, we should learn what we can from them. 
The results should stand on their own within the fields of conflict and peace studies; 
however, they could have a surplus of meaning for those interested in religious-based 
conflict in general and those interested in a theology of peace in particular. 
 Since I am arguing for a particular methodology, let me offer a definition so that 
we are all on the same page to start out with. “Methodology” comes from the Greek 
words meta, hodos, and logos. Meta introduces the ideas of attendant circumstances, that 
which is in relationship to something else, and that which comes after or lies behind 
(Bauer, 1958, s.v. meta). Hodos means “way,” in fact, on Greek street signs it is used as 
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the equivalent of “street” or “avenue.”  Logos speaks of reckoning or a reasoned 
approach to something. Putting these together we have the concept of methodology as a 
reasoned reflection about the way in which we proceed, including what lies behind our 
approach to doing research or discovering truth. Methodology then concerns itself with 
what it is we are trying to find out, the kinds of questions we ask in our heuristic 
endeavour, and what we do to get answers to these questions. Each discipline or field has 
well developed questions that are posed about social phenomena; for example, social 
psychology, sociology, anthropology and political science, in confronting social conflict, 
would ask questions about ethno-narratives, group dynamics, cultural values and 
governance structures respectively. I am suggesting that in the field of identity-based 
conflict and reconciliation, an interpretive framework that asks questions about how one 
grounds the impulse toward reconciliation and what principles guide its processes are 
central to its methodology. In other words, a hermeneutics of blessing will be shown to 
be methodologically significant for the study of reconciliation. With this in mind we will 
turn to a definition of and framework for reconciliation.  
 
Reconciliation 
 
Reconciliation I conceptualize as the transformation of mimetic structures of 
violence to mimetic structures of blessing. Mimetic structures are diachronic patterns in 
which the actions, orientation and attitudes of those in relational systems are mutually 
reciprocated (Redekop, 2002; note at this point that I am offering a concise summary of  
From Violence to Blessing). Within a mimetic structure of violence, parties are each 
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oriented to value the diminution of the other. They wish to hurt the other, attack the 
dignity of the other, take from the other, or get ahead at the expense of the other. 
Violence, as René Girard argues (1987), is mimetically returned with interest. Hence 
mimetic structures of violence tend to grow in intensity until one side or the other is 
vanquished; or both are sufficiently diminished that they lose energy and impetus to 
continue; or they become locked in a mutually hurting stalemate (Zartman and Faure, 
2005).  
Mimetic structures of blessing entail mutual contributions to each other’s well 
being. There is an orientation that manifests itself in attitudes of mutual respect and in 
actions that are mutually empowering. Mimetic structures of blessing are dynamic, 
constantly changing and sometimes conflictual. Because of the basic orientation toward 
blessing, conflicts are used as occasions for creativity. 
 Mimetic structures are found within relational systems. They are complex; the 
complexity can be deconstructed through the use of a theoretical framework that includes 
identity needs, mimetic desire, scapegoating, hegemonic structures, and social 
psychological concepts such as chosen traumas and chosen glories (Redekop, 2002). A 
change in mimetic structures implies a reframing of identity narratives in relation to the 
other and a new imagination of future horizons. 
 Less abstractly, reconciliation can be conceptualized as a coherent set of 
relationships among a number of elements, arranged as follows (Redekop, 2008, with 
modifications). 
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Figure 1. Reconciliation 
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Meta‐requisites
Healing
Change
Structures
Relationship
Transcendence
Sense of 
Justice
 
At the heart of reconciliation are discursive and symbolic processes, indicated by the 
diamond. These processes include presentations of narratives; eliciting and validating 
truth-claims; expressions of emotion, remorse, apology, and commitment to make 
amends; indications of forgiveness; and symbolic actions and rituals to reinforce 
transformations. In order for these to take place there are pre-requisites such as safety and 
vision, mandate and resources for reconciliation initiatives. Key result areas are 
transcendence, personal healing, a change of structures, new relationships, and a sense of 
justice. 
 Meta-requisites are those things that are connected to reconciliation, are needed 
throughout the process, at times lie behind actions taken, and play an empowering role. 
They include: 
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1. GRIT—Gradual Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction: a dance of making 
safe concessions which, if mimetically followed by the other lead to a gradual 
thawing of relationships (Osgoode, 1966). 
2. Institutions: reconciliation processes usually happen in the context of institutions 
which may range from circle and dialogue processes to quasi-legal institutions 
such as truth and reconciliation commissions. 
3. Process leadership skills: skilled third parties can expedite the various phases of 
the total process. 
4. Support from the Third Side: Ervin Staub has argued persuasively that bystanders 
can make a big difference in a conflict (1988) and William Ury has identified nine 
different roles for members of the third side, that is, a community of people not 
directly involved with the conflict (1999). 
5. Teachings of Blessing: these are stories, values, principles, analyses, and 
frameworks that establish and feed the impulse, vision, motivation and capacity to 
proceed  with reconciliation.  
We will now examine the concept of teachings of blessing more closely. 
 
Teachings of Blessing 
 Previously, I did a critical examination of the concept of teachings of  blessing by 
doing a hermeneutical circle inquiry around the Hebrew words   הכרב berikah—blessing 
and תהרו  Torah—teaching (Redekop, 2007a). The four steps to the inquiry included: 1) 
an examination of the meaning of the word in the context of the Hebrew Bible; 2) a 
hermeneutics of suspicion in which I enumerated reasons why it was inappropriate to use 
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such a concept in the field of conflict studies; 3) looking at opportunities that open up 
with the use of the concept, probing ways in which new possibilities introduced by the 
use of the word that would be lost without it; 4) returning to the meaning of the word, 
giving it a new definition for use in the field. I will provide highlights of my conclusion 
with regard to each concept. “Blessing,” I concluded,  
 
is used to connote a life-oriented, creative impulse oriented toward the mutual well-
being of Self and Other. Within a mimetic structure of blessing Self and Other feed 
one another at many different levels of reality. If blessing becomes mimetic, both 
parties are at the same time receptive and generous. Symptoms of blessing are joy, 
confidence, self-esteem, peace, dignity and respect (Redekop, 2007a, p.145). 
 
I identified other concepts associated with blessing that fill out its meaning. The root 
metaphor of berikah is the verb to kneel. The connection is that people kneel to receive a 
blessing. This indicates an attitude of receptivity reminiscent of the Taoist concept of 
ying. Receptivity, contrasted with a power orientation, yang, is an openness to receive 
from others and reciprocally a willingness to give generously. In the context of the 
Hebrew Bible, blessing is associated with land (Brueggeman, 2002; Martens, 1981) 
suggesting the need to care for the environment. The ancient Hebrew understanding of 
blessings extending through the generations resonates with Indigenous teachings that 
decisions ought to be made for the benefit of the next seven generations (Ross, 1996). 
The discursive field of blessing includes compassion, patience, mercy and forgiveness 
(Bole and others, 2004; Lederach, 1997; Volf, 2005).  
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I was initially led to the concept of “teachings” as significant when I conducted a 
structural analysis of the Exodus, an archetypal story of liberation—freedom from slavery 
to positive freedom to enter the promised land (Redekop, 1995). My question was “How 
can people who were oppressed avoid oppressing others when they get into a position of 
power?” I noted that between the time of leaving Egypt where they were slaves to 
entering Canaan was a period of 40 years during which time they received Torah 
understood as normative teachings. Examining the law codes embedded within the 
Torah, understood as the first five books of the Hebrew Bible, I discovered a number of 
teachings that addressed the matter of avoiding exploitation of slaves. Among them, for 
example was the admonition to “remember that you were slaves in Egypt” every week on 
Shabbat (Deuteronomy 5:15) The realization that Torah as teachings was important in 
personal and collective transformation led me to adopt the concept for use in 
understanding reconciliation. 
Here are some conclusions about the concept of teaching from my subsequent 
work: 
 
The concept of teaching assumes that there is something deliberate about the 
generation of appropriate value-laden insights and the passing on of these insights 
to others. If there are “teachings,” there must be teachers. The Torah was linked 
with the person of Moses who received teachings but who also taught the people. 
Insofar as the teachings helped to restore both order and mutual well-being in the 
face of harmful activity, he functioned as a judge to arbitrate; but at the same time 
with the arbitration he established precedents and demonstrated how to navigate the 
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complexities of applying principles to ambiguous contexts. Furthermore, he 
literally taught other judges (please note here that I am lifting ideas from the story 
line, this does not imply a literal uncritical reading, as I argued elsewhere, even if 
these stories are retrojected back in time they still convey a particular approach to 
life.) All this is to say that in the Hebrew Bible it is impossible to isolate the 
teachings from the teacher. That is to say that the teachings take on the value that is 
needed to impact how people live in large measure on the basis of them coming 
from particular teachers. The same point could be made in Islam in relation to 
Prophet Mohammed being the teacher both as recipient of the Qur’an as well as the 
one who brought the teachings of the Quran to life in Mecca and Medina… Given 
the basic mimetic nature of humankind, the idea that effective teachers are those 
who bring a certain presence to the teaching process but that they also model what 
the teachings are all about. Among Canada’s First Nations and Inuit peoples, elders 
play the role of teachers. In academia, professors not only teach, they model 
academic life and the value of a pursuit of truth through their research. This concept 
starts to connect with the insight regarding mediation that the presence and 
modelling action of a particular mediator can be determinative of positive outcomes 
(Redekop, 2007a, p. 139). 
 
Along with Michael Polanyi, we note that academic disciplines have rules of rightness, 
teachings if you like, that help to distinguish what is vital to the discipline from that 
which is misleading, false or spurious (1964). 
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 As we develop a self-awareness of the teachings that guide in a given endeavour, 
we have a basis for self-reflection, validation, questioning and evaluation. That is, the 
teachings help bring to light what is happening, they assist in re-framing, and they hold a 
standard by which we compare our own reality with what could potentially be the case. 
The moment of self-reflection in the light of teachings is a heuristic moment, it is a time 
of discovery of new insights, direct or inverse, and a time to open up new possibilities 
that go beyond what is included in the teachings per se but are the result of the creative 
engagement of teachings with lived reality. 
 With Thomas Mooren, we note that at least the Abrahamic religions have texts of 
violence that can be used to legitimate violence (2002). This means that the hermeneutic 
orientation becomes very important. I would like to argue for a hermeneutics of blessing 
such that the orientation of the serious interpreter of texts uses texts to find nuggets of 
truth and direction that can enhance the process of reconciliation and the creation of 
mimetic structures of blessing. We will now examine more closely what might be 
involved in a hermeneutics of blessing before examining Toews approach to Romans as 
an example of such an endeavour. 
 
Hermeneutics of Blessing 
 
 Hermeneutics is the art and science of interpreting; that is, to find meaning in 
communicative acts which may be oral, conveyed through a particular medium or which 
may result in texts. There are many technical aspects of interpretation texts resulting in 
many questions. These include questions related to language, metaphor, genre, form, 
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context, intended recipient of the communication, emotional components of the 
communication, intended impact, changes of meaning structures through time, history of 
interpretation, the connection with the interpreter, the impact on the interpreter, the 
mental models or paradigms that the interpreter uses to generate meaning, etc. These all 
have validity but for the present moment the specificity associated with them goes 
beyond what can be dealt with in this article. What we wish to begin with is the 
hermeneutical impulse which includes the question, why choose a text to interpret? 
Which text is chosen? And which questions will be answered through the hermeneutical 
exercise? 
 In response to these questions, we have already established an interest in 
reconciliation and in mimetic structures of blessing. (Reflexively, I can observe that my 
own interest in these concepts is the result of a hermeneutical exploration that has been 
described in part above.) Our heuristic quest is for something that is both practical, that 
is, associated with action, and normative, in that it highlights values. In other words, the 
interpretive impulse is of an ethical nature. Ethics we take in its teleological sense of 
having an end, a goal, a desired outcome (Ricoeur, 1992); this, recognizing a secondary 
deontological sense of having to do with principles or value statements that invoke a duty 
to abide by them. We are thinking then of an ethical vision akin to Ricoeur’s positive 
sense of utopia as an achievable vision of a practical horizon of the future (1984). In 
particular, we start with an ethical vision of blessing; that is, we hope we can find a way 
of taking action such that we can create and nurture mimetic structures of blessing—
mutually satisfying relationships. This is a particular challenge when the starting point is 
the constellation of resentment, hatred, envy, greed and other passions (emotions, backed 
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by understandings and orientation) that are concomitant with mimetic structures of 
violence (Redekop, 2002; Girard, 1990; Sites, 1990; Murphy and Hampton, 1988). 
 
Figure 2. Ethical Vision of Blessing 
Ethical Vision of Blessing
Hermeneutical
Orientation
Methodology
Heuristic
Act
Teachings
Paradigms
 
As we can see in Figure 2, the ethical vision of blessing gives a particular hermeneutical 
orientation to the endeavour. This orientation asks the question, “Is there something in 
this text that contributes to our understanding, imagination and requisite values in order 
to develop and sustain positive relationships with our Other?” This can be a very 
conscious goal. With that orientation we develop a methodology, understood as a 
deliberate reflection on the way to proceed in our hermeneutical endeavour. The 
methodology includes the kinds of questions we bring to the enterprise, including the 
broad questions around what are the mimetic structures of violence and what indicates 
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the potential for transformation and the more operational questions of author, intention, 
context, intended audience, intended impact. As we interact with the text we engage in a 
heuristic action that leads to insights (Melchin and Picard, 2008). This is a reflexive and 
reciprocal action in which we read the text and the text reads us. That is, we develop new 
realizations about ourselves as we read the text; these realizations help us mimetically 
enter into the world of the author, the text and the initial recipients. Out of this heuristic 
endeavour, we start to get insights into the very real conflict situation we face and wish to 
address—we start to find some tentative answers to the broad question of how can we 
affect a transformative process of reconciliation. These become the teachings we are 
looking for. These tentative answers then need to be scrutinized and validated by and 
with our interactions with others. They also are fed back into the heuristic enterprise for 
internal validation within the world of the text. As they become clearer, they result in 
paradigms that enable us to see and discover new aspects to reality. The paradigms, or 
higher level teachings, can then eventually inform specific actions and even action 
practices in the form of policies and programs. The very concept of a mimetic structure 
of blessing is one of these paradigmatic developments that is itself in the process of being 
validated within the field. 
 Note in the diagram above that there is a circular development in that the 
discoveries that lead to certain teachings are fed back into the hermeneutical orientation, 
helping to refine and nuance the questions that are being posed of the text.     
 The foregoing has introduced a paradigmatic framework within which we can 
place a hermeneutics of blessing. It shows that this hermeneutical impulse and orientation 
is needed to discern and formulate teachings of blessing that might motivate and guide 
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processes of reconciliation in a given context. Teachings of blessing are but one of a 
number of elements of reconciliation, but one that could be significant throughout the 
process; indeed they help to define the goal of reconciliation.  
We will now turn to the work of John E. Toews, a biblical exegete who devoted 
his academic career to a study of the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, one of the books in 
the Christian New Testament.  
 
Toews’ hermeneutics of blessing applied to Romans 
 
 The heuristic operation is depicted in Figure 3 and involves my interpretation of 
the work of John E. Toews in developing a new paradigm to interpret the letter of Paul to 
the Roman house churches around 55 CE. Drawing on a body of scholarship around this 
new paradigm he included insights from biblical scholars such as  J. C. Beker,  E. P. 
Sanders, Krister Stendahl, and N. T. Wright. In this operation, the work of Toews is 
presented as an exercise of a hermeneutics of blessing. Subsequently I will synthesize 
particular teachings of blessing from the book of Romans using the Toews paradigm. 
These teachings of blessing will be shown to have a double valence: first, they functioned 
as teachings of blessing in the first century to their primary audience; second, they can 
serve a useful purpose in the interests of reconciliation in the contemporary world. 
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Figure 3. Redekop’s Interpretation of Toews’ Hermeneutics of Blessing 
Toews as 
Interpreter
RomansHermeneutics 
of Blessing
Redekop
 
 John E. Toews is a Mennonite biblical scholar. Back in the 1970s when he did his 
doctoral studies in New Testament, most Mennonite academics were concentrating on the 
Sermon on the Mount and the Gospels in their endeavour to develop a peace theology. 
Toews thought it might be interesting to do something different—to look to the Apostle 
Paul as the grounding for a peace theology and to focus on the book of Romans in 
particular. As a responsible exegete, he mastered the history of Pauline studies and 
Romans scholarship. He then undertook his own analysis of the book of Romans (Toews, 
1977). What he discovered was quite extraordinary. 
 For those not familiar with biblical scholarship, particularly in the Protestant 
tradition, it is important to note that the book of Romans played a pivotal role in the 
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development of Martin Luther’s doctrine of justification by faith. In brief, Luther 
inherited a sin problem from his Catholic tradition. This manifested itself  in a belief that 
humans were destined for hell on account of their sinfulness but that because of Jesus 
there was respite from this prognosis of the human condition. To appropriate forgiveness 
of sins and a place in heaven, one could be justified, in Luther’s terms through faith in 
Jesus—faith alone was deemed sufficient. This became a cornerstone for subsequent 
Protestant theology for centuries after Luther. Romans was read as a theological treatise 
meant to develop this particular doctrine. Corollary to this was a negative reading of 
Judaism, which was construed as “works righteousness” based on legalism. Hence 
Romans was read in a way that offered a polemic against Judaism. This was the dominant 
paradigm (Toews, 2004, p.30). 
 Toews did a historical reconstruction and a structural analysis which introduced a 
radically different paradigm. It became clear to him that the basic problem addressed in 
Romans was a conflict between Jews and Gentiles. The earliest church in Rome was a 
network of house churches that emerged from a significant network of house synagogues. 
These synagogues included God-fearers—Gentiles who wished to participate in the life 
of the Jewish community, but did not fully convert (Toews, 2004, pp. 22-23). Christianity 
had not yet established an identity separate from that of Judaism but the house church 
gatherings of followers of Jesus included God-fearers and other Gentiles who were 
attracted to this movement. Romans 16 is the conclusion of the book of Romans in which 
Paul greets each of the house groups by the name of the person in whose house they 
meet. There is an extensive list, indicating a large number of house churches. 
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Significant debates were taking place concerning the degree to which Gentiles 
had to become Jews first before being part of these early churches, circumcision being a 
significant point. Within this network of churches were many conflicts over ethics, 
lifestyle, diet, sacred days, and basic theological understandings. People had woven 
different customs into their identities; to forge a new community with people tied to 
radically different lifestyles was a major challenge. Paul, recognizing both the strategic 
importance of a church in Rome as well as its vulnerability to falling apart because of 
internal conflicts, wrote his longest letter to the Romans. It more than any other has been 
considered the best developed theological statement coming from Paul. 
 The new paradigm advocated by Toews posits that Romans was meant to provide 
a framework for Jews and Gentiles to be part of a new inclusive community. This can be 
seen in the structure and the themes. The argument of Paul, as developed by Toews, runs 
something like this. God is presented as having the twin characteristics of being angry 
about things that are not right in the world and being passionate about making them right. 
The anger is directed at both Gentiles and Jews; neither group can claim perfection and 
neither can pull moral rank. The sense of things going wrong is linked to a force field of 
sin that pulls people into destructive ways of being. God’s transformative action 
(righteousness of God) is directed at both groups to their respective benefit; hence, in this 
enlarged frame of reference, they are in a similar state in relation to God. This argument 
is made in Romans 1 to 8 and sets up the central argument according to Toews. 
 The problematique leading to the conflict includes a context in which the Jews 
have an awareness of a covenant with God, that is, a relationship of solidarity in which 
they are to be agents of goodness within the world. As part of this covenant, they are to 
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live according to the Torah. As they define a Torah-oriented lifestyle, it sets them apart 
from the surrounding community. Their lifestyle becomes a boundary marker that sets 
out their identity. A key problem for Paul, who would like to see an inclusive community, 
becomes the issue of how to frame the teachings (Torah) and the self-understanding of 
the Jewish followers of Jesus such that Gentiles will be welcome without becoming Jews 
first. On the other hand, how can he convince the Gentiles to truly honour the Jewish 
heritage within which the Jesus movement is emerging? Having established that both are 
susceptible to the force-field of sin as well as the transformative work of God, Paul uses a 
metaphor to advance his argument. 
 In Romans 9 to 11, Paul uses the metaphor of a tree to create a new level of 
consciousness concerning the respective identities of the Jews and Gentiles in the Jesus 
movement. The tree represents Judaism. It is a strong and healthy tree. It is not cut down 
or destroyed. Rather, it is honoured. However, a new branch is grafted in—the Gentile 
branch. It is the reality of the life and work of Jesus that makes this possible. By using 
this metaphor, Paul argues to the Gentiles that they need to respect the life-giving 
tradition of the Jews. The Jews for their part have to welcome the Gentile branch as an 
integral part of the now expanded tree. Both are part of the same organism. But how can 
they make this work? Each group has its own baggage—baggage that creates conflict 
between the two groups. 
 Romans 12 to 15 is identified by Toews as the set of teachings that show both the 
Gentiles and Jews of the movement how practically they can flourish together. We will 
return to this text in the following section. 
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 Framing the work of Toews as exemplifying a hermeneutics of blessing, we can 
make the following observations. First, this new paradigm enables us to see the degree to 
which there was a social identity-based conflict in first century Rome and the creativity 
of the Apostle Paul in addressing it. Second, this work shows how a previous reading of 
Paul provided a paradigm among Christians that depreciated the religious standing of 
Jewish people; conversely Toews’ reading provides an impetus among Christians to 
honour the Jewish tradition in a new way. Third, by developing this particular paradigm, 
Toews raises the question, How exactly did Paul creatively address the conflict and what 
can we learn from his efforts? A question we will now attend to in the fourth section.  
 
Teachings of blessing in Romans 
 
 We are now ready to identify teachings of blessing in Romans. As is shown in 
Figure 4, this happens through a reflection on the book of Romans based on the Toews 
paradigm but with a particular question in mind: what are the teachings of blessing within 
this ancient text? More practically, how did Paul manage to set forth a framework and 
agenda that kept a fledging movement intact?   
The teachings of blessing identified in this section are of a threefold nature. First, 
we will look at Paul’s reconciling methodology. Second, we will look at the teachings on 
Torah as an instructive dimension of Paul’s approach. Third, we will identify the specific 
principles that Paul developed in Roman 12 to 15. Finally, in relation to these principles, 
I will describe some action research undertaken to validate these as teachings of blessing. 
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Figure 4. Generating and Validating Teachings of Blessing 
Redekop RomansToews’ Paradigm of Blessing
Teachings 
of 
Blessing Workshop
Class
 
Paul as a Third Party Neutral—His Reconciling Methodology 
 In analyzing Romans as a conflict transformation document, one can discover a 
number of methodological elements that point to Paul’s passion to bring the two sides 
together. First, he identified with both groups, saying in the first chapter that he is a 
debtor to both. Second, Paul shows commonality between them as has been pointed out. 
Third, the language of “all” is used 68 times throughout the book in an attempt to be 
inclusive (Redekop, 1980). Fourth, the central metaphorical argument of the tree becomes 
a creative way of developing a new consciousness. Fifth, as will emerge in the section 
below, Paul is attentive to the vulnerabilities of the weakest members of the movement. 
 
Teachings about Teachings 
 A very tricky point for Paul was how to regard Torah. For Jewish people, Torah 
is at the center of their faith and has different valences (Neusner, 1993; Martens, 1981). 
First, it designates the first five books of the Hebrew Bible known traditionally as the 
books of Moses. Second, it refers to the instructions given to Moses during the 40 years 
in the wilderness. Third, it designates eternal principles; there is a Jewish tradition that 
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Torah existed before the creation of the world. Fourth, the concept of oral Torah 
designates the living tradition that has been passed down through a community that has 
lived continuously since the written Torah was established. Fifth, Torah is associated 
with wisdom, as providing the source of insights needed to live well. Within Judaism, 
there has been constant questioning and debate about how to interpret the Torah and what 
it means to live by its teachings.  
 Given this high regard for Torah on the one hand, and the manner in which it was 
interpreted to create boundaries, on the other, Paul was left in quite a predicament. If he 
only affirmed everything in the Torah as it was understood and practiced, he could not 
reconcile the inclusion of Gentiles into a community still dominated by Jews and rooted 
in the Jewish tradition. If he dismissed it, he would be undercutting the ground of his own 
being. There are three ways in which he works his way through this paradox. 
 First, Paul makes a distinction in his use of the Greek word nomos, which is the 
word used to translate the Hebrew Torah. It is the word for law; this in itself is 
misleading because it misses the connotation of teaching embedded within Torah. When 
Paul is critical of how the Torah is used, he refers to it simply as nomos, without a 
definite article. When Paul is speaking of the Torah as a gift from the Divine, he uses a 
definite article, ho, referring to the nomos. Periodically he asks rhetorically, “Does this 
mean that the nomos is abrogated?” He then answers with the most emphatic negative 
possible in Greek.  
Second, Paul argues that something that is essentially good can be subverted by 
the force-field of sin and death. This subversion he sees happening when the Torah is 
used to substantiate violence through a legalism that removes principle and practice from 
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the spirit of Torah, which is good and pure. In other words, he exposes a hermeneutics of 
violence and argues for a hermeneutics of blessing when it comes to Torah. His same 
arguments could be used against those who in later Christian contexts used his very 
words to develop a new kind of legalism that was used to justify such things as Anti-
Semitism.  
Third, as we will see below, Paul synthesized from the Torah a number of 
teachings meant to engender positive orientations, values, and attitudes among the people 
to whom his letter was addressed. Paul’s methodology could be useful in deconstructing 
the subversive way in which religion is used to legitimate acts of violence (terrorism) by 
people who frame their motivation in legalistic terms, which demonize an Other 
(Juergensmeyer, 2001). 
 
Practical Teachings of Blessing—Principles which Paul Developed 
 The overall point Paul is working towards is expressed in Romans 14:19. In the 
Jerusalem Bible it is expressed: “So let us adopt any custom that leads to peace and our 
mutual improvement.” In the NRSV it is translated, “Let us then pursue what makes for 
peace and for mutual upbuilding.” In Greek the two phrases in this verse are Eirenes 
diokomen which means eagerly pursue peace and ta tes oikodomes tes eis allelous 
meaning literally pursue the things that build up one another. The first key word, 
oikodomes, introduces a root metaphor connoting initial house construction or 
renovation; in either case it makes things better. Allelous is the reflexive pronoun 
referring to one another; it implies mutuality. Let us look now at a series of teachings 
within the text—teachings to build up one another. In other words, we are identifying 
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teachings that promote mimetic structures of blessing from Romans 12-15:6. I will 
synthesize the themes as they emerge consecutively. 
1. Recognize that your actions are to be directed toward a higher good. (12:1) 
2. Do not let your minds be mimetically moulded according to current trends in 
thinking but transform your way of thinking through creative renewal. (12:2) 
3. Do not be hyper-concerned about your own importance but think reasonably 
about your distinct role and gifts in relation to the community as a whole. 
(12:3,4-8) 
4. Establish structures of mutual reciprocity around care and recognition. (12:10) 
5. Participate in meeting the needs of others. (12:13) 
6. Delight in welcoming those different from you into your homes. (12:13) 
7. Say upbuilding things about those who are working against you (persecuting, 
scapegoating, picking on you.) (12:14) 
8. Show empathy to one another through a range of emotions from celebration to 
mourning. (12:15) 
9. Mimesis of evil is out; do not return harm or bitterness when it has been 
directed to you. (12:17; 13:8-10) 
10. Thoughtfully look out for the well-being of all people. (12:17b) 
11. As much as is possible, respecting the fact that relationships are two-sided, 
live peacefully with all people. (12:18) 
12. Do not take revenge; find a safe place to put your anger; feed your enemies. 
(12:19) 
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13. Don’t let mimetic structures of violence overtake you but defeat these 
structures with good. (12:21) 
14. Honour your civic responsibilities. (13:1-7)  
15. Fulfill the Torah by practicing love. (13:8-10) 
16. Do not judge the thoughts, action and lifestyles of others. (14:1-19) 
17. Those who are strong ought to assist those with certain weaknesses to bear 
their burdens. (15:1-2) 
Two particular points of contention addressed by the principles were eating food offered 
to idols and honouring specific feast days. For Paul, there is nothing intrinsically wrong 
with food offered to idols. Food is food. Idols have no power. Materially there is no 
reason why this could not be done. However, for those coming from a Pagan environment 
this is a big deal. Hence Paul argues that out of respect for those who might be offended 
it is best not to indulge when in their presence. Similarly he argues for mutual respect 
when it comes to feast days. 
 
Validating the Teachings 
The challenge for me was to see whether a hermeneutics of blessing could be used 
with a group of Jews, Christians, Muslims and those not committed to any theistic faith to 
discern and validate teachings of blessing derived from the New Testament to their 
mutual heuristic and personal benefit. This involved first creating a dialogical space, then 
presenting a framework, and then presenting a list of teachings derived from Romans 12-
15 and asking them to engage in dialogue on these teachings. This list was presented to a 
group of about twenty people in a workshop at the Colloquium on Violence and Religion 
             A Hermeneutics of Blessing  
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 17, Number 1 
‐ 260 ‐ 
 
at Purdue University in June 2002. After talking about the list in pairs participants voted 
for the top three teachings. A similar process was used with three different classes of  
graduate students studying conflict resolution. Within the four groups were Jews, 
Muslims, Christians and non-theists. In each case people participated willingly in the 
exercise after receiving the introductory information presented in the case study. These 
cases show that people from divergent backgrounds were prepared to engage on a set of 
teachings drawn from the Christian Testament. The results of their votes are presented in 
the table below. 
Table 1. Top 5 Teachings from Each Group 
Top 5 Teachings from Each Group Group 1 
Rank (votes) 
Group 2 
Rank (votes) 
Group 3 
Rank (votes) 
Group 4 
Rank (votes) 
a. Fulfill the Torah by practicing love. 
(13:8-10) 
 
1 (8)   2(3) 
b. Do not let your minds be mimetically 
moulded according to current trends in 
thinking, but transform your way of 
thinking through creative renewal. (12:2) 
2 (6) 1 (9)  2(3) 
c. Mimesis of evil is out; do not return 
harm or bitterness when it has been 
directed to you. (12:17; 13:8-10) 
3 (5)    
d. Do not take revenge, find a safe place 
to put your anger; feed your 
enemies.(12:19) 
4 (4) 3 (8)  2(3) 
e. Say upbuilding things about those who 
are working against you (persecuting, 
scapegoating, picking on you.) (12:14) 
4 (4) 4 (7)  1(7) 
f. Do not judge the thoughts, action and 
lifestyles of others. (14:1-19) 
 
 1 (9) 1(7)  
g. Do not be hyper-concerned about your 
own importance but think reasonably 
about your distinct role and gifts in 
relation to the community as a whole. 
(12:3,4-8) 
 4 (7)  2(3) 
h. Those who are strong ought to assist 
those with certain weaknesses to bear 
  2(6)  
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their burdens. 
i. Show empathy to one another through 
a range of emotion from celebration to 
mourning. 
  3(4)  
j. As much as is possible, respecting the 
fact that relationships are two-sided, live 
peacefully with all people. 
  3(4)  
k. Recognize that your actions are to be 
directed toward a higher good. 
  4(3)  
l. Participate in meeting the needs of 
others. 
  4(3)  
m. Don’t let mimetic structures of 
violence overtake you but defeat these 
structures with good. 
   2(3) 
 
 The top seven teachings, when considering all of the results, are all directed 
toward establishing and maintaining mimetic structures of blessing. Of these, a,b, and g 
concentrated on the Self; f concentrated on the Other; c,d, and e concentrated on 
responses to conflictual dynamics. Of those concentrating on the Self, “b” could be seen 
as a corrective to aliuscentricism, an over-emphasis on the Other, and “g” as a corrective 
to egocentricism, an over emphasis of the Self. Of the three that the three groups have in 
common, “b” is inclined to develop a strong healthy sense of Self and “d” and “e” 
provide one negative and one positive response to the kind of behaviour that would 
normally prompt mimetic violence. Significantly, the first group voted for the affirmation 
of love as central to Torah. Taken as a whole, these eight teachings, if acted upon would 
help to build, maintain and strengthen mimetic structures of blessing. 
 At the end of the first process, one member of the first group mentioned that the 
session had been nourishing to his heart, to his whole being. At the end of the second 
process, one of the participants asked about the place of people outside of Religion. Her 
question prompted an affirmation of those without a belief in God who care about the 
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earth (cf. Harrington, 1985) and the potential for finding teachings of blessing within 
texts and stories generated by non-theists.  
 
Relevance to Reconciliation 
 
 I have made the argument that those interested in furthering reconciliation would 
do well to exercise a hermeneutics of blessing to generate teachings of blessing. This 
approach could be used with any text relevant to a given context. Where religion is 
involved in a conflict, this principle should be brought to bear on the study of religious 
texts. Doing so would help to elicit the potentially positive contribution of religion 
(Appleby, 2000; Bole, and others 2004; Johnstone & Sampson, 1994; Sampson & 
Lederach, Silva, 2001). What is significant is that an eirenic text written in one context 
can be shown to produce positive results at many levels when interpreted with a 
hermeneutics of blessing. In this case, the book of Romans, which was shown to address 
an identity conflict in the first century, can be interpreted to undergird Jewish-Christian 
dialogue in the twenty-first century and argue against Christian anti-Semitism. It can 
generate principles that appeal to people of many different backgrounds, showing the 
potential for what works in one context to work in others as well. To further corroborate 
this point, it would be interesting to see how these particular teachings could be 
constructively drawn upon in a conflict situation. Also worthy of further study would be 
to show how conflict resolvers follow a methodology similar to that of the Apostle Paul. 
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